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Abstract

Multi-agent learning has been widely used to solve real-world problems in a wide
range of industrial and commercial domains, such as manufacturing/business process control, telecommunication systems, traﬃc and transportation management
and electronic commerce. In multi-agent learning, the concurrent distributed learning processes can make the learning environment non-stationary for each individual
learner. Learning to achieve eﬃcient coordinated/cooperative behaviors in such a
non-stationary environment is a diﬃcult problem, especially when agents also need
to deal with incomplete information. This thesis investigates the challenging issues
in multi-agent learning in a number of diﬀerent environments so that eﬃcient coordinated/cooperative behaviors can be achieved by the agents in these environments.
Speciﬁcally, this thesis
1. studies coordinated multi-agent learning in loosely coupled multi-agent systems. Two coordinated multi-agent learning approaches are proposed to enable agents to learn coordinated behaviors by exploiting sparse interactions
and diﬀerent levels of independent relationships among agents in loosely coupled multi-agent systems. Unlike most existing approaches, the proposed approaches do not require agents to have any prior knowledge about the domain
structure or assumptions such as global observability of the environment. Experimental results show that agents using the proposed approaches can learn
eﬃcient coordinated behaviors in domains of diﬀerent sizes;
2. studies multi-agent learning for the emergence of social norms in networked
multi-agent systems. A collective multi-agent learning framework is proposed
to study the impact of agent local collective learning on the emergence of social
norms in a number of diﬀerent settings in terms of agent heterogeneities and
topological varieties. The framework models the opinion aggregation process in
human decision making. This feature makes it diﬀerent from all the existing
v

sequential learning frameworks in MAL for norm emergence. Experimental
results reveal some signiﬁcant insights into the manipulation and control of
norm emergence in networked multi-agent systems achieved through agents’
local collective learning behaviors; and
3. investigates emotions in multi-agent learning to enhance cooperation in social
dilemmas. A two-layered emotional multi-agent learning framework is proposed to endow agents with internal cognitive and emotional capabilities that
can drive these agents to learn reciprocal behaviors in social dilemmas. Experimental results reveal that diﬀerent ways of appraising emotions and various
network topologies have signiﬁcant impacts on agent learning behaviors in the
proposed framework, and under certain circumstances, full cooperation can be
achieved among the agents.
In summary, this thesis studies multi-agent learning of coordination and cooperation in a variety of complex environments. Experimental results demonstrate
the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of the proposed multi-agent learning approaches and
frameworks in those environments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the development of new technologies in computer science and telecommunications, today’s world has witnessed numerous examples of complex systems, ranging
from the ubiquitous internet and social networks, to the traﬃc and transportation
systems. Such systems are usually large, distributed and unpredictable, and also
need to operate in dynamic and heterogeneous environments. Multi-Agent Systems
(MASs) have been widely used to conceptualise, model and solve tasks and problems arising in these systems. The complexity of the tasks in these practical systems,
however, makes it diﬃcult or even impossible for system designers to formulate an
eﬃcient agent behavior in advance. Instead, agents must discover solutions on their
own through learning from interaction experience in order to be ﬂexible, robust and
capable of adapting to dynamic environments. Multi-Agent Learning (MAL) provides a promising paradigm to study how agents can learn to achieve satisfactory behaviors in complex environments. The main problem in MAL is that the concurrent
multiple learning processes can make the learning environment non-stationary for
each individual learner. Learning to achieve coordinated/cooperative behaviors in
such a non-stationary environment is a challenging problem, especially when agents
also need to deal with incomplete information caused either by their communication
constraints or by their observability limits.
The purpose of this thesis is to study and develop MAL solutions to facilitate
coordination and cooperation among agents in diﬀerent kinds of MASs. Section 1.1
of this chapter gives an overview of MASs. Section 1.2 gives a basic description of
MAL. Section 1.3 lays out the three research issues and the objectives of this thesis.
Section 1.4 outlines the contributions of this thesis. Finally, Section 1.5 explains the
structure of this thesis.

1

1.1. Multi-Agent Systems

1.1

2

Multi-Agent Systems

Agent technology has been widely used to solve many real-world problems in various industrial and commercial applications, such as manufacturing/business process
control [Lei09, MP11], telecommunication systems [Mit00], traﬃc and transportation management [CC10, Baz09] and electronic commerce [HJL03]. Although agent
technology has been extensively studied and widely used, there is no universally
accepted deﬁnition of the term agent. Nevertheless, most researchers have agreed
that an agent is a computer system that is situated in an environment and is capable of autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its design objectives [Woo08]. This deﬁnition is the one that can best highlight the attributes that
an agent is expected to have, including autonomy, reactivity, pro-activeness and
social ability [JSW98].
MASs are used to refer to all types of systems composed of multiple autonomous
agents that work cooperatively or competitively to complete activities they are not
able to accomplish individually [Wei99]. Research in MASs is concerned with the
construction of complex systems consisting of agents that can have diﬀerent or even
conﬂicting goals, and focuses on the coordination/cooperation of the behaviors of
the agents in such systems. The use of MASs to model, simulate and solve realworld problems has been receiving increasingly interest because many real-world
systems can be formulated as a group of spatially distributed or functionally separated entities (represented as agents), and coordination/cooperation of these agents
can enable them to work more eﬃciently. In particular, the use of MASs can exhibit
advantages such as the ability to provide eﬃciency, robustness and scalability, and
to solve distributed problems [Woo08, JSW98].

1.2

Multi-Agent Learning

Although agents in MASs can usually be preprogrammed with behaviors that have
been deﬁned in advance, it is often necessary that agents learn new behaviors themselves in order to gradually improve the performance of the whole system [SV00]. In
fact, learning is a fundamental attribute of the intelligence of agents. This is because
the complexity in practical MASs makes it diﬃcult or even impossible for system
designers to formulate an eﬃcient agent behavior in advance, particularly when designers cannot anticipate all situations that the agents might encounter. Moreover,
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to handle frequently changing requirements in dynamic environments, agents must
discover solutions on their own through learning from interaction experience in order
to be ﬂexible, robust and capable of adapting to such dynamic environments.
Learning in a multi-agent context, or simply referred to as MAL, has recently
gained a great deal of interest in the MAS research community [SPG07, PL05, San07,
Gor07, Sto07, BBDS08, HTP+ 06]. MAL, which uses techniques and concepts from
areas such as artiﬁcial intelligence, game theory, psychology, cognition and sociology,
provides a promising paradigm to study how agents can learn to achieve satisfactory
behaviors in complex environments.

1.2.1

Advantages of Multi-Agent Learning

MAL has the potential to solve many real-world problems because it can provide additional advantages that cannot be seen in single-agent learning. These advantages
include:
∙ the increase of eﬃciency by exploiting the decentralised structure
of tasks

In MAL, the learning process can be sped up when agents exploit the decentralised structure of the task. This is especially the case in domains where the
overall task can be decomposed into several independent subtasks that can be
solved by separate agents with particular skills and capabilities;
∙ the increase of eﬃciency by sharing learning information

In MAL, agents can learn eﬃcient behaviors not only through trial-and-error
interactions with the environment, but also through sharing instantaneous information such as episodic experience and learnt knowledge [BBDS08]. In
this way, all agents can beneﬁt and therefore the tasks can be solved faster
and better. For instance, agents can exchange information using communication [Tan93], skilled agents may serve as teachers for learners [TT13], or
learners may watch and imitate the skilled agents [PB03];

∙ the increase of robustness

In MAL, when some agents fail, other agents can take over the tasks of these
broken agents. This implies that MAL inherently has the attributes of selfhealing and self-management, and therefore, it is more fault-tolerant and robust than single-agent learning; and
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∙ the increase of scalability

In MAL, considering social and cognitive capabilities of agents during learning
allows an easy insertion of new agents into the system so as to increase the
degree of scalability.

1.2.2

Applications of Multi-Agent Learning

Due to the above mentioned advantages, MAL has been successfully applied to
a variety of virtual as well as real-life domains ranging from distributed control,
multi-robot systems and resource management to automated trading [BBDS08].
∙ Distributed Control

Distributed control is one typical application of MASs, in which a set of autonomous, interacting controllers (agents) act in parallel on the same process (environment). MAL has been widely used to solve distributed control problems due to its decentralised learning processes. Typical distributed
control domains where MAL has been applied include traﬃc (signals) control [BGS10, ALUK10, Baz09] and power network control [DH10, SWMR99].

∙ Multi-robot systems

Multi-robot systems are one of the most popular application domains of MAL
[YG04]. In this type of applications, robots use MAL to acquire skills of different complexities, ranging from basic behaviors such as navigation [YZR11,
YZR12] and pursuit [ISK03, KHBV05] to complex behaviors such as cooperative target observation [Tou00] or playing soccer [SSK05, KS10].

∙ Resource Management

Resource management occurs in many domains such as web services, the
grid and other distributed systems. MAL is well suited for solving resource
management problems especially in open and dynamic environments such as
agent-based grid systems, because introducing learning allows the system to
adapt to dynamics caused by changes of resource capacities, resource failures,
or the introduction of new agents into the system. In particular, MAL has
been applied to distributed task allocation [TJDB07, ZLS09, Ven07, GCL05],
network routing [PS02, BL94, WW06] and workload scheduling and balancing [WXZL11, SST95, BC96].
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∙ Automated Trading

Intelligent agents are a major technique used in electronic markets. Automated
trading provides a fertile research ﬁeld for MAL [NJ06, CJ04, HT08, YRZ13].
In this type of competitive circumstances, agents need to learn how to adapt
themselves to changes of the opponents and/or the environment in order to
achieve a satisfactory result.

1.2.3

Why Is Multi-Agent Learning Challenging

Generally speaking, MAL to achieve satisfactory agent behaviors is challenging because of two main reasons: the non-stationary learning environment and incomplete
learning information.
∙ The non-stationary learning environment

In single-agent scenarios, there is always an explicit learning goal for the learn-

ing agent. The learner explores its environment, and while doing so, improves
its behavior. Thus, traditional machine learning techniques are more applicable to guarantee convergence to the optimal policy assuming suﬃcient learning
cycles and a stationary environment. Situations change with multiple learners
in that the learners must adapt their behaviors concurrently with other colearners. This co-adaptation and the concurrent multiple learning processes
can make the learning environment non-stationary for each individual learner.
Dynamics in such a non-stationary learning environment can cause the learning
goal of a learner to change continuously, making MAL into a “moving-target
learning” problem [BBDS08]. This is a signiﬁcant violation of the basic assumptions behind most traditional machine learning techniques adopted in
single-agent learning research.
∙ Incomplete learning information

Agents in MAL not only conduct their learning processes in a non-stationary
learning environment, but also need to deal with incomplete information about
domain structures or other co-learning agents. Learning with incomplete information can be caused either by communication constraints or by observability
limits of agents. This means that agents must use limited information to
reason about other agents’ possible actions in order to achieve eﬃcient coordinated/cooperative behaviors.

1.3. Research Issues and Objectives of This Thesis
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Research Issues and Objectives of This Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to study and develop MAL solutions to facilitate coordination and cooperation among agents in a number of diﬀerent MASs. Speciﬁcally,
this thesis focuses on three challenging issues in current MAL research. They are
(1) coordinated MAL in loosely coupled MASs, (2) MAL for the emergence of social
norms and (3) MAL for achieving cooperation in social dilemmas.
1. Coordinated MAL in loosely coupled MASs
In loosely coupled MASs, sparse interactions and diﬀerent levels of independent
relationships among agents can conﬁne coordinated behaviors to some speciﬁc parts of the environment. Agents, therefore, only need to consider other
agents’ information for coordination when necessary. Existing approaches to
coordinated MAL in loosely coupled MASs are based on a number of assumptions. These assumptions include agents’ prior knowledge about the domain
structure, agents’ full observability of the joint-states and/or joint-actions of
other agents and agents’ individual learnt policies. These assumptions cannot always be met in practice, thus heavily conﬁning the applications of these
approaches in real-world domains. How to develop eﬃcient coordinated MAL
approaches without these assumptions is a challenging issue in MAL research.
2. MAL for the emergence of social norms
Social norms have been shown to be an eﬃcient tool to facilitate coordination among agents by restricting the action choices of the agents to certain
prespeciﬁed ones. MAL has been shown to be an eﬃcient mechanism for
the emergence of social norms. Current research in MAL for norm emergence,
however, is based on simple sequential interaction protocols, in which an agent
must interact randomly with another agent in the population or in the neighborhood and this agent learns directly from the interaction. These interaction
protocols simplify real-life situations when individuals can collectively make
a decision from multiple alternatives. How to model this kind of collective
decision making in MAL in order to emerge robust and eﬃcient social norms
is an important issue in MAL research.
3. MAL for achieving cooperation in social dilemmas
Learning to achieve cooperation in social dilemmas is a challenging issue in
MAL research. Without extra mechanisms or assumptions, directly applying
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naive MAL approaches in social dilemmas will end up with convergence to the
Nash equilibrium of mutual defection. The mutual defection outcome occurs
due to the pure rationality in traditional MAL approaches, in which agents
learn based on what they receive directly from the environment and adopt the
best-response actions for interactions. One way to facilitate cooperation in
social dilemmas is to endow agents with certain social and cognitive capabilities
that can drive these agents to achieve more rational and eﬃcient behaviors.
Emotions have been shown to be an important heuristic to assist humans’
bounded rationality for an eﬀective decision making, and play a fundamental
role in learning by eliciting physiological signals that bias humans’ behaviors
toward maximising reward and minimising punishment. How to incorporate
emotions into MAL in order to achieve cooperation among agents in social
dilemmas is a challenging problem in MAL research.
Focusing on these research issues, this thesis has the following three objectives.
1. Objective 1: to develop sophisticated coordinated MAL approaches in loosely
coupled MASs so that eﬃcient coordinated behaviors of agents can be achieved
without the assumptions required in the existing approaches.
2. Objective 2: to design an MAL mechanism that is capable of modeling
the collective learning process in human decision making so that robust and
eﬃcient social norms can emerge in agent societies.
3. Objective 3: to investigate the importance of emotions in MAL to modify
agent rational behaviors during learning in order to achieve cooperation in
social dilemmas.

1.4

Contributions of This Thesis

Focusing on the three research issues and objectives, this thesis makes the following
three contributions.
∙ Two coordinated MAL approaches in loosely coupled MASs

Two coordinated MAL approaches are proposed to enable agents to learn

where and how to coordinate their behaviors in loosely coupled MASs. The
ﬁrst one is an oﬀ-line learning approach in terms of learning where and how
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to coordinate agents’ behaviors separately. This approach decomposes the
learning process into two sup-processes eﬃciently: independent learning in
uncoordinated states and coordinated learning in coordinated states. The second one is an on-line learning approach in terms of learning where and how
to coordinate agents’ behaviors concurrently. This approach enables agents
to learn how to make a trade-oﬀ between a single-agent learning process and
a coordinated learning process through dynamic adaptation of the estimation
of independent relationships among agents. Both approaches require neither
prior knowledge about the domain structure nor assumptions about the learning agents. This feature sets the proposed approaches apart from most existing
approaches in related work and render them potentially suitable for wider practical applications. Experimental results show that the proposed approaches
can reduce the computational complexity signiﬁcantly compared with a centralised learning approach and achieve a better performance by improving the
average reward compared with an uncoordinated learning approach.
∙ A collective MAL framework for the emergence of social norms in
networked MASs

A collective MAL framework is proposed to study the impact of agent local
collective learning behaviors on the emergence of social norms in networked
MASs. The framework, which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the paired learning
framework that has been adopted in most previous studies, imitates the opinion aggregation process in human decision making, and models the formation
and evolution process of opinions, conventions and rules in human societies.
Extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate the framework with respect
to diﬀerent network topologies, learning strategies and numbers of actions,
and the inﬂuence of non-learning agents. Experimental results reveal some
signiﬁcant insights into the manipulation and control of norm emergence in
networked MASs achieved through local collective learning behaviors.
∙ A two-layered emotional MAL framework for cooperation in spatial
social dilemmas

A two-layered emotional MAL framework is proposed to study the emergence
of cooperation in spatial social dilemmas. The framework captures two fundamental variables in the appraisal of emotions: individual wellbeing and social fairness, and presents an explicit instantiation of the structural model of
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emotion appraisal to derive emotions based on these two appraisal variables.
The emotional MAL framework models the human emotional reaction process by using two contradictory emotional cues to compete with each other in
an inner-layer learning process. The emotional MAL framework can endow
agents with internal cognitive and emotional capabilities that can drive these
agents to learn reciprocal behaviors in social dilemmas. Experimental results
reveal that diﬀerent ways of appraising emotions and various network topologies have signiﬁcant impacts on agent learning behaviors, and under certain
circumstances, full cooperation among the agents can be achieved.

1.5

The Structure of This Thesis

The remaining chapters of this thesis are organised as follows.
Chapter 2 reviews the current literature on MAL, in particular, in regard to
the three research issues of this thesis: coordinated MAL, MAL for norm emergence
and MAL for achieving cooperation in social dilemmas.
Chapter 3 introduces two approaches to coordinated MAL by exploiting the
sparse interactions and diﬀerent levels of independent relationships among agents in
loosely coupled MASs.
Chapter 4 presents a collective learning framework for the emergence of social
norms in order to study the impact of agent local collective learning behaviors on
the emergence of social norms in networked MASs.
Chapter 5 proposes a two-layered emotional MAL framework in order to study
the emergence of cooperation in spatial social dilemmas.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a summary of its contributions and directions of the future work.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.1 gives a general review of
current MAL research. Section 2.2 gives a detailed review of the current research
in coordinated MAL. Section 2.3 provides a detailed review of the research in MAL
for norm emergence. Finally, Section 2.4 gives a detailed review of the MAL for
achieving cooperation in social dilemmas.

2.1

An Overview of Multi-Agent Learning

MAL has become an increasingly important topic in MAS research. In recent years,
several overview articles have been published to lay out the state-of-the-art techniques and open issues in MAL research. In the important paper [SPG07], “If
multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?” published in the Journal
of Artiﬁcial Intelligence in 2007, Shoham et al. launched a discussion regarding
the deﬁnitions, goals and evaluation criteria in MAL. Based on a review of current
techniques in MAL in terms of game theory, artiﬁcial intelligence and regret minimisation, this paper proposed that (1) MAL is not only a technically but also a
conceptually challenging research issue, (2) the current evaluation criterion of converging to an equilibrium has not been justiﬁed, and (3) there are ﬁve paradigms for
the current work in MAL, which are “computational”, “descriptive”, “normative”,
“prescriptive cooperative” and “prescriptive non-cooperative”.
These ﬁve paradigms are described as follows.
(1) “Computational”: This paradigm views MAL as an iterative way of computing the properties of games such as the Nash equilibrium.
(2) “Descriptive”: This paradigm is to determine how agents make decisions and
how their decisions can be predicted.
10
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(3) “Normative”: This paradigm is to determine which sets of learning algorithms
are in equilibrium with each other and under what circumstances.
(4) “Prescriptive, cooperative”: This paradigm is to design MAL approaches
to maximise the value of a global reward function achieved by the joint policy
of all agents in a distributed learning environment.
(5) “Prescriptive, non-cooperative”: This paradigm is to design MAL approaches
to maximise an individual reward in repeated interactions.
Shoham et al.’s paper [SPG07] caused a ﬁerce discussion in MAL research. Tuyls
and Parsons [TP07] discussed the ﬁve paradigms proposed by Shoham et al. from
the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Fudenberg et al. [FL07] commented on
the relevance and relative importance of the ﬁve paradigms from an economics perspective. In [San07], Sandholm laid out a reﬁnement of Shoham et al.’s taxonomy of
paradigms, with problems and suggested directions identiﬁed within each paradigm.
Gordon [Gor07] proposed two additional paradigms, “modeling” and “design”, to
cover the problems, which are needed to be considered before designing a learning
algorithm in a multi-agent context. Mannor et al. [MS07] joined in the discussion
by presenting challenges which arise in engineering applications and discussing the
potential appeal of MAL to meet these challenges. In addition, they highlighted the
diﬀerences in underlying assumptions and research concerns between the engineering applications and the economic game theory. The most confronting statement
came from Peter Stone’s paper “Multiagent learning is not the answer, it is the
question.” [Sto07], in which the author argued that the way in which MAL could be
usefully applied in complex domains was still a large open question.
Because of its strong connections with a variety of disciplines including game
theory, artiﬁcial intelligence, cognition and sociology, MAL research can be carried
out from very distinct perspectives, and the motivation and corresponding criterion
to evaluate MAL approaches can also vary. Although the paradigms proposed by
Shoham et al. provide a way for classifying current MAL research, there are several
other paradigms for categorising MAL research. For example, based on the techniques used, MAL research can be classiﬁed into two subsets: Reinforcement Learning (RL) [SB98] methods, which estimate explicit value functions, and stochastic
search methods such as Evolutionary Computation (EC) [TP07] and gradient ascent search [BP03], which explore directly the space of agent behaviors; Based on
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the assumptions about agents’ prior knowledge of the task, an MAL approach can
be model-based when the task model is available to the agent, or model-free when
such a task model is unavailable; Based on the assumptions about the agent’s inputs, an MAL approach can be one that requires the agents to observe the actions
and/or rewards of other agents.
In the current literature, there is a widely adopted taxonomy for the classiﬁcation of MAL research based on the tasks targeted by the MAL approaches. There
are some review papers which discuss MAL from three perspectives for solving 1)
cooperative, 2) competitive, or 3) mixed tasks. The most comprehensive survey
was done by Busoniu et al. [BBDS08], in which the authors discussed in detail a
representative set of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) techniques for
fully cooperative, fully competitive and mixed tasks. The main open issues, together with promising ways of addressing these issues were also laid out. Van et
al. [VDHHK+ 07] surveyed the dynamics and performance of state-of-the-art MAL
algorithms in games. In particular, this work studied initial conditions, parameter
settings, convergence speed and local versus global convergence in a wide variety of
cooperative and competitive games. Hoen et al. [HTP+ 06] classiﬁed MAL problems
as cooperative or competitive ones. The cooperative MAL problems were further
divided as two major categories of team learning and concurrent learning. The competitive MAL problems were divided into two dominant streams of research from
the perspective of economics or matrix games. Last but not the least, Panait and
Luke [PL05] provided a broad survey of the cooperative MAL literature, in which
a wide spectrum of areas in MAL, including RL, evolutionary computation, game
theory, complex systems, agent modeling and robotics were discussed. Additionally, the authors discussed direct and indirect communications in connection with
learning, plus open issues in task decomposition, scalability, and adaptive dynamics.
As introduced in Chapter 1, this thesis mainly studies three research issues in
MAL. They are coordinated MAL in loosely coupled MASs, MAL for norm emergence and MAL for achieving cooperation in social dilemmas. These three research
issues fall into the prescriptive, non-cooperative paradigm proposed by Shoham et
al.’s [SPG07], which is to design MAL approaches to maximise an individual reward in repeated interactions. These research issues aim at solving mixed-task MAL
problems, in which the general-sum game structures require agents to learn coordinated/cooperative behaviors so that the agents’ selﬁsh goals can be achieved. In
the following three sections, research into these three issues is reviewed.
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Coordinated Multi-Agent Learning

In MASs, the need for coordination among agents stems from the fact that the eﬀect
of an agent’s action on an environment also depends on the actions taken by other
agents. Here, coordination is deﬁned as “the ability of two or more agents to jointly
reach a consensus over which action to perform in an environment” [KK02]. Hence,
agents’ actions must be mutually consistent so that their intended eﬀect can be
achieved. This section reviews coordinated MAL in three diﬀerent research directions: game theory-based coordinated MAL, organisational/structural coordinated
MAL and coordinated MAL in loosely coupled MASs.

2.2.1

Game Theory-Based Coordinated Multi-Agent
Learning

Game theory has been a driving impetus for modeling MAL problems. Most work
in the current literature solves coordinated MAL problems from a game theory perspective in terms of ﬁnding a convergence equilibrium, such as the Nash equilibrium
and the Pareto optimal, for matrix games, or speeding up such a convergence process. Coordinated MAL is often studied in cooperative and general-sum games, each
of which is reviewed as follows.
In Cooperative Games
In cooperative games, such as the penalty game and the climbing game, agents have
the same reward function and each agent is designed with a goal to maximise the
group utility. As agents are independent learners, coordination problems arise in
cooperative games even if all the agents learn the same global value function. In
some cooperative games (e.g., the penalty game), agents not only need to learn how
to escape from the sub-optimal Nash equilibrium, but also need to learn how to
select an optimal equilibrium from the multiple optimal joint actions. The latter
is also known as the “equilibrium selection problem” [BBDS08], which is a diﬃcult
issue in MAL research.
Several approaches have been proposed to solve coordinated MAL problems in
cooperative games. Claus and Boutilier [CB98] proposed and compared two forms of
MARL, Independent Learners (ILs), which ignored the existence of other agents, and
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Joint Action Learners (JALs), which learnt the value of their own actions in conjunction with those of other agents. Their experimental results showed that both JALs
and ILs converged to an equilibrium in speciﬁc settings of fully cooperative games.
When used in games with multiple equilibria, however, the two approaches could
not assure the optimal equilibrium. The authors then proposed several optimistic
exploration strategies to increase the likelihood of reaching an optimal equilibrium.
Wang and Sandholm [WS02] presented the Optimal Adaptive Learning (OAL)
approach, which was the ﬁrst approach in the literature capable of converging to
an optimal Nash equilibrium with 100% probability in any cooperative game. This
achievement, however, was attained at the cost of high complexity because each
agent must make an empirical estimate of the model of the game structure, models
of other agents and an optimal value function for the game.
Kapetanakis and Kudenko [KK02] proposed the Frequency Maximum Q-value
(FMQ) heuristic to incorporate into the estimated value functions the information
of how frequently an action produced its maximum corresponding reward. Experimental results showed that the convergence rate to the optimal joint action was
almost 100%, which is much higher than that achieved by most existing approaches.
Littman [Lit01b] proposed the Team Q-learning algorithm to achieve the optimal
equilibrium in team Markov games. This approach, however, assumed that only one
optimal equilibrium existed. In other words, the “Equilibrium Selection Problem”
could not be solved using this approach.
In General-Sum Games
In general-sum games, each agent has its individual reward function, and no constraints are imposed on the reward functions of the agents. In other words, the
sum of the agents’ rewards can be any value. General-sum games provide a widely
used test bed for mixed-task MAL, and a signiﬁcant number of approaches have
been proposed in MAL research to enable agents to learn desirable solutions such
as optimal equilibrium in the general-sum games.
Hu and Wellman [HW98] proposed Nash-Q, which was able to converge to Nash
equilibrium for general-sum games, but was suitable for a limited class of games.
Later, Littman [Lit01a] proposed the Friend-or-Foe approach, which treated the
other agent as either a friend or a foe, and could converge to Nash equilibrium with
fewer restrictions than Nash-Q.
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In [Tes03], an approach called Hyper-Q was introduced to learn the value of joint
mixed strategies instead of joint base actions. This approach converged to a cyclic
Nash equilibrium, which was a nice outcome of self-play learning in a repeated game.
Conitzer and Sandholm [CS03] proposed the AWESOME algorithm, short for
“Adapt When Everybody is Stationary, Otherwise Move to Equilibrium”, which
converged to the “Best Response” action against stationary opponents, and otherwise converged to a pre-computed Nash equilibrium in self play.
The concept of “Reactivity” [BP04] was deﬁned to measure how fast a learner
could adapt to an unexpected hypothetical change in an opponent’s policy and how
fast an agent could learn a best response to an unexpected worst case switch in the
opponent’s policy. The criterion of reactivity was special to the MAL domain as it
was a measure of how quickly an agent could react to being exploited.
Greenwald and Hall [GH03] proposed the correlated-Q approach based on the
notion of correlated equilibrium. In this approach, a learner maintained belief about
its opponent. The learning process would converge to a correlated equilibrium if both
agents believed that adjusting their policies would not bring any further beneﬁt
based on their beliefs about their opponents.
Sen et al. [SAM03] proposed an innovative expected utility probabilistic learning strategy by incorporating an action revelation mechanism. Simulation results
showed that agents using the action revelation strategy under self-play could achieve
the Pareto optimal outcomes, which dominated the Nash equilibrium in certain
games, and also the average performance with action revelation was signiﬁcantly
better than the Nash equilibrium solution over a large number of randomly generated game matrices.
There are also numerous gradient-ascent based algorithms in MAL, such as the
Policy Hill Climber (PHC) [BV02], Weighted Policy Learner (WPL) [AL08] and
WoLF (Win or Learn Fast) [BV02, Bow04]. The WoLF algorithm updated its
learning parameters to exploit the opponent. In WoLF, the learning rate was altered
to be large if the learner found that it was losing. Otherwise, the learning rate was
kept small as a good strategy had been found. A modiﬁed version of WoLF, called
PDWoLF [BP03], was proposed to speed up the convergence. In [Bow04], a noregret-measure with the GIGA-WOLF algorithm was proposed. Regret measured
how worse an algorithm performed compared to the best static strategy, with the
goal of guaranteeing at least zero average regret, i.e. no-regret.
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Advantages and Disadvantages of the Game Theory Perspective
From a game theory perspective, coordinated MAL focuses on computing a convergence equilibrium, in particular, the Nash equilibrium, or speeding up such a
convergence process in games. Because the interaction models are often two-player
two-action games, it is easy to understand the learning principle and to analyze
the dynamics of agent learning behaviors during the convergence to a desired equilibrium. Approaches in this area, however, suﬀer signiﬁcantly from the curse of
dimensionality, and are only capable of solving relatively small-scale problems in
matrix games and small grid-world domains. Moreover, most of the current approaches assumed that an agent must know the underlying game structure, or the
Nash equilibrium (e.g., [BV02, BP07]). Some approaches even required knowing the
actions and/or rewards of other agents (e.g., [HW03, CS03]). If agents are unaware
of the underlying game and are not observing each other, then learning a coordinated
behavior can be a very challenging task [AL08].
In the game theory-based coordinated MAL, the “equilibrium selection problem” [BBDS08] is common, so that explicit coordination is required for the agents
to achieve one equilibrium from multiple optimal ones. Most previous work in this
direction, however, focused on single stage matrix games. Chapter 3 of this thesis
investigates coordinated MAL in more general multiple stage of games where sparse
interactions of agents indicate that “equilibrium selection” is only constrained to
some particular parts of the environment. Agents, therefore, not only need to compute the optimal Nash equilibrium in speciﬁc parts of the environment, but also
need to learn the circumstances when such coordination is necessary.

2.2.2

Organisational/Structural Coordinated Multi-Agent
Learning

Many studies have investigated coordinated MAL by exploiting the organisational
or structural independent relationships among agents for an eﬃcient coordinated
learning under diﬀerent emphasis and assumptions.
Hierarchical MAL approaches [GMM06, BM03, MMG01] have been proposed to
divide an overall task in a hierarchy of subtasks, each of which is restricted to the
states and actions relevant to that particular subtask. The subtasks were conducted
individually by each agent and were not required to share the local state of diﬀerent
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agents. Going up the hierarchy corresponds to moving from low-level hierarchical
tasks to higher-level hierarchical tasks. During this process, coordination was necessary and must be accounted for explicitly. Since execution at the highest level
corresponded to several low-level time steps, communication needs were minimised.
Coordination-graph based approaches [GLP02, KV04a, KHBV05] took advantage of an additive decomposition of the joint reward function to local value functions, each of which was related only to a small number of neighboring agents, to
eﬃciently construct jointly optimal policies.
Schneider et al. [SWMR99] proposed a learning approach based on the distributed value functions to take advantage of the dependence between networked
agents so that each agent could learn a value function to estimate a weighted sum
of future rewards of all the agents in a network.
Abdallah et al. [AL07] studied the interactions between self-organisation and
learning by developing a novel self-organisation mechanism to enable agents not
only to self-organise the underlying network during learning, but also to use the
information from learning to guide the self-organisation process.
Zhang et al. [ZAL09] developed an organisation-based control framework MASPA
to speed up the convergence of MAL algorithms in a network of agents. This framework deﬁned a multi-level organisational structure for automated supervision and a
communication protocol for exchanging information between lower-level agents and
higher-level supervising agents. An automated supervision mechanism generated supervisory information based on the information from lower-level agents to guide and
coordinate the agents’ learning process. This supervision mechanism continuously
interacted with and dynamically controlled the learning process. The hierarchical
organisation, however, was assumed to be given and ﬁxed in [ZAL09]. To remove
this assumption, Zhang et al. [ZLA10] proposed a distributed, negotiation-based
approach to dynamically forming the hierarchical organisations among agents.
All the above approaches focus on coordinated MAL when an explicit representation of agent independence is given beforehand. This explicit representation is indicated either by a predeﬁned task decomposition (e.g., [GMM06, BM03, MMG01])
or by a ﬁxed interaction structure (e.g., [GLP02, YZBI10, ZAL09]) in these approaches. In other words, most of these studies only solved the problem of “learning
how to coordinate”. In many cases, however, agents must learn not only how to
coordinate their behaviors, but also when coordinated behaviors are necessary. As
a result, agents need to build up a representation of the agent independence from
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their experiences for eﬃcient coordinated learning. Chapter 3 of this thesis develops
eﬃcient coordinated MAL approaches that enable agents not only to learn how to
coordinate their behaviors, but also to learn the circumstances when coordinated
behaviors are necessary. This focus diﬀerentiates the work in Chapter 3 from the
studies reviewed in this subsection.

2.2.3

Coordinated Multi-Agent Learning in Loosely Coupled Multi-Agent Systems

In many real-world MASs, agents can exhibit a large amount of context-speciﬁc
independence so that a general decision-making problem can be decomposed eﬃciently into sub-problems which are easier to solve [RSV07]. In this kind of MASs,
agents are loosely coupled and diﬀerent levels of independence between agents can
conﬁne coordinated behaviors to some speciﬁc parts of an environment. In this way,
an agent only needs to consider other agents’ information for coordination when it is
necessary. This kind of MASs has a wide range of applications in practical problems.
One example might be that of two robots ﬁghting a ﬁre in a building with a doorway connecting two rooms. The doorway is assumed to be too narrow to let both
robots pass at the same time. In this case, most of the time the robots can move
around independently according to their own decisions. It is only when both robots
come near the doorway that they need to coordinate their behaviors. In this type of
MASs, it is obvious that coordinated behaviors can be conﬁned to certain speciﬁc
parts of the environment, e.g. the area around the doorway. Agents must learn from
experience to determine these parts where coordination is most beneﬁcial and how
to coordinate their behaviors once these parts have been determined. However, due
to the uncertainties caused by agents’ local observability and the dynamics of concurrent learning processes, contriving an eﬃcient learning approach by exploiting
sparse interactions of agents is still a challenging issue in current MAL research.
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the problems of coordinated
MAL by capturing the sparse interactions of agents in loosely coupled MASs. Kok
et al. [KV04b] proposed an approach called sparse tabular Q-learning to learn joint
action values in those coordinated states where coordination was beneﬁcial. The
action space was reduced signiﬁcantly because agents could learn individually without taking into account the other agent in most situations, but only needed to
conduct coordinated learning in the joint action space when dependence between
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agents existed. Kok et al. further extended their approach to enable agents to
coordinate their actions when there were more complicated dependencies between
agents [KV04a], and used statistical information about the rewards obtained to learn
these dependencies [KHBV05].
De et al. [DHVN09] proposed a coordinated learning problem called 2observe.
This approach decoupled an MAL process into two separate layers. One layer learnt
where it was necessary to observe the other agent and the other layer adopted
a corresponding learning technique to avoid conﬂicts. In their work, the ﬁrst layer
used a Generalized Learning Automation (GLA) to decide whether agents should act
cooperatively. The GLA received the manhattan distance between two agents as an
input and based on this distance and the rewards, agents learnt when coordination
would be beneﬁcial. Then in the second layer, a random action selection mechanism
was performed to decrease the probability of collision in the coordinated states.
Spaan et al. [SM08] introduced a model for solving the coordination problem in
loosely coupled MASs called interaction-driven Markov Games (IDMG). In IDMG,
the states where agents should coordinate with each other were speciﬁed in advance
and a fully cooperative Markov Game was deﬁned in these coordinated states so
that agents could compute the game structure and the Nash equilibria to choose
their actions accordingly. IDMG was based on the game theory solution to resolve
the planning problem that required the computation of multiple equilibria. Later,
Melo et al. [MV09] proposed a two-layer extension of the Q-learning algorithm to
enable agents to learn where coordination was beneﬁcial by augmenting the action
space with a pseudo-coordination action. In their approach, agents were able to
learn a trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts arising from good coordination and the cost
of choosing the pseudo-coordination action. As a result, agents could learn to use
the pseudo-coordination action only in states when it was necessary.
De et al. [DHVN10] proposed an algorithm called CQ-learning to enable agents
to adapt the state representation in order to coordinate with each other. CQlearning, however, depended on the assumption that each agent already had an
optimal individual policy so that every agent could have a model of its expected
rewards. In this way, those states where the expected rewards diﬀered signiﬁcantly
from the observed rewards were marked as dangerous states in which the other
agent’s state information should be considered for decision-making.
All these approaches, however, require that: (1) the speciﬁc situations when
coordination is necessary must be predeﬁned and it is assumed that agents know
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these situations beforehand [KV04a, KV04b]; (2) each agent must be required to
have certain prior knowledge, e.g., an individual optimal policy [DHVN10]; and
(3) each agent must have full observability of the joint-states and/or joint-actions
of other agents [KHBV05, KV04a, DHVN09]. These assumptions cannot always
be met in practice, thus heavily limit the applications of these approaches in real
world domains. These preconditions in existing approaches greatly limit the development of eﬃcient coordinated MAL approaches in practical MASs. To overcome
the current limitations of the existing approaches, Chapter 3 of this thesis proposes
two coordinated MAL approaches that enable agents to learn coordinated behaviors
without imposing on the agents the important assumptions required in the existing
approaches. The ﬁrst approach is an oﬀ-line learning approach, in which agents learn
where and how to coordinate their behaviors separately, while the second approach
is an on-line learning approach, in which agents learn where and how to coordinate
their behaviors concurrently. In both approaches, agents learn coordinated behaviors without any prior knowledge about the domain structure or assumptions about
the learning agents themselves.

2.3

Multi-Agent Learning for Norm Emergence

One of the most critical problems in the coordinated control of large scale distributed
MASs is to design eﬃcient strategies that enable all the agents to reach an agreement in areas of common interest [WFS12]. The concept of social norms [Pos02],
originally used in the ﬁeld of sociology to study human social behavior, is of great
interest to MAS researchers as it can be used to help increase the predictability of
agent behavior and facilitate the coordination and cooperation among distributed
agents to achieve a consensus in the whole system. There have been numerous theoretical investigations in the MAS literature of social norms under diﬀerent assumptions about agent interaction protocols, societal topologies, and observation capabilities [SAP11]. In empirical applications, social norms have been used as an eﬃcient
mechanism to regulate agent behaviors in large scale distributed systems such as
electronic institutions [CAG+ 11], agent-supported computational societies [ASP09]
and norm-governed Ad-hoc networks [AKPS05].
It has been well recognised that two distinct approaches are suitable for the
establishment of a social norm in MASs [SC11]. The ﬁrst one is the prescriptive
approach that an omnipresent authority formulates, speciﬁes and enforces how the
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agents should behave according to the administrative incentives. The second one
is the bottom-up approach that enables a norm to evolve and emerge on its own
without relying on any centralised authority. As the environments where agents are
located become dynamic and change continuously, and the system may involve a
large number of distributed agents, it is expensive and ineﬃcient to have a centralised
enforcer to formulate and specify social norms in a prescriptive manner. Because of
this, it is more desirable to enable social norms to evolve on their own automatically.
Understanding what mechanisms contribute to the bottom-up emergence of social
norms is of great interest in the coordinated control of distributed MASs [MGKL12,
FGJ13, SA07, VSMS11].
MAL has been a robust mechanism to facilitate the emergence of stable norms for
distributed MASs [SC11], and numerous studies have focused on equipping agents
with the capacity to learn in order to establish a norm for a system [ST97, SA07,
MSA08, SAP11]. In this section, some eminent studies on norm emergence using
MAL techniques in unstructured as well as structured MASs are reviewed.

2.3.1

Multi-Agent Learning for Norm Emergence in Unstructured Multi-Agent Systems

Many researchers have studied MAL for the emergence of social norms in unstructured MASs. In [Axe86], Axelrod proposed an evolutionary learning model, in which
successful strategies multiply over generations, potentially leading to the emergence
of norms. Agents can observe others and have the ability to punish those who have
defected. The strategy of each agent in determining whether to defect and whether
to punish others is determined by two diﬀerent attributes, boldness, which encourages agents to defect and vengefulness, which encourages them to punish others. The
ideal result is that all agents have high vengefulness and low boldness, since they
would punish those agents who have defected but they themselves would not defect.
Axelrod’s model, however, depends on certain assumptions and some speciﬁc and
arbitrary conditions. In [MGKL10], Mahmoud et al. provided a further analysis of
Axelrod’s model, drawing out some important considerations for the establishment
of norms more generally.
Shoham and Tennenholtz [ST97] proposed an approach based on the Highest
Cumulative Reward (HCR) rule to study the emergence of social norms. According
to this rule, an agent chooses the strategy that has yielded the highest reward in
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the past 𝑚 iterations. The history of the strategies chosen and the rewards for
each strategy are stored in a limited memory. The experiments showed that the
rate of updating strategy and the interval between memory ﬂushes had a signiﬁcant
impact on the eﬃciency of norm emergence. The author also theoretically proved
that under the HCR rule the network would always converge on one social norm.
Sen et al. [SA07] proposed a mechanism for the emergence of norms through
social learning from private interactions. At each time step, each agent interacts
with a single other agent, which is chosen randomly from the population. They
experimented with three MAL algorithms (Q-Learning, WoLF-PHC and Fictitious
Play) and studied the inﬂuence of population size, number of actions, diﬀerent
learning strategies, non-learning agents and multiple relatively isolated populations
on the speed and stability of norm emergence. The experimental results conﬁrmed
that the distributed, individual learning was robust for evolving stable social norms.
The social learning model proposed by Sen et al. [SA07] was signiﬁcant, since the
model conﬁrmed that private experience alone was suﬃcient for the emergence of a
norm in a society of learning agents. This is in contrast with prior work on norm
evolution which requires agents to have knowledge about non-local interactions between other agents and their strategies, or requires agents to learn from repeated
interactions against the same player. Later, Mukherjee et al. [MSA08] studied two
extensions to the social learning model that signiﬁcantly enhanced its applicability.
They evaluated the eﬀect of heterogeneous learning populations and spatial interaction constraints on the speed and nature of norms that emerge through social
learning. Their experimental results demonstrated that agent populations where
interactions were restricted to immediate neighbors produced faster convergence to
social norms, and limiting interactions could isolate sub-populations, thus allowing
for diﬀerent norms to evolve in diﬀerent parts of the population.
Savarimuthu et al. [Sav11] provided an overview of diﬀerent mechanisms employed by norm learning researchers and discussed the contributions of diﬀerent
mechanisms to the three aspects of active learning (i.e., learning by doing, learning
by observing and learning by communicating). Two normative architectures of norm
learning were also compared and the features that must be considered in future norm
learning architectures were laid out. In their later work, Savarimuthu et al. [SAP11]
discussed how three aspects of active learning can be integrated to facilitate norm
learning in agent societies and demonstrated the usefulness of combining these three
aspects of learning to boost norm convergence. They also demonstrated the eﬀect
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of liars on norm emergence when a communication-based learning mechanism was
used.
All these studies handled the issue of norm emergence via learning in the context of an agent population, in which each agent can interact randomly with other
agents1 , and showed that a random type of agent learning would be suﬃcient for
the emergence of robust norms without a centralised authority. In Chapter 4 of
this thesis, a collective MAL framework is proposed to study the impact of agent
local collective behaviors on the emergence of social norms in networked MASs.
This work diﬀers from all these studies because it focuses on norm emergence by
examining the underlying network topology of agents. In addition, agents in the
collective MAL model learn simultaneously and collectively with all their neighbors
to achieve a ﬁnal consensus by using ensemble learning techniques. This is in contrast to the sequential learning process in all these previous studies, in which each
agent is selected sequentially to interact with another agent in the population.

2.3.2

Multi-Agent Learning for Norm Emergence in Networked Multi-Agent Systems

In the real world, people usually interact with each other under some physical constraints. In other words, who meets whom is not random, but is determined by some
spatial relationship or social networks [OHLN06]. Actually, social networks provide
the topology and the infrastructure through which the norms can be exchanged and
inﬂuenced, and thus are fundamental in determining the process of norm emergence
[Del02]. For this reason, a number of researchers have studied norm emergence by
examining the underlying network topology of agents [SS10, VSMS11, VSSM09].
Delgado [Del02] studied the eﬃciency of the emergence of social norms in complex
networks (small-world and scale-free networks). The main result was that complex
graphs made the system much more eﬃcient than regular graphs with the same
average number of links per node, and scale-free graphs made the system as eﬃcient
as fully connected graphs.
Sen et al. [SS10] evaluated how varying topologies of social networks aﬀected
the emergence of norms through social learning. Three diﬀerent kinds of network
1

Although the grid topology was considered in [MSA08], each learner still interacted with
another agent, which was either randomly selected from the neighborhood of the learner or was
selected according to a probability with the distance between the neighbor and the agent.
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topologies (scale-free, fully-connected and ring networks) were studied to show how
quickly norms converged in social networks depending on parameters such as the
topology of the network, the population size, and the number of actions available.
Villatoro et al. [VMS09] proposed a reward metric that was derived directly from
the history of the interacting agents. The reward metric is based on the majority
rule that agents are proportionally rewarded based upon their conformity to the
majority action when interacting with another agent. They investigated the eﬀects
of history size, agent population size and neighborhood size on the norm emergence
in one-dimensional lattice and scale-free network. Villatoro et al. [VSSM09] further
investigated the eﬀects of memory and the history of past activities during learning
on the success and rate of emergence of social norms in diﬀerent network structures. The authors conﬁrmed that diﬀerent characteristics of the topology in which
agents were located could produce diﬀerent convergence rates for reaching a social
norm. Later, Villatoro et al. [VSMS11] used social instruments to facilitate norm
emergence in networked agent societies. Two social instruments (i.e., rewiring and
observation) were proposed to eﬀectively address the frontier eﬀect problem caused
by the sub-norms in the network.
Mahmoud et al. [MGK12] further extended Axelrod’s seminal model [Axe86]
by considering the scale-free topological structure of the agents and by oﬀering a
new dynamic policy adaptation approach to learning the right behavior for norm
emergence. Their experimental results demonstrated that this dynamic policy adaptation could overcome the diﬃculties posed by the asymmetric distribution of links
in scale-free networks, leading to an absence of norm violation, and therefore, the
emergence of social norms.
Zhang and Leezer [ZL09] developed the Highest Rewarding Neighborhood (HRN)
rule, which enabled agents to update their connections through a selﬁsh rewardmaximising decision-making strategy. Under the HRN rule, cooperative behavior
emerged even though agents were selﬁsh and attempted only to maximise their own
utilities, because agents were able to break unrewarding relationships and were thus
able to maintain mutually beneﬁcial relationships. In their later work [ZW12], Zhang
and Leezer proposed the extended HRN rule, the Highest Weighted Reward (HWR)
rule, which allowed the agents to use a discount factor to devalue past interactions
with their neighbors. The more recent the interaction was, the more heavily the
corresponding reward was weighted in the evaluation function. Their experimental
results identiﬁed certain patterns of the networks and the authors demonstrated the
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existence of the pattern both theoretically and empirically.
All these studies, however, are based on a simple interaction protocol: each agent
must be paired for interaction with one of its neighbors, randomly or preferentially,
so that this agent can learn directly from the interaction. This interaction protocol
simpliﬁes real-life situations when individuals can collectively make a decision from
multiple alternatives. This collective decision making is inherent in human nature
because people often seek several opinions before making a ﬁnal decision [Pol06].
To reach a group consensus, people often interact with others at the same time and
learn simultaneously from all of these interactions.
The collective MAL framework proposed in Chapter 4 imitates the opinion aggregation process in human decision making. In the framework, an agent interacts
simultaneously with all of its neighbors and learns collectively from these interactions. A number of key issues such as neighborhood and population size, agent
cognitive deﬁciency and learning strategy, and their inﬂuences on norm emergence
are investigated in the collective learning framework. The focus of Chapter 4 is to
study the impact of local collective behaviors on the overall emergence of norms in
a number of diﬀerent conditions. This focus diﬀerentiates the work in Chapter 4
from all these previous studies.

2.4

Multi-Agent Learning for Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

In the real world, cooperative behaviors can be observed at diﬀerent organisations
ranging from microorganisms and animal groups to human societies [HCS11]. Solving the puzzle of how such cooperative behaviors emerge among self-interested entities is a challenging issue that has motivated scientists from various disciplines
including economics [RK95], psychology [FG00], sociology [FF03] and computer science [HCS11] for decades. The emergence of cooperation is often studied in the
context of social dilemmas, in which selﬁsh individuals must decide between a socially reciprocal behavior of cooperation to beneﬁt the whole group over time and a
self-interested behavior of defection to pursue their own short-term beneﬁts. Social
dilemmas often arise in many situations in MASs, e.g., ﬁle sharing in peer-to-peer
(p2p) systems, load balancing/packet routing in wireless sensor networks and bandwidth allocation/frequency detection in telecommunication systems [SRAA+ 11]. For
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this reason, mechanisms that promote the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas are of great interest to researchers in MASs.
In the current MAL literature, the study of cooperation in social dilemmas
can be carried out in two paradigms, one based on the evolutionary game theory [PS10, SF07] and one based on MARL. In evolutionary game theory, various
mechanisms, such as kin selection [Now06], reciprocal altruism [Now06], spatial selection [LHN05, SP05, Now06] and social diversity [SPL06, SSP08], have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation. The focus is either on the macro-level
population dynamics using replicator functions or on the agent-level strategy dynamics using predeﬁned imitation rules, such as Imitate-Best-Neighbor. Real animals
and humans, however, not only replicate or mimic others, but can also learn eﬃcient
strategies from past interaction experience. In fact, this experience-based learning
capability is important in building intelligent agents that can align human behavior,
particularly when designers cannot anticipate all situations that the agents might
encounter. This section reviews MARL for cooperation, in which agents learn based
on the immediate rewards from the interactions.

2.4.1

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning to Solve TwoAgent Social Dilemmas

It is well known that directly applying distributed MARL approaches in the setting
of social dilemmas will end up with convergence to the Nash equilibrium of mutual
defection among the agents if no additional mechanisms are implemented. The
convergence to the Nash equilibrium occurs because both agents adopt the bestresponse actions during learning. As a result, neither agent can achieve a dominant
position by choosing defection to exploit its opponent because the opponent will
eliminate such dominance by also choosing defection, resulting in mutual defection
between the agents. Numerous studies have investigated MARL in the context of
social dilemmas.
Sandholm and Crites [SC96] pioneered this area by conducting extensive experiments in which two Q-learning agents played Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)
using lookup tables and recurrent neural networks to store the state-action estimates (Q-values). Three diﬀerent dimensions: the length of the history, the type
of memory as well as the exploration mode were examined and the results showed
that mutual cooperation did not occur when neither of the agents took their past
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actions into account and that the exploration mode had a major impact on the level
of cooperation.
Vassiliades et al. [VCC11, VCC09] investigated MARL with spiking and nonspiking agents in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma by exploring the conditions required to enhance its cooperative outcome. The results showed that cooperation was
enhanced by a mixture of positive and negative payoﬀ values and a high discount
factor in the case of non-spiking agents and by having longer time constants in the
eligibility trace in the case of spiking agents.
Masuda et al. [MO09] analytically and numerically analyzed how a Temporal
Diﬀerence RL agent behaved against stochastic strategies and another learner in
the IPD. They showed that learners with only two internal states properly learnt to
cooperate with retaliatory players and to defect against unconditional cooperators
and defectors. Four-state learners are more capable of achieving a high payoﬀ against
various opponents. Moreover, they showed that four-state learners could learn to
establish mutual cooperation for suﬃciently small learning rates.
Reward shaping [NHR99] is a technique that introduces imaginary rewards to an
RL algorithm, during the learning process, as an addition to the actual reward from
the environment, with the purpose of helping the agent learn a desirable behavior
more eﬃciently. Some studies have tried to reshape or evolve the payoﬀs of the
agents so that cooperation can be achieved. Babes et al. [BdCL08] presented a
technique called “social reward shaping” that initialised the Q-functions of a Qlearning agent with values derived from an analysis of a mutually beneﬁcial sub-game
perfect equilibrium of the IPD. By doing so, the agents were eﬀectively encouraged
to converge more quickly to mutual cooperation. This was achieved because the
initialisation of the Q-function has been shown to be equivalent to adding shaping
rewards during the learning process. Vassiliades and Christodoulou [VC10] proposed
a method that evolved the pay-oﬀs of the IPD in order for RL agents to rapidly reach
an outcome of mutual cooperation.
In [SGW01], the concept of satisﬁcing was proposed as a modiﬁcation of rationality in order to boost cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. Experimental studies illustrated the circumstances under which agents could learn to cooperate, and
showed that stable outcomes other than the Nash equilibrium were always achieved.
In [MF02], Macy and Flache proposed a novel learning model, called the BM
model, which consisted of a stochastic decision rule and a learning algorithm. The
consequences of a decision create positive and negative stimuli that could be used
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to update the probability of choosing a decision. The work investigated the impacts
of diﬀerent aspiration levels on the emergence of cooperation. Izquierdo [IIG08]
provided further insight into the solution concepts in [MF02], illustrated some analytical results on the dynamics of the BM model and discussed the robustness of
such results to occasional mistakes made by players in choosing their actions. Results showed that the dynamics of the BM model were strongly dependent on the
speed at which players learn, and the inclusion of small quantities of randomness
in players’ decisions can change the dynamics of the model dramatically. Other
subsequent work [TM11, MN11] extended the BM model to enable it to be suitable
for more general situations.
In addition, a number of teacher strategies [LS01, LS05] have been proposed
to induce better performance from the opponents via a punishment mechanism,
assuming that the opponents adopt best-response strategies such as Q-learning.
Based on the teacher strategy Goldfather++ [LS05], Crandall and Goodrich [CG05]
propose the strategy SPaM employing both teaching and following strategies and
show its better performance in the context of two-player games against a number of
best-response learners. Hao and Leung [HL12a] proposed a novel learning strategy
TaFSO combining the characteristics of both teacher and follower strategies.
Banerjee and Sen [BS07] proposed the conditional joint action learning strategy
(CJAL) to reach the Pareto-optimality in the prisoner’s dilemma. In this strategy,
each agent takes into consideration the probability of an action taken by its opponent given its own action, and utilises this information to make its own decision.
Simulation results showed that agents adopting this strategy under self-play could
learn to converge to the pareto-optimal solution of mutual cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game when the game structure satisﬁes certain condition. However,
all previous strategies are based on the assumption of self-play, and there is no
guarantee of the performance against opponents using diﬀerent strategies.
Moriyama [Mor07] investigated how to maintain mutual cooperation when the Qlearning agents occasionally reach the outcome due to stochastic exploration. The
author derived two related theorems to provide guidance on maintaining mutual
cooperation between the agents. The ﬁrst theorem stated how many times mutual
cooperation outcome is needed to be reached in order to maintain it forever (i.e.,
making the Q-function of cooperation larger than that of defection); The second
one dealt with how many additional rewards are needed to make the Q-function of
cooperation larger. Following this work, the author proposed another Q-learning
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algorithm called the learning rate adjusting Q-learning (LAR-Q)[Mor08] to achieve
cooperation among the agents. The key idea of this approach is that the agents
have to adjust their learning rate according to the outcome of the game.
All these studies, however, focus on analyzing the learning dynamics between two
agents and discovering the conditions under which naive RL agents can successfully
learn cooperative behaviors. In this thesis, Chapter 5 studies MARL for cooperation in spatial social dilemmas by considering the topological structures among
the agents. The focus of Chapter 5 is to study the impact of local interactions on
the emergence of cooperation in the whole system. Furthermore, in the emotional
MARL framework proposed in Chapter 5, each agent’s learning behavior is emotionally motivated. This makes the work in Chapter 5 diﬀerent from all the existing
studies reviewed here.

2.4.2

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning to Solve Spatial
Social Dilemmas

There are a few studies that deal with spatial social dilemmas using MARL techniques. Hao and Leung [HL12b] proposed a learning framework, which modiﬁed the
Q-function updating rule for each agent by allowing the agents to imitate their neighbors’ actions, to study IPD in a one-dimensional lattice network. The experimental
results showed that the system based on this learning framework could maintain a
certain level of cooperation. The authors also developed a mathematical model to
analyze the dynamics resulting from the learning framework. The theoretical results
of the mathematical model were able to successfully predict the transition point and
the expected behaviors of the system compared with the simulation results.
Peleteiro [PBB11, PBB10] investigated the beneﬁts of using RL (Learning Automata and Q-Learning) and coalitions in the spatial IPD game. In their approach,
agents can learn to join coalitions or to play independently, as well as decide about
which action to take in each situation. The experimental results showed that agents
could learn which was the best behavior and the formation of coalitions could emerge,
which accordingly increased the level of cooperation among the agents.
Bazzan et al. [BPB11] used social attachments (i.e., belonging to a hierarchy or
to a coalition) as an eﬃcient mechanism to lead learning agents in a grid to a certain
level of cooperation. The authors claimed that the emergence of cooperation in the
IPD using MARL could only be achieved if agents were equipped with some social
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attachments such as spatial relationships or emotions toward group attachments.
Unlike these studies, Chapter 5 of this thesis investigates the possibility of emotions in MARL in order to achieve cooperation in spatial social dilemmas. An
emotional MARL framework is proposed to endow agents with internal cognitive
and emotional capabilities that can drive these agents to learn reciprocal behaviors
in social dilemmas. The focus of the framework proposed in Chapter 5 is to exploit
emotions in modifying agent rational learning behaviors. This focus makes the work
in Chapter 5 diﬀerent from all these studies reviewed here.

2.5

Summary

In this chapter, the current literature regarding the three research issues of this thesis
was thoroughly reviewed. Speciﬁcally, the review concentrated on related studies on
coordinated MAL, MAL for norm emergence and MAL for achieving cooperation in
social dilemmas. The advantages and disadvantages of related studies in each area
have been discussed in detail.

Chapter 3
Approaches to Coordinated Learning in
Loosely Coupled Multi-Agent Systems
This chapter proposes two coordinated MAL approaches by exploiting sparse interactions and diﬀerent levels of independent relationships of agents in loosely coupled
MASs. Section 3.1 describes the problem, introduces theoretical foundations and formalises important concepts of the problem. Section 3.2 presents an oﬀ-line learning
approach and Section 3.3 presents an on-line learning approach. Section 3.4 gives
experimental studies. Section 3.5 lays out some discussions. Finally, Section 3.6
summarises this chapter.

3.1

Problem Description and Deﬁnitions

This section gives a brief description of the robot navigation problem, which is a
typical representative for loosely coupled MASs, and introduces theoretical foundations for decision making in this kind of problems. Some important concepts are
then formally deﬁned for the purpose of introducing the approaches.

3.1.1

Robot Navigation Problem

Figure 3.1 illustrates three very simple domains in which two robots are navigating
in a room, each trying to reach its own goal. In the ﬁgure, 𝑅1 , 𝑅2 represent two
robots and 𝐺1 , 𝐺2 are their goals, respectively (In Figure 3.1 (b), 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 are
in the same grid denoted by 𝐺). In this kind of MASs, agents are loosely coupled
and sparse interactions of agents make coordination “local”, which means that, in
general, each agent can make its own decision without regard to the other agent’s
state and/or action but in certain speciﬁc situations (e.g., some local parts of the
environment), the agents are tightly coupled and hence must coordinate with each
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Figure 3.1: Three small-scale robot navigation domains.
other in order to achieve a better performance. In such a case, it is possible to
decompose the learning problem into two distinct sub-problems. One is to let each
agent learn its own optimal policy and completely disregard the existence of the
other agent. The other is to let the agents coordinate their behaviors with each
other when interactions (in terms of coordination) are necessary. A typical example
is when multiple agents attempt to simultaneously use a common resource such as
space, tools or shared communication channels [SM08]. As shown in Figure 3.1, if
both robots learn their optimal policies individually in order to achieve their goals
and cross the doorway simultaneously, they may crash into each other and get stuck
there. In many applications, this kind of conﬂict may prevent agents (robots) from
achieving their goals and in some domains such as agent-based disaster management
and emergency rescue systems such conﬂicts must be avoided. In this situation, the
robots must learn to coordinate their behaviors when in an area of potential conﬂicts.
Learning to achieve an eﬃcient coordinated policy in this kind of loosely coupled
systems is not a trivial task. This is because all the agents are learning concurrently
so that the learning environment is non-stationary from the perspective of each
agent. Due to this non-stationary learning environment, it is diﬃcult for an agent to
build an explicit model of the environment. This diﬃculty is made worse when each
agent has only local observability of the environment. For this reason, a number
of approaches have been put forward to simplify the problem by predeﬁning the
conﬂicting areas to the agents [SM08], or by imposing some assumptions on each
agent, such as its individual optimal policy [DHVN10] and full observability of the
environment [DHVN09]. This chapter aims to propose sophisticated approaches that
enable agents to learn a coordinated policy based on their limited observability of the
environment and without any prior knowledge about either the domain structure
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or the agents themselves. Before introducing the proposed approaches developed
in this thesis, it is necessary to give a description of theoretical foundations and
several important concepts to help understand how a general MAL problem can
be decomposed eﬃciently into sub-problems by exploiting the inherent independent
relationships of agents.

3.1.2

Theoretical Background

This subsection brieﬂy introduces the widely used theoretical models for agent decision making in MAL. First, the Markov decision process and existing approaches
for ﬁnding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process are introduced. Then,
the extension of Markov decision process model to multi-agent cases is discussed.
Some fundamental concepts are clariﬁed and notations are established for further
description in subsequent sections.
Markov Decision Process
A Markov Decision Process (MDP) [Put09, Ber95] is a general model to describe
a sequential decision-making problem, in which an agent must choose an action at
every time step to maximise some reward-based functions.
Formally, an MDP can be deﬁned by a 5-tuple 𝑀 = (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑃, 𝑅, 𝛾), where
∙ 𝑆 is a ﬁnite state space and 𝑠𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 denotes the state of the agent at time 𝑡;
∙ 𝐴 is a set of actions available to the agent and 𝑎𝑡 ∈ 𝐴 denotes the action that
the agent performs at time 𝑡;

∙ 𝑃 (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠′) : 𝑆 × 𝐴 × 𝑆 → [0, 1] is a Markovian transition function when the
agent transits from state 𝑠 to state 𝑠′ after taking action 𝑎;

∙ 𝑅 : 𝑆 × 𝐴 → ℜ is a reward function that returns the immediate reward 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑎)
to the agent after taking action 𝑎 in state 𝑠;

∙ 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor.
An agent’s policy 𝜋 : 𝑆 × 𝐴 → [0, 1] is a probability distribution that maps an

action 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 to a state 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 of the agent. When given an MDP and a policy 𝜋,

the expected reward of following this policy when starting in state 𝑠, 𝑉 𝜋 (𝑠), can be
calculated as follows:
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𝑉 𝜋 (𝑠) = 𝐸𝜋

[

∞
∑

𝛾 𝑡 𝑅(𝑠𝑡 , 𝜋(𝑠𝑡 ))∣𝑠0 = 𝑠

𝑡=0

]

(3.1)

The value function can also be deﬁned recursively as the Bellman equation [Bel57]:
𝑉 𝜋 (𝑠) = 𝑅(𝑠, 𝜋(𝑠)) + 𝛾

∑

𝑃 (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠′ )𝑉 𝜋 (𝑠′ )

𝑠′ ∈𝑆

(3.2)
∗

For any ﬁnite MDP, there is at least one optimal policy 𝜋 ∗ , such that 𝑉 𝜋 (𝑠) ≥

𝑉 𝜋 (𝑠) for every policy 𝜋 and every state 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆. To involve the action information,
Q-value is used to represent the optimal value of each state-action pair as follows:
𝑄∗ (𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑎) + 𝛾

∑

𝑃 (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠′) max
𝑄(𝑠′ , 𝑎′ )
′
𝑎 ∈𝐴

𝑠′ ∈𝑆

(3.3)

There are many solution techniques to compute an optimal policy for a given
MDP. These techniques can be distinguished to be model-based or model-free.
Model-based techniques require a complete description of the model in terms of the
transition and reward functions. When a model of the problem is not available, the
problem can then be solved by using Reinforcement Learning (RL) methods [SB98],
in which an agent learns through trial-and-error interactions with the environment.
One of the most important and widely used RL approach is Q-learning [WD92],
which is an oﬀ-policy model-free temporal diﬀerence control approach. Its one-step
updating rule is given by Equation 3.4.
𝑄𝑡+1 (𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝑄𝑡 (𝑠, 𝑎) + 𝛼𝑡 [𝑅(𝑠, 𝑎) + 𝛾 max
𝑄𝑡 (𝑠′ , 𝑎′ ) − 𝑄𝑡 (𝑠, 𝑎)]
′
𝑎

(3.4)

where 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1] is an appropriate learning rate which controls the contribution of
the new experience to the current estimate.

An agent should balance the exploitation of the knowledge obtained so far by
choosing greedy actions and the exploration of the state and action space in order to
ﬁnd new eﬃcient actions by choosing other actions. The most commonly used strategy is 𝜀-greedy exploration policy which selects the greedy action, arg max𝑎 𝑄𝑡 (𝑠, 𝑎),
with a high probability, and, occasionally, with a small probability selects an action
uniformly at random. This ensures that all actions and their eﬀects are experienced.
The 𝜀-greedy exploration policy can be given by Equation 3.5.
𝜋(𝑎′ ) =

{

1 − 𝜀 if 𝑎 = arg max𝑎′ 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎),
𝜀

otherwise.

(3.5)
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where 𝜀 ∈ [0, 1] is an exploration rate.
Decentralised Markov Decision Processes
A Decentralised MDPs (Dec-MDPs) [BGIZ02] model is an extension of the aforementioned MDP model to allow distributed decision makings of multiple agents.
Formally, a Dec-MDPs can be deﬁned by a tuple 𝑁 = (𝑛, 𝐽𝑆, {𝐴𝑖 }, 𝑃, 𝑅), where
∙ 𝑛 is the number of agents;
∙ 𝐽𝑆 is a ﬁnite set of joint states of all agents with 𝑗𝑠 = ⟨𝑠1 , ..., 𝑠𝑛 ⟩ ∈ 𝐽𝑆 and
𝐽𝑆 = ×𝑛𝑖=1 𝑆𝑖 . Each 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛]) represents the state of agent 𝛼𝑖 ;

∙ 𝐴𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛]) is a ﬁnite set of actions available to agent 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑖
represents the action of agent 𝛼𝑖 ;

∙ 𝑃 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎, 𝑗𝑠′) represents the transition probability from joint state 𝑗𝑠 to joint

state 𝑗𝑠′ when joint action 𝑗𝑎 is taken in state 𝑗𝑠, where 𝑗𝑎 = ⟨𝑎1 , ..., 𝑎𝑛 ⟩ ∈ 𝐽𝐴
and 𝐽𝐴 = ×𝑛𝑖=1 𝐴𝑖 is the set of joint actions of all the agents;

∙ 𝑅(𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) : 𝐽𝑆 × 𝐽𝐴 → ℜ represents the reward received by the agents when
joint action 𝑗𝑎 is taken in state 𝑗𝑠

For simplicity in later description, 𝑎−𝑖 = ⟨𝑎1 , ..., 𝑎𝑖−1 , 𝑎𝑖+1 .., 𝑎𝑛 ⟩ is used to denote

the reduced action of agent 𝛼𝑖 , thus the joint action 𝑗𝑎 = ⟨𝑎1 , ..., 𝑎𝑛 ⟩ can be simply
represented as 𝑗𝑎 = ⟨𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖 ⟩. Similarly, the joint state 𝑗𝑠 = ⟨𝑠1 , ..., 𝑠𝑛 ⟩ can be simply
represented as 𝑗𝑠 = ⟨𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖 ⟩.

The Dec-MDPs model is a particular case of the more general model,

De-

centralised Partial Observable MDP (Dec-POMDP) [SZ08], where every agent has
partial observability so that the agent can only determine its local state ambiguously
through its local observation. In Dec-MDPs, however, an agent can have local full
observability [MV11], which means that each agent can infer the corresponding local
state unambiguously from its local observations. In other words, all the agents in
Dec-MDPs, together, have joint full observability, or collective observability [PT02],
which means that each agent observes a part of the state and the combined observations of all agents uniquely identify the overall state. It has been shown that
the decision complexity for a ﬁnite-horizon Dec-MDPs problem is NEXP-complete,
even if in a 2-agent case [BGIZ02]. This high complexity is attributed to the decentralised decision-making processes in Dec-MDPs, where agents are coupled with a
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shared transition and reward function but no individual agent can access the global
state information due to its local observability of the environment.

3.1.3

Agent Independence and Coordinated States

It has been recognised that decision-making in a general Dec-MDPs model is computationally prohibited [BGIZ02]. To reduce the high complexity, one approach is
to identify sub-classes of the Dec-MDPs model by making reasonable assumptions
about the model. As observed in many practical multi-agent problems (e.g. the
robot navigation problem studied here), the state transitions and rewards usually involve certain independence so as to allow a more compact problem representation and lower computational complexity. Many previous studies, therefore,
focused on a more specialised version of the general Dec-MDPs model for more
eﬃcient decision making. Becker et al. [BZLG03, BZLG04] deﬁned a speciﬁc subclass model of Dec-MDPs, called transition-independent Dec-MDPs, in which the
overall transition function 𝑃 can be separated into 𝑛 distinct individual transition functions 𝑃𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛]). For any next state 𝑠′𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 of agent 𝛼𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖 is given
by 𝑃𝑖 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎, 𝑗𝑠′ ) = 𝑃𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠ˆ′𝑖 ), where 𝑠ˆ𝑖 is the local state of agent 𝛼𝑖 1 . In other
words, the next local state of each agent is independent of the local states of all other
agents, given its previous local state and individual action. It has been shown that a
transition-independent Dec-MDPs problem has an NP-complete complexity, which
is a signiﬁcant reduction from general Dec-MDPs [BZLG04, BZLG03]. It is argued,
however, that not all multi-agent domains are fully transition-independent [RSV07].
Further more, due to the shared reward component, it is still a non-trivial task to
solve a transition independent Dec-MDPs problem.
Similarly, Dec-MDPs can also be reward-independent when the joint reward function 𝑅 can be represented as a function of individual reward functions 𝑅1 , ..., 𝑅𝑛 [GZ04,
AZ09]. Interestingly, it was recently shown that a reward-independent Dec-MDPs
problem retains an NEXP-complete complexity [APZ08, AZ09]. However, when associated with transition independence, reward independence implies that an n-agent
Dec-MDPs problem can be decomposed into n independent MDP subproblems, each
of which can be solved separately. The complexity of this class of problems thus
1

Local state of agent 𝛼𝑖 is deﬁned as 𝑠ˆ𝑖 = ⟨𝑠0 , 𝑠𝑖 ⟩ (𝑠ˆ𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 × 𝑆0 ), where 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 represents the
portion of global state speciﬁc to agent 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑠0 ∈ 𝑆0 represents the portion of the global state
shared among all agents. In this chapter hereinafter, unless otherwise speciﬁed, 𝑠𝑖 is directly used
to denote the local state of agent 𝛼𝑖 by omitting 𝑠0 to simplify notation.
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reduces to that of standard MDPs (P-complete) [AZ09].
Although assuming a full transition and reward independence in a Dec-MDPs
problem can signiﬁcantly reduce the complexity of solving such a problem, this assumption is hardly feasible in practical applications as in many MASs agents are
coupled with each other in certain speciﬁc situations. Furthermore, since the individual functions of an agent are potentially aﬀected by other agents due to their
interdependencies, an agent’s local state and individual action usually cannot determine the individual functions fully as assumed in general transition-independent
and reward-independent Dec-MDPs. To better reﬂect the feature of uncertainties in Dec-MDPs, the individual transition function 𝑃𝑖 can be decomposed as
𝑃𝑖 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎, 𝑗𝑠′ ) = 𝑃𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠ˆ′𝑖 ) + 𝑃𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎, 𝑗𝑠′ ), where 𝑃𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠ˆ′𝑖 ) corresponds to a
local individual transition component that depends only on agent 𝛼𝑖 ’s local state
and individual action, and 𝑃𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎, 𝑗𝑠′) is an interaction transition component that
depends on all the agents. Similarly, the individual reward function 𝑅𝑖 can be decomposed as 𝑅𝑖 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) = 𝑅𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝑅𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎), where 𝑅𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) corresponds to a
local individual reward component and 𝑅𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) is an interaction reward component. Based on this factorisation, the independence between agents can be formally
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Agent Independence) Agent 𝛼𝑖 is independent of the remaining
agents 𝛼−𝑖 in state 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , which is denoted as 𝛼𝑖 ⊳⊲𝑠𝑖 𝛼−𝑖 , if 𝑃𝑖 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎, 𝑗𝑠′) =
𝑃𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠ˆ′𝑖 ) and 𝑅𝑖 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) = 𝑅𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ), where 𝑗𝑠 = ⟨𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖 ⟩, 𝑗𝑎 = ⟨𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖 ⟩ .
As shown in the deﬁnition, agent 𝛼𝑖 is independent of the remaining agents in
a state if in this state both individual transition and reward functions of agent 𝛼𝑖
can be fully determined by its local information (i.e., local state 𝑠ˆ𝑖 and individual
action 𝑎𝑖 ). This means that the dynamics of the learning environment caused by
other learning agents has no inﬂuence on agent 𝛼𝑖 so that agent 𝛼𝑖 can make its own
decision individually without regard to the existence of other agents. To be more
explicit, look at the value function decomposed as follows,
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𝑄𝑖 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) = 𝑅𝑖 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) + 𝛾

∑

𝑃𝑖 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎, 𝑗𝑠′) max
𝑄𝑖 (𝑗𝑠′ , 𝑗𝑎′ )
′
𝑗𝑎

𝑗𝑠′

= 𝑅𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝑅𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) + 𝛾
= 𝑅𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝛾
+𝛾

∑
𝑗𝑠′

∑

]
∑[
𝑃𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠′𝑖 ) + 𝑃𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎, 𝑗𝑠′ ) max
𝑄𝑖 (𝑗𝑠′ , 𝑗𝑎′ )
′
𝑗𝑎

𝑗𝑠′

𝑃𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑠′𝑖 ) max
𝑄𝑖 (𝑗𝑠′ , 𝑗𝑎′ ) + 𝑅𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎)
′
𝑗𝑎

𝑗𝑠′

𝑃𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎, 𝑗𝑠′ ) max
𝑄𝑖 (𝑗𝑠′ , 𝑗𝑎′ )
′
𝑗𝑎

= 𝑄𝑖 (ˆ
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝑄𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎)
Similarly, the value function for a policy 𝜋 can be given by Equation 3.6.
𝑄𝜋𝑖 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) = 𝑄𝜋𝑖 𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝑄𝜋𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎).

(3.6)

From Equation 3.6, it is clear to see that if an agent is independent on the other
agents as deﬁned by Deﬁnition 3.1, the interaction component 𝑄𝜋𝐼 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) = 0, thus
the agent’s individual value function 𝑄𝜋𝑖 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎), which depends on the joint policy
𝜋 of all agents, can be fully determined by the agent’s local component 𝑄𝜋𝑖 𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ),
which depends on its individual policy 𝜋𝑖 .
Accordingly, agent dependence can be deﬁned by Deﬁnition 3.1 and 𝛼𝑖 ⊨𝑠𝑖 𝛼−𝑖
is used to denote that agent 𝛼𝑖 is dependent on the remaining agents 𝛼−𝑖 in state
𝑠𝑖 . Based on these deﬁnitions, uncoordinated states and coordinated states can be
deﬁned by Deﬁnition 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Uncoordinated States) Uncoordinated States 𝑆𝑖𝑐¯ are a set of
adjacent states where agent 𝛼𝑖 can act independently, which can be deﬁned as 𝑆𝑖𝑐¯ =
𝑐
¯

{𝑠𝑐𝑖¯∣𝑠𝑐𝑖¯ ∈ 𝑆𝑖 }, where ∀𝑠𝑐𝑖¯ ∈ 𝑆𝑖𝑐¯ ⇒ 𝛼𝑖 ⊳⊲𝑠𝑖 𝛼−𝑖 .
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Coordinated States) Coordinated States 𝑆𝑖𝑐 are a set of adjacent
states where agent 𝛼𝑖 needs to coordinate with other agents, which are deﬁned as
𝑐

𝑆𝑖𝑐 = {𝑠𝑐𝑖 ∣𝑠𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 }, where ∀𝑠𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖𝑐 ⇒ 𝛼𝑖 ⊨𝑠𝑖 𝛼−𝑖 .
If it is considered that ∀𝛼𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖𝑐 = ∅, an n-agent Dec-MDPs model is equivalent to

a full transition-independent and reward-independent Dec-MDPs model as stated
above. In this case, the Dec-MDPs model reduces to n independent MDPs, each
of which can be solved independently. While ∀𝛼𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖𝑐¯ = ∅, a Dec-MDPs model can
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be transformed into an MMDP [Bou96, Bou99], which can be solved by assuming
a centralised controller or agents’ global observability of the environment so that
each agent can make a decision based on joint-state/action information of all the
agents. In the former case, solving the Dec-MDPs problem has a low complexity
(P-complete as MDP) but does not capture the interactions between agents, and
thus may result in a poor performance. Although in the latter case an optimal
learning result might be achieved, that is infeasible because an agent usually has
limited observability of the environment and practical problems are decentralised in
nature. A direct combination of these two extreme cases is to decompose the DecMDPs model to independent MDPs when an independent relationship really exists
between agents, and MMDP when agents must depend on each other in case of
uncoordinated behaviors. In this way, a Dec-MDPs problem can be solved eﬃciently
without considering all the state-action information during decision-making, most
of which is redundant as indicated by the context-speciﬁc independence.

3.1.4

Agent Independent Degrees

As discussed in the previous subsection, general transition/reward-independent DecMDPs decompose the overall function 𝑃 /𝑅 into each agent’s individual function
𝑃𝑖 /𝑅𝑖 , which depends only on each agent’s local state 𝑠ˆ𝑖 and individual action 𝑎𝑖 .
Since an agent is potentially aﬀected by other agents, the agent’s local state and
individual action usually cannot fully determine its individual function 𝑃𝑖 /𝑅𝑖 . The
individual function can then be decomposed into a local individual component based
on the agent’s local information 𝑠ˆ𝑖 and 𝑎𝑖 and an interaction component based on all
the agents’ information 𝑗𝑠 and 𝑗𝑎. This factorisation, however, is based on agents’
prior knowledge about the domain structure in terms of the location of interaction
states where agents mutually aﬀect each other’s transitions/rewards. Outside these
interaction states, a full independence is assumed so that all the agents can make
decisions individually. In other words, a state is identiﬁed as one in which the
agents are either completely independent or completely dependent on each other.
This handling of independence is always intractable due to the complexity of DecMDPs and the lack of prior knowledge about the domain structure. To better reﬂect
the uncertainties of agent independence, transition/reward independent degree is
introduced in the factorisation of individual functions by Deﬁnition 3.4.
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Deﬁnition 3.4 (Transition/Reward Independent Degree) Transition/Reward
Independent Degree 𝜇/𝜈 ∈ [0, 1] is a value to signify the extent of transition/reward

independence of agent 𝛼𝑘 regarding to the remaining agents.

According to Deﬁnition 3.4, agent 𝛼𝑘 ’s individual transition function 𝑃𝑘 can be
decomposed by Equation 3.7,

𝑃𝑘 (⟨𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠−𝑘 ⟩, ⟨𝑎𝑘 , 𝑎−𝑘 ⟩, ⟨𝑠′𝑘 , 𝑠′−𝑘 ⟩) = 𝜇𝑃𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 , 𝑠ˆ′𝑘 )+(1−𝜇)𝑃 𝐼 (⟨𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠−𝑘 ⟩, ⟨𝑎𝑘 , 𝑎−𝑘 ⟩, ⟨𝑠′𝑘 , 𝑠′−𝑘 ⟩)
(3.7)

where

𝑃𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 , 𝑠ˆ′𝑘 )

is a local individual function that depends only on agent 𝛼𝑘 ’s

local information and 𝑃 𝐼 is an interaction function that depends on the overall
information of all agents.
Accordingly, the individual reward function 𝑅𝑘 can be decomposed into a local
individual function 𝑅𝑘 and an interaction function 𝑅𝐼 as follows.
𝑅𝑘 (⟨𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠−𝑘 ⟩, ⟨𝑎𝑘 , 𝑎−𝑘 ⟩) = 𝜈𝑅𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) + (1 − 𝜈)𝑅𝐼 (⟨𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠−𝑘 ⟩, ⟨𝑎𝑘 , 𝑎−𝑘 ⟩)

(3.8)

Transition/reward independent degree 𝜇/𝜈 signiﬁes the uncertainties of independence between agent 𝛼𝑘 and the remaining agents in terms of transition/reward
function. It is assumed that if 𝑃𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 , 𝑠ˆ′𝑘 ) > 𝑅𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 , 𝑠ˆ′𝑘 ), then 𝑃 𝐼 > 𝑅𝐼 holds,
and vice versa. This means that if an agent is more likely to determine its transition function through its local information, then the agent is also more likely to
determine its reward function through its local information. Agent 𝛼𝑘 ’s overall independence with the remaining agents, however, is signiﬁed by the value function 𝑄.
The independent degree can thus be formally deﬁned by Deﬁnition 3.5 to represent
the independence of agents.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Independent degree) Independent degree 𝜉 ∈ [min{𝜇, 𝜈}, max{𝜇, 𝜈}]

in state 𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑘 is a value that signiﬁes the extent of independence of agent 𝛼𝑘 regard-

ing to the remaining agents, so that the individual value function can be decomposed
according to Equation 3.9, where 𝑄𝑘 and 𝑄𝐼 are the expected local and interaction
value function of agent 𝛼𝑘 , respectively.
𝑄𝑘 (⟨𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠−𝑘 ⟩, ⟨𝑎𝑘 , 𝑎−𝑘 ⟩) = 𝜉𝑄𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) + (1 − 𝜉)𝑄𝐼 (⟨𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠−𝑘 ⟩, ⟨𝑎𝑘 , 𝑎−𝑘 ⟩)

(3.9)

Theorem 3.1 The independent degree 𝜉 in Deﬁnition 3.5 is well-deﬁned, that is, it
always exists and is unique.
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Proof:

Let 𝑎 = ⟨𝑎𝑘 , 𝑎−𝑘 ⟩, 𝑠 = ⟨𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠−𝑘 ⟩. For each value function of agent 𝛼𝑘 , 𝑄𝑘 (𝑎, 𝑠)

depends on agent 𝛼𝑘 ’s transition function 𝑃𝑘 and reward function 𝑅𝑘 . The other agents’

inﬂuence on agent 𝛼𝑘 is embodied in the common interaction components of transition
function 𝑃 𝐼 and reward function 𝑅𝐼 . Thus,
𝑄𝑘 (𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝑅𝑘 (𝑠, 𝑎) + 𝛾

∑

𝑃𝑘 (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠′ ) max
𝑄𝑘 (𝑠′ , 𝑎′ )
′
𝑎

𝑠′

= 𝜈𝑅𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) + (1 − 𝜈)𝑅𝐼 (𝑠, 𝑎)
]
∑[
𝜇𝑃𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 , 𝑠′𝑘 ) + (1 − 𝜇)𝑃 𝐼 (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠′ ) max
𝑄𝑘 (𝑠′ , 𝑎′ )
+𝛾
′
𝑠′

𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) +𝜇 𝛾
= 𝜈 𝑅𝑘 (ˆ
| {z
}
𝐴
|

𝑎

∑

𝑃𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 , 𝑠′𝑘 ) max
𝑄𝑘 (𝑠′ , 𝑎′ )
′
𝑎

𝑠′

+ (1 − 𝜈) 𝑅𝐼 (𝑠, 𝑎) +(1 − 𝜇) 𝛾
| {z }
𝐶
|

∑

{z
𝐵

}

𝑃 𝐼 (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠′ ) max
𝑄𝑘 (𝑠′ , 𝑎′ )
′

𝑠′

𝑎

{z
𝐷

(3.10)

}

where (𝐴 − 𝐶)(𝐵 − 𝐷) ≥ 0. To simplify illustration, it is assumed that 𝜈 < 𝜇, 𝐴 − 𝐶 ≥
0, 𝐵 − 𝐷 ≥ 0 (other cases can be analyzed in the same way) and an auxiliary function

𝑓 (𝑥) = 𝑥, 𝑥 ∈ [𝜈, 𝜇] is used. Let 𝑎 ≤ 𝑓 (𝑥) ≤ 𝑏, then
{

(𝐴 − 𝐶)𝑎 ≤ (𝐴 − 𝐶)𝑓 (𝜈) = (𝐴 − 𝐶)𝜈 ≤ (𝐴 − 𝐶)𝑏

(𝐵 − 𝐷)𝑎 ≤ (𝐵 − 𝐷)𝑓 (𝜇) = (𝐵 − 𝐷)𝜇 ≤ (𝐵 − 𝐷)𝑏

(
)
(
)
⇒ (𝐴 − 𝐶) + (𝐵 − 𝐷) 𝑎 ≤ (𝐴 − 𝐶)𝜈 + (𝐵 − 𝐷)𝜇 ≤ (𝐴 − 𝐶) + (𝐵 − 𝐷) 𝑏

⇒𝑎 ≤

(𝐴 − 𝐶)𝜈 + (𝐵 − 𝐷)𝜇
≤𝑏
𝐴−𝐶 +𝐵−𝐷

(3.11)

Because 𝑓 (𝑥) = 𝑥 is a continuous function with minimum 𝑓 (𝜈) = 𝜈 = 𝑎 and maximum
𝑓 (𝜇) = 𝜇 = 𝑏, according to the intermediate value theorem, based on Inequality 3.11, it is
safe to get that there exists only one 𝜉 to satisfy:
(𝐴 − 𝐶)𝜈 + (𝐵 − 𝐷)𝜇
= 𝑓 (𝜉) = 𝜉,
𝐴−𝐶 +𝐵−𝐷

𝜉 ∈ [𝜈, 𝜇]

Then, have the following transformation:

𝜈𝐴 + 𝜇𝐵 + (1 − 𝜈)𝐶 + (1 − 𝜇)𝐷 = 𝜉(𝐴 + 𝐵) + (1 − 𝜉)(𝐶 + 𝐷)
Combining Equation 3.10 and Equation 3.12 can have:

(3.12)
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(
)
∑
′ ′
𝑄𝑘 (𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝜉 𝑅𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) + 𝛾
𝑃𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 , 𝑠′𝑘 ) max
𝑄
(𝑠
,
𝑎
)
𝑘
′
𝑠′

𝑎

(
)
∑
′ ′
+ (1 − 𝜉) 𝑅𝐼 (𝑠, 𝑎) + 𝛾
𝑃 𝐼 (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠′ ) max
𝑄
(𝑠
,
𝑎
)
(3.13)
𝑘
′
𝑠′

𝑎

where the ﬁrst component on the right side denotes the value function determined by the
local information of the agent, i.e., 𝑄𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) and the second component is the interaction
component determined by all other agents, i.e., 𝑉 𝐼 (𝑠, 𝑎). That is,
𝑄𝑘 (𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝜉𝑄𝑘 (ˆ
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) + (1 − 𝜉)𝑄𝐼 (𝑠, 𝑎)

(3.14)

Note that, for all agents, if 𝜉 = 1 holds in every state, that is, both transition
and reward independence are completely achieved for these agents, a Dec-MDPs
problem can be reduced to a set of independent MDP subproblems, each of which
can be solved separately. The complexity of this class of models can thus become
the same P-complete as standard MDPs. In other situations, the Dec-MDPs problem becomes an NEXP-complete puzzle, even for the simplest two-agent scenario
[BGIZ02]. One straightforward way to reduce the complexity is to provide the agents
with suﬃcient information to overcome the uncertainties caused by agents’ local observability. This means allowing an agent to observe other agents’ information for
decision-making, either through full observability of the environment or unlimited
communication capability. Keeping all the other agents’ information during learning, however, becomes intractable as the search space grows exponentially with the
number of agents, and communication/observability is always restricted in real-life
applications. A direct solution to avoid this dilemma is to let agents learn to use
other agents’ information only when necessary. The independent degrees, which
capture the diﬀerent levels of independence in Dec-MDPs, can signify the extent of
such a necessity, and thus can be exploited for more eﬃcient decision-making without requiring an agent to consider all information from other agents, most of which
is redundant as indicated by the context-speciﬁc independence between agents.

3.2. An Oﬀ-line Coordinated Learning Approach

3.2
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An Oﬀ-line Coordinated Learning Approach

An oﬀ-line coordinated learning approach is proposed in this section to solve robot
navigation problems by capturing sparse interactions and diﬀerent levels of independent relationships between these robots. The approach is called oﬀ-line because agents learn where and how to coordinate their behaviors separately. Subsection 3.2.1 gives the principle of the approach. The details of the learning approach
are given in Subsection 3.2.2 and Subsection 3.2.3.

3.2.1

The Principle of the Approach

Algorithm 1: Learning approach from the view of agent 𝛼𝑘
1 Initialise learning parameters and single-agent Q tables;
2 Set information collecting episodes 𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 and learning episodes 𝑁;
3 // learning the coordinated states (given by Subsection 3.2.2);
4 for each episode n ≤ 𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 (n=1,...,𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 ) do
5
if a collision is detected in state 𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑘 then
6
recognises that coordination is most needed in state 𝑠𝑘 ;
7
recognises that coordination is also needed in 𝑠𝑘 ’s neighboring states
by considering the similarities between the neighboring states and 𝑠𝑘 ;
8

9
10

11
12
13
14
15

16
17

Determine the coordinated states based on the statistical information
collected in the last 𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 episodes by considering those direct causes of
detected collisions;
// learning of coordination (given by Subsection 3.2.3);
Initialise the joint Q table in the coordinated states by combining the
learning information of all the agents during the last 𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 episodes;
for each episode n > 𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 (n=𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 + 1,...,𝑁) do
for each step t (t=1,...,T) do
if agent 𝛼𝑘 is in an uncoordinated state then
chooses an action from its individual Q table;
else chooses an action from the joint Q table by giving an optimistic
estimation about the unobserved agents that are out of the
coordinated states;
transits to a new state and receives a reward;
updates Q tables according to the diﬀerent scenarios of state
transitions;

The sketch of the learning approach is given by Algorithm 1, in which 𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓
stands for the number of episodes for collecting statistical information to determine
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the coordinated states and 𝑁 stands for the number of the whole learning episodes.
In this approach, during the ﬁrst 𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 episodes, each agent learns independently
in an environment using a single-agent learning method and keeps statistical information of the rewards so as to discover the states where coordinated behaviors are
most needed (Lines 4-8). When a collision is detected in a state (Line 5), the agent
then recognises that coordination is most needed in this state (Line 6), and it is also
needed in the neighboring states (Line 7). After 𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 episodes, the agent then determines the coordinated states based on the statistical information collected in the
last 𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 episodes (Line 8). The agent then initialises the joint Q tables in the coordinated states (Line 10) and learns to coordinate its behaviors with others through
its local observability of the environment according to diﬀerent scenarios of the transitions between states (Lines 11-17). If the agent is in an uncoordinated state, it
chooses an action from its individual Q table (Lines 13-14). Otherwise, it chooses
an action from the joint Q table (Line 15). To deal with the uncertainties caused
by agents’ local observability, an optimistic estimation mechanism is introduced to
guide the agents’ learning process. After each transition (Line 16), the agent updates its learning information based on diﬀerent scenarios of state transitions (Line
17). This approach can capture the feature of sparse interactions between agents
and thus decomposes the learning process into sub-processes eﬃciently to reduce
the high complexity of decision-making in MAL.

3.2.2

Learning the Coordinated States

When agents learn independently in an environment, they may have conﬂicts in
any state during the learning process. Since the agents have no knowledge about
the domain structure, which means they do not know in which states they must
consider other agents for coordination, they need to learn these coordinated states
from experience. In an RL setting, the only feedback from the environment is the
reward. When an agent has received a severe penalty reward in a state, it is notiﬁed by the environment that coordinated behaviors are required in this potentially
conﬂicting state. Otherwise, the agent can act independently according to its individual information. However, during the learning process, agents are exploring the
environment, making the learning a stochastic process so that a conﬂicting state is
not suﬃcient to reveal the true structure of the environment. Nevertheless, from a
statistical point of view, more frequent conﬂicts in a state indicate that this state
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is more likely to be one of the coordinated states. Furthermore, if agents conﬂict
in a state, agents are also likely to conﬂict in the neighboring states. The contributions of the neighboring states to the conﬂict in a state can be determined by the
similarities between those states and the state where a conﬂict occurs.
Based on the considerations stated above, the kernel density estimation (KDE)
technique is chosen to collect statistical information to determine the coordinated
∫
states. The basis of KDE is the kernel function 𝐹 satisfying 𝐹 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 1. When
a variable (or an event) is observed, an estimation of the density is formed by

centering the kernel at this variable and the overall estimation is the sum of all
the overlapping kernels. In the problem here, the observation means that agents
conﬂict with each other in a state. An observation with the highest density signiﬁes
that the corresponding state is a location where coordination is most required. Let
𝑠 be a local state of an agent, which can be represented by a grid in Figure 3.1.
Let 𝑃𝑠 (𝑥𝑠 , 𝑦𝑠 ) represent the central point of state 𝑠 with the coordinate (𝑥𝑠 , 𝑦𝑠 ) and
let 𝐹𝑃 (𝑥, 𝑦) be the kernel function centralised at point 𝑃 . The overall estimation
𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠 for state 𝑠 is calculated by summing up all the overlapping kernels given
∑
by 𝑃 𝐹𝑃 (𝑥𝑠 , 𝑦𝑠 ). After the statistical collecting period, agents can determine the
coordinated states 𝑆 𝑐 according to Algorithm 2.

In Algorithm 2, 𝑠∗ is the state with the highest density and 𝑅 is the scanning
distance of the agents. As there may be more than one area of coordinated states,
𝑖 is used to be the index of each area of coordinated states 𝑆𝑘𝑐𝑖 . Agent 𝛼𝑘 ﬁrstly
determines possible areas of coordinated states by comparing the density of each
domain state with the highest density. If this diﬀerence is greater than a threshold
𝛿, the state is considered to be the central state of an area of the coordinated
ˆ𝑐 is the set of central states of corresponding areas in the
states (Lines 2-3, where 𝑆
𝑘
˜𝑐 by
coordinated states). Agent 𝛼𝑘 then computes its individual coordinated states 𝑆
𝑘

involving the states that are located in its scanning distance (Line 8). If a candidate
ˆ𝑐 already belongs to a coordinated state area, this state will be no longer
state in 𝑆
𝑘

considered to compute the individual coordinated states (Line 9). However, not all
𝑐𝑖
ˆ𝑐
the states in 𝑆˜
𝑘 are the causes of a conﬂict in central state 𝑠𝑘 . As a simple example,

if an agent transits from 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 to 𝑠∗ , causing the conﬂict in 𝑠∗ , and transits from
𝑠∗ to 𝑠3 and 𝑠4 . It is obvious that 𝑠3 and 𝑠4 , which have the same densities with 𝑠1

and 𝑠2 , are not the causes of the conﬂict in 𝑠∗ , and thus should be eliminated from
𝑐𝑖
𝑆˜
𝑘 . An elimination mechanism is applied to eliminate this kind of states (Line 10),
which is given by Algorithm 3 in detail. Finally, the overall coordinated states 𝑆𝑘𝑐𝑖
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Algorithm 2: Determining coordinated states of agent 𝛼𝑘 : 𝑆𝑘𝑐 (𝑆𝑘𝑐1 , ..., 𝑆𝑘𝑐𝑛 )
Input: The state with the highest density 𝑠∗ , the scanning distance of agents
𝑅, the index of diﬀerent areas of coordinated states i=1, 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛];
Output: Coordinated states 𝑆𝑘𝑐 (𝑆𝑘𝑐1 , ..., 𝑆𝑘𝑐𝑛 );
1 for each agent 𝛼𝑘 do
2
for each state 𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑘 do
∣𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑘 −𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠∗ ∣
ˆ𝑐 ← 𝑆
ˆ𝑐 ∪ {𝑠𝑘 } ; /* determine central
≥ 𝛿 then 𝑆
if
3
𝑘
𝑘
𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠∗
states of possible areas of coordinated states */
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

ˆ𝑐 do
for each state 𝑠ˆ𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑆
𝑘
for each agent 𝛼𝑘 do
𝑐𝑖
𝑆˜
/* initialise coordinated states of 𝛼𝑘 */
𝑘 ← ∅ ;
for each state 𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑘 do
˜𝑐𝑖
˜𝑐𝑖
if ∣𝑃𝑠𝑘 − 𝑃ˆ
𝑠𝑐𝑘 ∣ ≤ 𝑅/2 then 𝑆𝑘 ← 𝑆𝑘 ∪ {𝑠𝑘 };
ˆ𝑐 then 𝑆
ˆ𝑐 ← 𝑆
ˆ𝑐 ∖ {𝑠𝑘 };
if 𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆
𝑘

𝑐𝑖
𝑆˜
𝑘

𝑘

←
;
/* eliminate the states that are not
direct causes of a collision */
∪
˜𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝑘𝑐𝑖 ← 𝑁
𝑘=1 𝑆𝑘 ; /* combine all agents’ coordinated states */

11
12

𝑘

𝑐𝑖
eliminate(𝑆˜
𝑘 );

i++;

𝑐𝑖
are the union of the coordinated states 𝑆˜
𝑘 of all the agents (Line 11).
𝑐𝑖
Algorithm 3: Elimination mechanism: eliminate(𝑆˜
𝑘 )
˜𝑐𝑖 ) according to the density, 𝑆 𝑐𝑖 ′ ← ∅;
1 sort(𝑆
𝑘
𝑘
𝑐𝑖
˜𝑐𝑖 do
2 for each state 𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆
𝑘
𝑐𝑖
𝑐𝑖
𝑐𝑖
3
for each neighboring state 𝑠𝑐𝑘𝑖 ∈ 𝑆˜
/ 𝑆𝑘𝑐𝑖 ′ do
𝑘 of 𝑠𝑘 and 𝑠𝑘 ∈
if 𝑛 𝑐𝑖 𝑐𝑖 < 𝑛 𝑐𝑖 𝑐𝑖 then 𝑆˜𝑐𝑖 ← 𝑆˜𝑐𝑖 ∖ {𝑠𝑐𝑖 };
4
5

6

𝑆𝑘𝑐𝑖 ′

←
𝑐𝑖
return 𝑆˜
𝑘 ;

𝑠𝑘 →𝑠𝑘
𝑆𝑘𝑐𝑖 ′ ∪

𝑠𝑘 →𝑠𝑘

𝑘

𝑘

𝑘

{𝑠𝑐𝑘𝑖 };

𝑐𝑖
Algorithm 3 illustrates the process of the elimination mechanism. States in 𝑆˜
𝑘

are sorted in a descending order according to the density derived from the KDE
process (Line 1) to represent the importance that coordination is needed in the
corresponding state. For each sorted state 𝑠𝑐𝑘𝑖 , the agent determines whether its
neighboring state 𝑠𝑐𝑘 is the cause of the conﬂict in state 𝑠𝑐𝑘𝑖 . This can be done by
collecting historical information of the transitions between states 𝑠𝑐𝑘𝑖 and 𝑠𝑐𝑘 (Lines
3-4). If the agent transits from the state 𝑠𝑐𝑘𝑖 to a neighboring state 𝑠𝑐𝑘 more often
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than the reserve (Line 4, where 𝑛𝑠→𝑠′ represents the times of transitions from 𝑠 to
𝑠′ ), state 𝑠𝑐 is not the cause of conﬂict in 𝑠𝑐𝑖 and should be eliminated from 𝑆˜𝑐𝑖
(Line 4).

𝑘
𝑆𝑘𝑐𝑖 ′

𝑘

𝑘

𝑐𝑖
is a temporary set to store the previous computed states in 𝑆˜
𝑘 such

that these states would not be eliminated by a state with a lower density (Line 5).
In this way, the individual coordinated states 𝑆˜𝑐𝑖 can be computed by considering
𝑘

both the direct causes of the conﬂicts in a state and each state’s diﬀerent roles of
causing the conﬂicts.

3.2.3

Learning of Coordination

After determining coordinated states 𝑆𝑘𝑐 and uncoordinated states 𝑆𝑘𝑐¯, agent 𝛼𝑘
needs to learn how to coordinate its behaviors with other agents to avoid potential
conﬂicts. As previously described, when an agent is in an uncoordinated state, its
reward and transition functions are independent of other agents so that the agent
can learn independently according to its own policy. The single-agent Q-learning
approach is applied to update the Q-value in this case. Situations become more
complicated when an agent comes to a coordinated state where the agent’s reward
and transition functions are tightly coupled with other agents. Learning of coordination in this situation is diﬃcult when the agent only has local observability of the
whole environment. Here, it is assumed that each agent has limited full observability, i.e., 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 ) ≤ 𝑅 : 𝑃 [𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑠∣𝑂𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑜𝑖 ] = 1, where 𝑆(𝑡) = ⟨𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 ⟩ is

the overall domain state determined by agent 𝛼𝑖 and agent 𝛼𝑗 , 𝑜𝑖 is the individual

observation of agent 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑅 is the agent’s scanning distance. This means only
when agent 𝛼𝑗 is in the scanning distance of agent 𝛼𝑖 (i.e., 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 ) ≤ 𝑅)
can agent 𝛼𝑖 recover the overall state unambiguously through its individual observation. The perception process can be carried out either through the agent’s limited
observing capability of the environment or by using an explicit communication. For
example, in robot navigation problems, one robot can rely on its sensor to localise
the other robot or just send a message to require the other robot to divulge its
location [MV11]. Communication is assumed to be unlimited and noise-free in the
coordinated states. This assumption is reasonable because the coordinated states
are determined by the scanning distance of the agent as stated in Subsection 3.2.2.
Furthermore, assuming communication to be conﬁned to local parts in the environment is common in practical applications. For example, in the robot navigation
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domains, robots equipped with wireless communication devices are able to communicate only when they are spatially close to each other. The proposed approach is to
disregard the interactions between agents in the uncoordinated states and enables
agents to communicate locally in the coordinated states. In this way, the computational complexity of solving a Dec-MDPs problem decreases dramatically since the
coordinated states usually accounts for a small proportion of the whole state space
due to the sparse interactions of agents. As a result, the demand for communication
is greatly reduced and agents can achieve a good learning performance while keeping
minimum information during the learning process.
At the beginning of learning, each agent maintains a single state-action Q-value
table denoted by 𝑄𝑘 (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) (𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑘 ) for all states, where 𝑠𝑘 is agent 𝛼𝑘 ’s local state

and 𝑎𝑘 is its individual action. After coordinated states have been determined, a
joint-state-action Q-value table for the coordinated states is created by combining
all the Q-value information from the single learning process. Suppose there are
total 𝑁 agents in the environment. Let 𝑆𝑘𝑐 and 𝐴𝑘 be the coordinated state space
and the action space of agent 𝛼𝑘 , respectively. The joint-state space of all agents
𝑐
in coordinated states can be given by 𝐽𝑆 𝑐 = ×𝑁
𝑘=1 𝑆𝑘 and the joint-action space of
𝑐
𝑐
all agents is 𝐽𝐴𝑐 = ×𝑁
𝑘=1 𝐴𝑘 . This joint Q-value 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠 , 𝑗𝑎 ) can be initialised by

summing up the single Q-values 𝑄𝑘 (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) (𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 𝑐 ) of each agent, which can be
given by Equation 3.15, where 𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 𝑐 , 𝑗𝑠𝑐 ∈ 𝐽𝑆 𝑐 and 𝑗𝑎𝑐 ∈ 𝐽𝐴𝑐 .
𝑐

𝑐

𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠 , 𝑗𝑎 ) =

𝑁
∑

𝑄𝑘 (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 )

(3.15)

𝑘=1

𝑐

After adding the joint Q-value 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠 , 𝑗𝑎𝑐 ), agents can coordinate their behaviors
according to this Q-value when in the coordinated states. The basic idea of the
learning approach is to let agents act optimistically when facing uncertainties caused
by their local observability of the environment. In more detail, when all agents are
in the coordinated states at the same time, they can observe the overall state 𝑗𝑠𝑐
and choose joint-action 𝑗𝑎𝑐 according to the joint Q-value 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐 , 𝑗𝑎𝑐 ). But when
there are agents out of the coordinated states, those agents in the coordinated states
cannot receive the joint-state-action information of all the agents to determine their
actions from the joint Q-value 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐 , 𝑗𝑎𝑐 ) because agents can only observe each
other fully in the coordinated states (i.e. agents have limited full observability of
the environment). To solve this tricky issue, an optimistic estimation mechanism is
proposed so that agents can act optimistically by giving a best estimation of those
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unobserved agents. This means agents will always act according to the highest 𝑄value based only on the available state-action information. Let 𝐼𝑖 stand for the state
and action information of a group of 𝑖 agents. The 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is formally
deﬁned by Deﬁnition 3.6.
Deﬁnition 3.6 Optimistic Estimation A group of 𝑖 agents’ optimistic estimation
about the other 𝑗 agents, 𝑂𝐸(𝐼𝑗 ∣𝐼𝑖 ), is deﬁned to be a set of state and action information 𝐼𝑗∗ that makes the joint Q-value maximal, namely, 𝑂𝐸(𝐼𝑗 ∣𝐼𝑖 ) = {𝐼𝑗∗ ∈

𝐼𝐽 ∣𝑄(𝐼𝑗∗ ∣𝐼𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑄(𝐼𝑗 ∣𝐼𝑖 ), ∀𝐼𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝐽 }, where 𝐼𝐽 is the set of all possible state and action
for the 𝑗 agents.

Let 𝑠𝑘 be the current state of the agent at step 𝑡 and 𝑠′𝑘 be the state in the next
step 𝑡 + 1. 𝐽𝐴𝑐𝑚 denotes the joint-action space of 𝑚 agents in the coordinated states
𝑐
𝑐
and 𝐽𝑆𝑚
denotes their joint-state space. 𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑚 ∈ 𝐽𝐴𝑐𝑚 and 𝑗𝑠𝑐𝑚 ∈ 𝐽𝑆𝑚
are their joint-

action and joint-state, respectively. There are mainly two scenarios based on the
current state of agent 𝛼𝑘 and diﬀerent learning processes can be applied according
to the transitions between states in each scenario.
(i) Scenario 1: 𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 𝑐¯.
In this scenario, agent 𝛼𝑘 is in an uncoordinated state. It looks up its own single

Q-value table 𝑄𝑘 (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) and takes an action 𝑎𝑘 that has the highest Q-value to
transit into a new state. If the new state 𝑠′𝑘 is still in the uncoordinated states,
a normal single-agent Q-learning can be applied to update the Q-value given by
Equation 3.4.
However, if the new state 𝑠′𝑘 is in the coordinated states, the agent needs to
back up its Q-value by adding the expected future reward from the coordinated
state 𝑠′𝑘 . Note that in the coordinated states, agents only maintain a joint Q-value
table 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐 , 𝑗𝑎𝑐 ) which represents the overall expected reward when all the agents
are in the coordinates states with joint-state 𝑗𝑠𝑐 and joint-action 𝑗𝑎𝑐 . However,
agent 𝛼𝑘 only has local full observability of the coordinated states thus cannot
observe the state-action information of those agents that are out of the coordinated
states. As a result, the joint-state 𝑗𝑠𝑐 cannot be determined to choose a joint-action
𝑗𝑎𝑐 that maximises the Q-value. Suppose there are 𝑚 agents in the coordinated
states and 𝑛 agents in the uncoordinated states at step 𝑡 + 1. Agent 𝛼𝑘 observes
𝑐′
𝑐′
the joint state 𝑗𝑠𝑐′
𝑚 of the 𝑚 agents and chooses the highest 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠 , 𝑗𝑎 ) based on
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this information according to the optimistic estimation mechanism. The value of
𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐′ , 𝑗𝑎𝑐′) represents the overall expected reward and can be averaged by the total
number of agents 𝑁. The Q-value updating rule is formally given by Equation 3.16.

𝑄𝑘 (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) ← 𝑄𝑘 (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) + 𝛼[𝑅𝑘 (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) + 𝛾

1
max 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐′, 𝑗𝑎𝑐′ ) − 𝑄𝑘 (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 )] (3.16)
𝑁 𝑗𝑎𝑐′

where 𝑗𝑎𝑐′ is selected based on the optimistic estimation mechanism given by Equation 3.17.

𝑐′
𝑐′
𝑐′
𝑐′
𝑐′
𝑐′
𝑐′
∀𝑗𝑠𝑐′
𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐′ , 𝑗𝑎𝑐′)
𝑛 ∈ 𝐽𝑆𝑛 , ∀𝑗𝑎𝑛 ∈ 𝐽𝐴𝑛 , ∃𝑗𝑎 ∈ 𝐽𝐴 , ∃𝑗𝑠 ∈ 𝐽𝑆 ⇒ max
𝑐′
𝑗𝑎

(3.17)

𝑐′
Equation 3.17 means that for all the unobserved information 𝑗𝑠𝑐′
𝑛 and 𝑗𝑎𝑛 , there

is at least a state-action pair ⟨𝑗𝑎𝑐′, 𝑗𝑠𝑐′ ⟩ in the Q table that maximises the joint

𝑐′
Q-value based on the available information 𝑗𝑠𝑐′
𝑚 and 𝑗𝑎𝑚 of the 𝑚 agents in the

coordinated states.
(ii) Scenario 2: 𝑠𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 𝑐 .
In this scenario, agent 𝛼𝑘 is in the coordinated state at step 𝑡. It observes the
whole coordinated states to gain the state information of other agents that are in
the coordinated states currently. Assume there are now 𝑚(𝑚 ≤ 𝑁) agents existing

𝑐
in the coordinated states with the joint-state 𝑗𝑠𝑐𝑚 ∈ 𝐽𝑆𝑚
and other 𝑛 agents in the

uncoordinated states. The 𝑚 agents will look up the joint Q-value table 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐 , 𝑗𝑎𝑐 )

and choose joint-action 𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑚 with the highest Q-value simultaneously according to
their optimistic estimation of the other 𝑛 agents by Equation 3.18.
∀𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑛 ∈ 𝐽𝐴𝑐𝑛 , ∀𝑗𝑠𝑐𝑛 ∈ 𝐽𝑆𝑛𝑐 , ∃𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑚 ∈ 𝐽𝐴𝑐𝑚 ⇒ max
𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐 , 𝑗𝑎𝑐 )
𝑐
𝑗𝑎

(3.18)

After taking the joint-action 𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑚 , each agent jumps to a new state. Suppose
among the 𝑚 agents, there are 𝑝 (𝑝 ≤ 𝑚) agents still in the coordinated states and
other 𝑞 = (𝑚 − 𝑝) agents moving out to uncoordinated states. The 𝑚 agents should

back up the future rewards from 𝑄𝑐 according to the joint-state of the 𝑝 agents and
from 𝑄𝑘 according to the state of each agent that jumps out of the coordinated
states. The joint Q-value can be updated by Equation 3.19.
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𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐 , 𝑗𝑎𝑐 ) ← 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐 , 𝑗𝑎𝑐 ) + 𝛼[
+

𝑞
∑
𝑘=1

where 𝑅𝑚 =

∑𝑚

𝑘=1

𝑝
𝑁
(𝑅𝑚 + 𝛾( max
𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐′ , 𝑗𝑎𝑐′)
𝑚
𝑁 𝑗𝑎𝑐′

max
𝑄𝑘 (𝑠′𝑘 , 𝑎′𝑘 ))) − 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐 , 𝑗𝑎𝑐 )], ∀𝑗𝑠𝑐𝑛 ∈ 𝐽𝑆𝑛𝑐 , ∀𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑛 ∈ 𝐽𝐴𝑐𝑛 .
′
𝑎𝑘

(3.19)

𝑅𝑘 (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ) is the sum of the reward of the 𝑚 agents, 𝑗𝑎𝑐′ is

selected according to Equation 3.17 based on the 𝑝 agents’ state information. In
Equation 3.19, (1) max𝑗𝑎𝑐′ 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐′ , 𝑗𝑎𝑐′) is the expected reward of all the 𝑁 agents
based on the information of the 𝑝 agents. This value multiplied by

𝑝
𝑁

represents

the expected reward of the 𝑝 agents; (2) max𝑎′𝑘 𝑄𝑘 (𝑠′𝑘 , 𝑎′𝑘 ) is the expected reward
of each agent that moves out of the coordinated states. Summing up these values
represents all the expected reward of 𝑞 agents; (3)𝑅𝑚 + 𝛾( 𝑁𝑝 max𝑗𝑎𝑐′ 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑐′, 𝑗𝑎𝑐′ ) +
∑𝑞
′
′
′
𝑘=1 max𝑎𝑘 𝑄𝑘 (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 )) is the expected reward of the 𝑚 agents. This value multiplied by

𝑁
𝑚

represents the expected reward of all the 𝑁 agents; (4) ∀𝑗𝑠𝑐𝑛 ∈ 𝐽𝑆𝑛𝑐 , ∀𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑛 ∈

𝐽𝐴𝑐𝑛 means that this Q-value updating is applied for all the joint-state-action of the

𝑛 agents. In this way, the joint 𝑄𝑐 value can be updated using the available information among the 𝑚 agents.

3.3

An On-line Coordinated Learning Approach

In the previous section, the proposed approach is oﬀ-line in terms of learning the
situations when coordination is necessary ﬁrst and then learning how to coordinate
agents’ behaviors when these situations are determined. An on-line coordinated
learning approach is proposed in this section by conducting these two processes
concurrently through dynamic adaptation of the estimation of independent degrees.
Note that, although a transition and reward function can usually be deﬁned beforehand for a Dec-MDPs model, an explicit speciﬁcation of independent degrees is
not straightforward due to complexities and uncertainties in Dec-MDPs. Thus, an
estimation of these independent degrees must be made during learning to indicate
the independent relationships among agents.
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The Principle of the Approach

As introduced in Subsection 3.1.4, a hidden independent degree always exists in a
state of Dec-MDPs, signifying the necessity of coordination between agents. A higher
independent degree means that an agent is more independent from the remaining
agents and can learn to build a model of the environment with higher certainty
using only its individual information. In this situation, an agent can thus conduct
an independent learning process by disregarding the existence of other agents. More
speciﬁcally, when agent 𝛼𝑖 has an independent degree of 𝜉𝑖𝑘 in state 𝑠𝑘𝑖 , it will apply independent learning with a probability of 𝜉𝑖𝑘 . Otherwise coordinated learning
can be conducted to combine other agents’ information for decision-making with a
probability of 1 − 𝜉𝑖𝑘 . The coordinated learning process can be carried out by assuming that each agent has a limited observability of the environment, which means

that only when other agents are in the perception distance of agent 𝛼𝑖 can agent 𝛼𝑖
recover the joint state unambiguously through its individual observation. Here, the
coordinated learning process is assumed to impose no cost on the agents, that is,
whether or not to coordinate with other agents is completely determined by the value
of independent degrees and this process has no probability to fail. The fact that an
agent always succeed in activating the coordinated learning process, however, does
not mean that the agent can successfully receive other agents’ information all the
time since agents are only endowed with a limited observability of the environment.
An agent starts with an initial belief that there is no dependent relationship with
other agents. The agent then adapts the independent degrees dynamically during
learning to achieve an eﬃcient coordinated policy. This policy can make a trade-oﬀ
between the independent learning process and the coordinated learning process to
achieve computational savings and to mitigate the uncertainties in the learning environment. Through the dynamic trade-oﬀ between these two processes, agents can
achieve eﬃcient learning at the expense of minimum computational consumption.
The sketch of this learning approach is given by Algorithm 4, where Line 4 indicates the dynamic trade-oﬀ process, which is determined by the explicit independent
degrees, and Lines 5-8 show how to adapt the independent degrees to best reﬂect
the real independent relationships between the agents.
As agents are learning through trial-and-error interactions with the environment,
the only available information to an agent is the agent’s learning experience and the
immediate rewards from the environment. When a conﬂict occurs (i.e., penalised
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Algorithm 4: General learning approach for agent 𝛼𝑖
1 Initialises learning parameters;
𝑘
𝑘
2 For all state 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , 𝜉𝑖 ← 1;
𝑘
3 if agent 𝛼𝑖 is in state 𝑠𝑖 then
4
Conducts independent learning with a probability of 𝜉𝑖𝑘 or conducts
coordinated learning with a probability of 1 − 𝜉𝑖𝑘 ;
5
Receives penalised reward 𝑟𝑖 and search for causes of the reward;
6
for each state 𝑠𝑗𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 do
7
Calculates similarity 𝜁(𝑠𝑘𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗𝑖 ) and updates eligibility trace 𝜀𝑗𝑖 ;
8
Adjusts 𝜉𝑖𝑗 according to 𝜁(𝑠𝑘𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗𝑖 ) and 𝜀𝑘𝑖 based on the diﬀusion function
𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑘𝑖 (𝑠𝑗𝑖 );
𝑖

reward is received) in a state, the agent recognizee that its decision may depend on
other agents’ decisions as well (i.e., coordination might be required) in the corresponding state. The estimated independence thus can be updated by considering
both the potential contributions from other domain states and the most direct causes
of the conﬂict based on the agents historical experiences.
More speciﬁcally, a penalised reward received in state 𝑠 is implicitly contributed
to by all other states in the domain, with the extent of the eﬀect determined by the
diﬀerence between these domain states and state 𝑠. Let 𝑠 be the attribute vector
that describes state 𝑠. The similarity 𝜁⟨𝑠𝑖 ,𝑠𝑗 ⟩ between two local states 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 can

be given by 𝜁⟨𝑠𝑖 ,𝑠𝑗 ⟩ = ∥𝑠𝑖 −𝑠𝑗 ∥. In the robot navigation problem, which is modeled as

Dec-MDPs, each robot has local observability of the environment so that the robot
can accurately locate itself in the environment (e.g., through the robot’s sensor
equipment to gauge its coordinates in the environment). The similarity between
two states (locations) thus can be easily calculated. Based on the similarity of
states, the cause of a penalised reward can be diﬀused to other states through a
diﬀusion function as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 3.7 (Diﬀusion Function). A diﬀusion function of reward 𝑟 received
in state 𝑠∗ , 𝑓𝑠𝑟∗ (𝑠) ∈ (0, 1) is a Gaussian like function, which can be deﬁned by
Equation 3.20, in which 𝑠∗ is the state where reward r is received, 𝑠 is a local state
of the agent in the domain and 𝜁⟨𝑠,𝑠∗⟩ is the similarity between state 𝑠∗ and state 𝑠.
1
1
2
𝑓𝑠𝑟∗ (𝑠) = √ 𝑒− 2 𝜁⟨𝑠,𝑠∗ ⟩
2𝜋

(3.20)
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The diﬀusion function is a valid representation to reﬂect the contribution of each
state 𝑠 in the domain to the penalized reward received in conﬂicting state 𝑠∗ . When
a reward 𝑟 is achieved in state 𝑠∗ , 𝑓𝑠𝑟∗ (𝑠) has the highest value signifying that reward
𝑟 is mainly caused by state 𝑠∗ , and those states having the same similarity with
the conﬂicting state 𝑠∗ are assumed to play the same role of causing the reward in
state 𝑠∗ . As the similarity between 𝑠 and 𝑠∗ decreases, state 𝑠 has a lower eﬀect on
causing reward 𝑟, which is reﬂexed by the lower value of 𝑓𝑠𝑟∗ (𝑠).
In many cases, however, the roles of the states having the same similarity with
a conﬂicting state can be diﬀerent. For example, when an agent detects a conﬂict
in state 𝑠∗ , it wants to determine the roles of the neighboring states of state 𝑠∗ , say
𝑠1 , 𝑠2 , 𝑠3 and 𝑠4 , to cause this conﬂict. If the past statistical information indicates
that the agent usually transits from states 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 to 𝑠∗ , causing the conﬂict in
state 𝑠∗ , but in some cases it transits from state 𝑠∗ to states 𝑠3 and 𝑠4 . It is obvious
that states 𝑠3 and 𝑠4 are similar with states 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 , but are not the causes of
the conﬂict in 𝑠∗ . Thus, agents should assign credit to those states that are really
responsible for the resulting conﬂict. To solve this problem, Eligibility Trace (ET) is
introduced in order to make a temporary record of the occurrence of an event, i.e.,
a penalised reward is received. ET is one of the basic mechanisms of reinforcement
learning being used to speed up the learning process. For example, in the popular
temporal diﬀerence 𝑇 𝐷(𝜆) algorithm [SB98], the 𝜆 refers to the use of an eligibility
trace. Unlike 𝑇 𝐷(𝜆), where ET is updated at every step in the learning process to
boost learning eﬃciency, in the proposed approach, ET is updated only when an
event (i.e., a conﬂict) occurs. Let 𝑆 𝑐 be the state trajectory that causes an event
and 𝜀𝑗𝑖 be the ET value of agent 𝛼𝑖 in state 𝑠𝑗𝑖 , then for each state 𝑠𝑘𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , the

ET value can be updated by Equation 3.21, where 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1) is a discount rate and

𝜆 ∈ [0, 1] is the trace-decay parameter.
𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑡 + 1) =

{

𝛾 𝜆 𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑡) + 1,
𝛾 𝜆 𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑡),

𝑠𝑘𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 𝑐 ;
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒.

(3.21)

Based on the diﬀusion function and eligibility trace, a penalised reward 𝑟(𝑡)
signifying the necessity of coordination can be diﬀused to all the states that are
potentially eligible for this reward. The independent degree can thus be adjusted
according to Equation 3.22 and Equation 3.23.
𝜉𝑖𝑘 (𝑡 + 1) = ℸ(𝜓𝑖𝑘 (𝑡 + 1))

(3.22)
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𝑟(𝑡)

𝜓𝑖𝑘 (𝑡 + 1) = 𝜓𝑖𝑘 (𝑡) + 𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑡)𝑓𝑠∗ (𝑡) (𝑠𝑘𝑖 ) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜓𝑖𝑘 (0) = 0
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(3.23)

In Equation 3.22, ℸ(𝑥) is a normalisation function to map the value of 𝑥 to
interval [0, 1], with a lower value of 𝑥 corresponding to a higher value of ℸ(𝑥). In
Equation 3.23, 𝜓𝑖𝑘 (𝑡 + 1) is a value to signify the necessity of coordination, 𝑠∗ (𝑡) is
the state resulting in the penalised reward 𝑟(𝑡) and 𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑡) is the ET value of agent
𝛼𝑖 in state 𝑠𝑗𝑖 .

3.3.2

An Explicit Learning Approach

An explicit Q-learning based algorithm derived from the above approach (refer to
Algorithm 4) is proposed in Algorithm 5 to solve robot navigation problems from
the perspective of agent (robot) 𝑖. Although other learning techniques, such as the
on-policy TD control method Sarsa, Actor-Critic methods [SB98], are also suitable,
Q-learning has been chosen as an illustration because of its robustness, relative
simplicity and widely successful applications in a number of multi-agent domains.
Algorithm 5: Coordinated learning algorithm for agent (robot) 𝑖
𝑘
𝑘
1 Initialises 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) ← ∅, 𝜉𝑖 (𝑡) ← 1, 𝜀𝑖 (𝑡) ← 0,
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 ← ∅;
2 for each episode n (n=1,...,E) do
3
for each step t (t=1,...,T) do
4
Generates a random number 𝜏, 𝜏 ∈ [0, 1];
5
if 𝜉(𝑠𝑖 ) ≤ 𝜏 then
6
if agent 𝛼𝑗 is in vision then
7
PerceptionFlag = True and read 𝑠𝑗 , 𝑗𝑠𝑖 ← ⟨𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 ⟩;
8
if 𝑗𝑠𝑖 not in table 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) then
9
adds 𝑗𝑠𝑖 to table 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 )
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17

18

selects 𝑎𝑖 (𝑡) from 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 );
else selects 𝑎𝑖 (𝑡) from 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 );
else select 𝑎𝑖 (𝑡) from 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 );
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡.𝑎𝑑𝑑(𝑠𝑖 ), transit to state 𝑠′𝑖 and receive 𝑟𝑖 (𝑡);
if 𝜉(𝑠𝑖 ) ≤ 𝜏 and PerceptionFlag = True then
Updates
𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) ← 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝛼[𝑟𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝛾 max𝑎′𝑖 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠′𝑖 , 𝑎′𝑖 ) − 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 )];
else
Updates
𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) ← 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝛼[𝑟𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝛾 max𝑎′𝑖 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠′𝑖 , 𝑎′𝑖 ) − 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 )];
Call Algorithm 6 to adjust 𝜉𝑖𝑘 (𝑡), 𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑠′𝑖 ;
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In Algorithm 5, 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) is a single-state Q-value table for agent 𝛼𝑖 , 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) is
a joint-state Q-value table for both agent 𝛼𝑖 and agent 𝛼𝑗 , 𝜉𝑖𝑘 and 𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑘 = 1, ..., 𝑚) are
the values of the independent degree and eligibility trace, respectively, when agent
𝛼𝑖 is in state 𝑠𝑘𝑖 and 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a list to store the trajectory (i.e., the state
transition history) of the agent. Agent 𝛼𝑖 decides whether to coordinate with agent
𝛼𝑗 based on the independent degree in a state (Line 4). If agent 𝛼𝑖 chooses action
coordinate (Line 5), it will activate its perception process to determine the local state
information of agent 𝛼𝑗 through its limited observability of the environment (Line
6-11). Otherwise, agent 𝛼𝑖 chooses its action based on single-state Q-value table
𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) (Line 12). The perception process can be carried out either through agent
𝛼𝑖 ’s limited observing capability or by using explicit communication with 𝑗. Agent
𝛼𝑖 in the perception process, however, does not necessarily succeed in accessing agent
𝛼𝑗 ’s state information as this success is environment-dependent, which means that
only when agent 𝛼𝑗 is really located within the perception distance of agent 𝛼𝑖 can
agent 𝛼𝑖 receive agent 𝛼𝑗 ’s state information (Line 6). After the successful perception
process, agent 𝛼𝑖 makes use of the local state information from agent 𝛼𝑗 to choose
its action based on the joint-state Q-value table 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) (Line 7-10). Otherwise,
agent 𝛼𝑖 makes its decision based only on single-state Q-value table 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) (Line
11). After each transition (Line 13), agent 𝛼𝑖 updates its Q values (signifying how
to coordinate its behaviors with agent 𝛼𝑗 )(Lines 14-17) and independent degrees
(signifying when coordination is beneﬁcial)(Line 18), respectively .
Algorithm 6: Adjusting the independent degree 𝜉𝑖𝑘 (𝑡)
𝑘
𝑘
1 Input: time step 𝑡, 𝜉𝑖 (𝑡 − 1), eligible trace value 𝜀𝑖 (𝑡 − 1), (𝑘 = 1, ..., 𝑚),
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡;
2 if A collision occurs in state 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) then
3
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 ← 0;
4
for each 𝑠𝑘𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 do
5
if 𝑠𝑘𝑖 ∈ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 then 𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑡) ← 𝛾 𝜆 𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑡 − 1) + 1;
6
else 𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑡) ← 𝛾 𝜆 𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑡 − 1);
𝜀𝑘 (𝑡)

7
8
9
10

1

2

2

𝜓𝑖𝑘 (𝑡) ← 𝜓𝑖𝑘 (𝑡 − 1) + √𝑖 2𝜋 𝑒− 2 [(𝑥𝑘 −𝑥𝑢 ) +(𝑦𝑘 −𝑦𝑢 ) ] ;
if 𝜓𝑖𝑘 (𝑡) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 then 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝜓𝑖𝑘 (𝑡);

for each state 𝑠𝑘𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 do
𝜓𝑘 (𝑡)
𝜉𝑖𝑘 (𝑡) = 1 − 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 ;

The process of adjustment of the independent degrees is given by Algorithm 6,
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where 𝑠𝑘𝑖 (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑦𝑘 ) is a local state with coordinate ⟨𝑥𝑘 , 𝑦𝑘 ⟩, ⟨𝑥𝑢 , 𝑦𝑢 ⟩ is the coordinate of
the conﬂicting state 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝜓 is a value to signify the necessity of coordination (see

Equation 3.23). As the similarity between 𝑠𝑘𝑖 and 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) decreases (i.e., the Euclidean
distance of these two states increases, which is calculated as (𝑥𝑘 − 𝑥𝑢 )2 + (𝑦𝑘 − 𝑦𝑢 )2 ,
the value of the diﬀusion function decreases, indicating that state 𝑠𝑘𝑖 has a lower

impact on the cause of the conﬂict in state 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) (Line 7). The value of the diﬀusion
function is combined with the eligible trace value 𝜀𝑘𝑖 (𝑡) to indicate which previous
states are really responsible for the conﬂict in state 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡). As for the normalisation
function ℸ(𝑥) in Equation 3.22, the maximum 𝜓 (denoted as 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 ) after each
episode is chosen (Line 8) to let the values of 𝜓 in all other states be compared with
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 so as to conﬁne 𝜓 to [0, 1] (Line 10). This way of handling the normalisation
function ℸ(𝑥) is used as an illustration in the proposed algorithm, but a number of
other methods can be adopted to deﬁne a concrete normalisation function.

Figure 3.2: Illustration of the relation between individual single-state Q-value
𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) and the joint-state Q-value 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ).
Discussion: three discussions are laid out as follows.
1. As can be seen from Algorithm 5 (Line 15), the update of joint-state Q-value
𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) uses the estimates of individual single-state Q-value 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) in the
next step. The relation between individual single-state Q-value 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) and
the joint-state Q-value 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) is illustrated in Figure 3.2. An agent chooses
its action from individual Q-value 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) and updates this value by using
the maximum estimated Q-value of the state in next step (say, state 7) with
a probability of 𝜉. Otherwise, the agent chooses an action from joint-state
Q-value 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) with a probability of 1 − 𝜉 and updates the joint-state Qvalue (say, joint state 4-1) by using the maximum individual Q-value 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 )

in the next step. From Figure 3.2, it can be seen that the joint-state Q-value
of diﬀerent state/actions in table 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) are independent from each other
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and the joint-state Q-values 𝑄𝑐 (𝑗𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) only determines one-step coordinated
behaviors of an agent. This implies that if agents are loosely coupled (as
in robot navigation problems) and conﬂicts between agents are only conﬁned
to some particular parts (usually accounting for a small proportion) of the
environment, the joint-state Q-value table can be very sparse. Therefore,
learning for an optimal global policy in this situation will be computationally
inexpensive (almost the same with directly learning with individual singlestate Q-values).
2. In the robot navigation problem studied here, there are multiple optimal policies to avoid an uncoordinated joint action in the conﬂicting states. For example, when both robots come to the doorway in the HG domain, either robot
choosing to pass the doorway while the other makes a detour can constitute
an optimal joint action. Both robots should decide separately which joint action to choose to avoid mis-coordination. This type of diﬃculty is called an
“equilibrium selection problem” and it is inherent in any coordinated learning process. In the proposed approach, the equilibrium selection process is
carried out by using only the agents’ joint-state information. This is in contrast with some other approaches which use joint-action information [CB98],
or joint-state-action information in the oﬀ-line learning approach, or simply
a random action selection mechanism [DHVN09], to conduct the coordinated
learning process. It is obvious that learning from the joint-action information
of both agents can lead to a coordinated joint action. However, as shown later
in the experimental results, learning directly from the joint-state information
of both agents can also produce such a coordinated joint action. Importantly,
this implies that joint-state information alone can be enough for agents to
learn coordinated behaviors. Learning directly from the joint-action information or requiring further such information will thus be either unnecessary or
redundant in an equilibrium selection process.
3. In the proposed approach, agents adapt their independence every time an event
(a conﬂict) occurs. This means the approach is fully event-driven, and might be
potentially applied to other similar domains as long as a signiﬁcant conﬂicting
event can happen due to the dependence of the agents. Furthermore, an agent
updates its Q values (signifying how to coordinate its behavior with the other
agent) and independent degrees (signifying when coordination is beneﬁcial)
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concurrently during the learning process, which means that the learning approach is fully on-line. This is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the proposed oﬀ-line
learning approach and other existing approaches (e.g., [KHBV05]) in which
agents need a predeﬁned period to learn the situations when coordination is
beneﬁcial so that coordinated learning can be carried out afterwards.

3.4

Experiments and Analysis

Experiments are carried out to test the eﬀectiveness of the oﬀ-line learning approach,
denoted as 𝐶𝐿 (Coordinated Learning), and the on-line learning approach, denoted
as 𝐼𝐷𝐿 (Independent Degrees Learning). Subsection 3.4.1 introduces experimental
settings and Subsection 3.4.2 presents experimental results and analysis.

3.4.1

Experimental Settings

The aim of the experiments is to test whether eﬃcient coordinated policies can be
learnt using the proposed learning approaches 𝐶𝐿 and 𝐼𝐷𝐿 without the assumptions
of agents’ prior knowledge about, e.g., the domain structure, or the agents’ full
observability of the environment.
Experiment Sets
The experiments consist of two sets: one in small-scale domains and the other one
in large-scale domains.
∙ Set 1: In small-scale domains

The ﬁrst set of experiment is to test the proposed two approaches in the three

small domains in Figure 3.1. In these domains, the state space is relatively
small and in some regions of the domains, agents are closely coupled with each
other so that coordination may be heavily needed in order to avoid conﬂicts.
∙ Set 2: In large-scale domains

The second set of experiment is to test the proposed two approaches in six
larger domains, as shown in Figure 3.3 (originated from previous work [MV11]).
These more complex domains in Figure 3.3 have various sizes of state space
(from 43 individual states in ISR domain to 133 individual states in CMU
domain, corresponding to 1, 849 and 17, 689 joint states, respectively). There
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are fewer interactions between robots in these large domains than in the small
domains in Figure 3.1.
R1

R1

R2
R2

R1

R2

R2

R1

(a) ISR

(b) MIT

(c) PENTAGON (PTG)

(d) CIT

R2

R1

R1

R2

(e) SUNY

(f) CMU

Figure 3.3: Large-scale robot navigation domains used in the experiments (R1 and
R2 are two robots and the original state of one robot is the other’s goal state).

Benchmark Approaches
Because existing approaches to robot navigation problems are all based on certain
preconditions (e.g., robots’ global observability or prior knowledge about the domain structure), a direct comparison of the proposed approaches with these existing
approaches is not applicable. To provide benchmarks for comparison of learning
performance, two basic approaches, IL (Independent Learning ) and JSAL (JointState-Action Learning), have been implemented.
∙ Independent Learning (IL) [CB98]

In one extreme case, it can be assumed that all agents act independently so
that each agent can ignore the actions and rewards of the other agents. In approach IL, each agent stores and updates an individual table 𝑄𝑖 and the global
Q-function is deﬁned as a linear combination of all individual contributions,
∑
𝑄(𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) = 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑄𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ). Each local Q-function is updated completely independent of the other Q-functions using Equation 3.24.

𝑄𝑡+1 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) = 𝑄𝑡 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝛼𝑡 [𝑅(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝛾 max
𝑄𝑡 (𝑠′𝑖 , 𝑎′𝑖 ) − 𝑄𝑡 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 )] (3.24)
′
𝑎𝑖
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∙ Joint-State-Action Learning (JSAL) [DHVN09]

This approach provides another extreme scenario opposed to approach IL.
Agents either communicate freely with a central controller and select their
individual actions according to those indicated by the central controller, or
have full observability of the environment to receive the joint-state-action information of all agents to control the learning process synchronously. With
suﬃcient learning periods, JSAL is capable of achieving an optimal performance as the overall decision-making process is considered as a single MDP,
in which agents learn in a static environment. The leaning updating process
is given by Equation 3.25.
𝑄𝑡+1 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) = 𝑄𝑡 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) + 𝛼𝑡 [𝑅(𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎) + 𝛾 max
𝑄𝑡 (𝑗𝑠′ , 𝑗𝑎′ ) − 𝑄𝑡 (𝑗𝑠, 𝑗𝑎)]
′
𝑗𝑎

(3.25)

Parameter Settings
In all domains, robots are navigating with four actions, i.e., “Move East”, “Move
South”, “Move West” and “Move North”. Each action moves the robot to the
corresponding direction deterministically 2 . When robots collide with a wall, they
rebound and stay where they were. If they collide with each other, both robots
break down and are transferred back to their original states. The exploration policy
adopted is the ﬁxed 𝜀 − 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑦 policy with 𝜀 = 0.1. The learning rate 𝛼 = 0.05,
discount factor 𝛾 = 0.95, trace-decay parameter 𝜆 = 0.8, perception distance 𝑅 = 2
and rewards 𝑟 are given as follows: +20 for reaching the goal state, −1 for colliding

with a wall and −10 for colliding with the other robot. All approaches are run
for 𝑁 = 10, 000 episodes and average the last 𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 2000 episodes to compute
the overall performance. To use the oﬀ-line learning approach, a two-dimensional
standard normal distribution function is used as the kernel function because of its
simplicity of implementation. The value of 𝛿 is set to be 95%. To also show the
eﬀects of diﬀerent scanning distance 𝑅 on the oﬀ-line learning performance, two
cases of CL are studied. In the ﬁrst case of CL, which is denoted as 𝐶𝐿1 , the
scanning distance 𝑅1 is set to 2, while in the second case, which is denoted as 𝐶𝐿2 ,
the scanning distance 𝑅2 is set to 4. In both cases, the ﬁrst 1000 (i.e., 𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓 = 1000)
2

Although some previous works also used a non-deterministic transition setting, assuming a
low probability of failure of the actions so that the agents transit to unintended directions with a
uniform probability. From a statistical point of view, this setting can achieve the same learning
performance as the setting used here.
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episodes are used to collect statistical information to determine the coordinated
states in approach CL. All results are then averaged over 𝑅𝑢𝑛 = 25 runs.
The values and meanings of parameter settings are listed in Table 3.1 for clarity.
Table 3.1: Parameter settings in robot navigation problems
Parameters
𝜀
𝛼
𝛾
𝜆
r
𝑅
𝑅1
𝑅2
𝛿
𝑁
𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑔
𝑁𝑜𝑓 𝑓
𝑅𝑢𝑛

3.4.2

Values
0.1
0.05
0.95
0.8
+20
-1
-10
2
2
4
95%
10,000
2,000
1,000
25

Meanings
Fixed exploration policy 𝜀 − 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑦
Learning rate
Discount factor
Trace-decay parameter
Reward of reaching goals
Reward of colliding into a wall
Reward of colliding with each other
Perception distance in approach 𝐼𝐷𝐿
Perception distance in approach 𝐶𝐿1
Perception distance in approach 𝐶𝐿2
Threshold to determine the center of the coordinated states
Number of learning episodes
Number of learning episodes for average results
Number of oﬀ-line learning episodes in CL
Number of Monte Carlo runs

Experimental Results and Analysis

This subsection presents the experimental results and analysis applying the two
proposed approaches, CL and IDL, and the two benchmark approaches, JSAL and
IL, in diﬀerent scales of domains.
3.4.2.1 Results and Analysis in Small-Scale Domains
Results in Small-Scale Domains
Table 3.2 gives the overall performance of the four approaches in small-scale domains
in terms of average rewards achieved by the robots, the collision probability and steps
to goals. The state and action spaces, as well as corresponding number of estimated
𝑄 values are also laid out to show computational complexities of the approaches.
As can be seen from Table 3.2, the four approaches maintain diﬀerent numbers
of states and actions during learning, leading to diﬀerent scales of computation
complexities. As an example, when using 𝐶𝐿1 in domain TTG, robots can detect
3 coordinated states around the tunnel among the whole 25 states. The state space
that each robot keeps in domain TTG thus can be calculated as 22 + 32 /2 = 26.5
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Table 3.2: Performance of diﬀerent learning approaches in small-scale domains (with
95% conﬁdence intervals)
Domain Approach

HG

TTG

TR

IL
𝐶𝐿1
𝐶𝐿2
IDL
JSAL
IL
𝐶𝐿1
𝐶𝐿2
IDL
JSAL
IL
𝐶𝐿1
𝐶𝐿2
IDL
JSAL

States Actions
21
22.5
52.5
25.4
441
25
26.5
42.5
29.27
625
36
48
148
41.01
1296

4
5.71
7.68
4
16
4
5.44
7.36
4
16
4
6
9.33
4
16

Q Values

Reward

Collision(%)

Step

84
128.48
403.2
101.6
7,056
100
144.16
312.8
117.08
10,000
144
288
1381.33
164.04
20,736

0.16±0.19
11.20±0.15
15.77±0.26
16.38±0.19
17.10±0.49
6.77±0.21
16.60±0.08
16.81±0.16
17.66±0.10
18.22±0.29
6.71±2.29
15.43±0.16
16.92±0.24
17.47±0.43
18.19±0.46

0.65±0.01
0.24±0.01
0.12±0.01
0.09±0.01
0.05±0.02
0.42±0.01
0.10±0.00
0.09±0.00
0.04±0.00
0.00±0.00
0.43±0.08
0.16±0.01
0.07±0.01
0.06±0.01
0.01±0.01

12.50±0.17
17.56±0.36
20.39±1.55
17.13±0.55
21.66±2.79
12.53±0.04
16.92±0.11
20.33±0.64
15.78±0.22
22.42±3.12
13.66±0.53
27.82±1.35
28.59±2.03
16.55±1.01
29.94±8.63

and the action space is 4 × 22/25 + 42 × 3/25 = 5.44. When using 𝐶𝐿2 , robots have

a longer scanning distance so that robots can detect 7 coordinated states in domain
TTG. The state and action spaces can be calculated accordingly. The average states
kept by the robots using approach IDL can be calculated based on the probability
of using the other robot’s state information during learning. As robots do not need
to use the action information of the other robot in approach IDL, the number of
actions kept by the robots is the same as that in approach IL. In all domains,

approaches IDL and CL only maintain very low computational complexities (in
terms of total Q values to be estimated), which are quite close to those in approach
IL. These approaches reduce computational complexities signiﬁcantly compared with
the centralised learning approach JSAL. This reduction is more desirable in largescale domains where the computational complexities using approach JSAL are too
high for the approach to be implemented eﬃciently, which can be veriﬁed by results
in large-scale domains given later.
In all small-scale domains, the proposed learning approaches IDL and CL can
achieve average rewards that are much higher than the rewards in approach IL and
are quite near to the optimal rewards in approach JSAL. The rewards of approach
IDL are higher than those of approach CL in all domains. Approaches 𝐶𝐿1 and
𝐶𝐿2 have almost the same performance in domains TTG and TR, but approach
𝐶𝐿2 can have a bit higher rewards than approach 𝐶𝐿1 , due to the longer scanning
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distances of robots in approach 𝐶𝐿2 . In domain HG, however, approach 𝐶𝐿2 can
signiﬁcantly increase the reward of using approach 𝐶𝐿1 . This phenomenon will be
explained in detail in the experimental analysis given below. The results of collision
percentage show that approaches IDL and CL decrease the likelihood of collision
compared with the uncoordinated approach IL.
Another important aspect showing the diﬀerent performances of these approaches
is the number of steps for both robots to reach their own goals. The steps of both
robots to reach their own goals are calculated in those runs when both robots do not
collide with each other and reach the goal successfully. The results show that robots
using approach IL always ﬁnd the shortest path to their goals, which, in turn, causes
a high probability of collision because robots do not coordinate with each other when
both come to potentially dangerous states where coordination is required. On the
contrary, approach JSAL receives the joint state-action information of both robots
so that a safe detour strategy will be learnt by both robots to reduce the probability
of collision, thus increasing the steps to the goals. The 95% conﬁdence intervals of
steps to goals also imply that approach JSAL is the most unstable approach, that
is, the policy in approach JSAL can be aﬀected by the stochastic learning process.
This means that if robots are “lucky” enough at the early exportation stage, they
can learn a short path to the goals. On the contrary, a much longer path is learnt
if the learning process is deviated from a better trajectory.
Analysis of Experimental Results in Small-Scale Domains
To have a better understanding of the various learning performances of the approaches, this subsection gives a detail analysis of the experimental results in smallscale domains. The analysis is conducted from three diﬀerent angles: 1) learning
dynamics, 2) steps to goals and 3) learnt independent degrees in the domains.
1) Learning dynamics
The learning dynamics in terms of average rewards gained by both robots in
small-scale domains are given by Figure 3.4- Figure 3.6, where x-axis indicates the
learning episode and y-axis indicates the reward averaged every 50 episodes. It can
be seen that approach JSAL can converge to an optimal value because it can receive
joint-state-action information of both robots. The optimal reward is a bit lower than
20 because of the stochastic exploration during the last 2000 episodes. Approach
JSAL, however, is not applicable in practise because the increase of searching space
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Figure 3.4: Learning dynamics of diﬀerent approaches in small-scale domain HG.
is exponential with the increase of the number of agents, and the assumptions of
a central controller or agents’ global observability are infeasible in most practical
problems. By contrast, approach IL can only achieve a very low reward due to the
lack of coordination. That is because the learning environment is non-stationary
when a robot is learning from the individual learner perspective, but the robot
does not account for this non-stationarity. Thus, the robot will continuously “catch
up” with the dynamic and adaptive learning environment, causing a suboptimal
performance which is much lower than that in optimal JSAL.
Robots using approach CL conduct their learning independently during the ﬁrst
1000 episodes and collect statistical information to determine the coordinated states
where coordination is most required. After that, the average reward dramatically
increases as robots can use the joint state-action information to lower the probability
of conﬂicts when they are in the coordinated states. Approach 𝐶𝐿1 and 𝐶𝐿2 ,
therefore, perform almost the same as IL during the ﬁrst 1000 episodes, but quickly
outperform IL after the coordinated states are determined at episode 1000. The
performance in approach CL, however, still remains at a sub-optimal level due to
an over estimation caused by the optimistic estimation mechanism, which always
chooses the highest 𝑄 value to update the learning information.
Robots using approach IDL also conduct their learning independently at the
beginning of the learning process because no dependent relationships between robots
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Figure 3.5: Learning dynamics of diﬀerent approaches in small-scale domain TTG.
are assumed beforehand. The robots then adapt the dependent relationships (in
terms of adapting independent degrees) dynamically during the learning process. In
this way, coordination can be achieved when there are low independent degrees in
some states indicating that robots are mutually dependent on each other for decision
making. Approach IDL can achieve a better performance than approach CL. The
learning curves of approach IDL converge more quickly than those of approach JSAL
and then gradually converge to the optimal values of approach JSAL.
In all, learning dynamics showed that the proposed approaches CL and IDL could
achieve higher average rewards than the independent learning approach IL and could
have faster convergence of learning processes than the centralised learning approach
JSAL.
2) Steps to Goals
Results in Table 3.2 show that diﬀerent ranges of coordinated states in approach
CL have various eﬀects on the learning performance in diﬀerent domains. To give a
better understanding of this phenomenon, 50 episodes in the last 2000 episodes in
each run are randomly sampled to trace the robots’ transitions to see how the robots
managed to solve the collision conﬂict using the four diﬀerent approaches. Figure 3.7
gives an illustration of robots’ transitions (not considering the collision with wall
caused by the exploration during the learning process) around the coordinated states
in HG and TTG domain using approach 𝐶𝐿1 and 𝐶𝐿2 . In TTG domain, 𝐶𝐿1
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Figure 3.6: Learning dynamics of diﬀerent approaches in small-scale domain TR.
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Figure 3.7: Illustration of robots’ transitions around the coordinated states in HG
and TTG domains using approach CL (The arrows represent one step transition
between two states and the associate number 𝑛 indicates the corresponding 𝑛-th
step of transition. Case1 and Case2 represent 𝐶𝐿1 and 𝐶𝐿2 , respectively.).
already obtains a very good performance with high rewards while expanding the
coordinated states larger in 𝐶𝐿2 does not improve the results much further. This
can be explained that in this domain, when both robots are around the entrance of
the tunnel, only one step of detour is suﬃcient to avoid the conﬂict at the entrance.
Thus, 3 coordinated states around the entrance using 𝐶𝐿1 are enough to capture the
most hazardous situation in this domain. The situation, however, is quite diﬀerent
in HG domain because 3 coordinated states are not suﬃcient to let the robots
make a big enough detour to avoid the conﬂicts when both robots are near the
doorway simultaneously. As can be seen from Figure 3.7 (a), robots still have a
high probability of colliding with each other near the doorway. That is why the
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performance of 𝐶𝐿1 in this domain is better than that of IL but still much worse
than the optimal performance of approach JSAL. When the robots learn with a
wider range of coordinated states as shown in Figure 3.7 (b), however, they can
have a large enough detour to avoid the collision, which correspondingly increases
the learning performance further in approach 𝐶𝐿2 .
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Figure 3.8: Illustration of robots’ transitions in the HG domain using the four
diﬀerent learning approaches.
Figure 3.8 gives an illustration of robots’ transitions in the HG domain when
robots have a scanning distance of 2 using the four diﬀerent approaches. As expected, robots using approach IL learn their policies independently, causing the
high probability of collisions around the doorway. Robots using approach CL can
determine coordinated states (i.e., the three states near the doorway) and then
combine each other’s state and action information for coordinated learning in these
states. That is why robot 𝑅2 can learn to make a tour by transiting to a point
beyond the doorway (i.e., transition 1 in Figure 3.8 (b)). However, because the new
state of robot 𝑅2 is not in the learnt coordinated states, robot 𝑅2 cannot receive
robot 𝑅1 ’s information for coordination in this new state. Although most of the
time, robot 𝑅2 can learn to avoid conﬂict with robot 𝑅1 by transiting to the right
side, in some cases, robot 𝑅2 will still transit back to the coordinated states (i.e.,
transition 2 in Figure 3.8 (b)), causing a collision near the doorway. This probability
of collision, however, is greatly reduced compared to that in approach IL. Figure
3.8 (c) shows the most likely occurring transitions when robots use approach IDL.
As robots can learn a value of independent degree in each state, they can combine
each other’s state information for coordination during each transition (with a different probability indicated by the value of the corresponding independent degree).
As can be seen from Figure 3.8 (c), robot 𝑅2 can successfully learn a big enough
detour by transiting from the right-up side of the doorway to the right side (i.e.,
transition 3 in Figure 3.8 (c)), which implies that the robots can learn a collision
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free strategy together. Comparing the transitions and corresponding performance
between approach CL and IDL, it provides a better understanding of the beneﬁt
of taking into account the uncertainties of independence between agents (robots)
in approach IDL (In approach CL, a fully dependence between robots is assumed
in those learnt coordinated states, while in the remaining states robots are fully
independent). Lastly, as stated above, robots using approach JSAL learn their policies in a centralised manner. Searching among a large number of state-action pairs
causes robots to learn large detour strategies to avoid potential collisions. A simple
illustration is given by Figure 3.8 (d).
Analysis in this part shows that the proposed two approaches can combine the
merits of the independent learning approach IL and the centralised learning approach JSAL, allowing robots to ﬁnd the shortest path to the goals with a higher
certainty while only making small detours around the states where coordination is
most needed. This is why the steps to goals in approach IDL and CL are a bit
higher than those in approach IL but much lower than those in approach JSAL.
3) Learnt Independent Degrees

Figure 3.9: Values of 1 − 𝜉 in small-scale domains from the perspective of robot 𝑅1
using approach IDL.
Figure 3.9 shows the estimated values of 1 − 𝜉 in three small domains from the

perspective of robot 𝑅1 using approach IDL. These values are averaged values of
the last 2000 episodes during 25 runs. These values signify the dependent degrees
(versus the independent degrees of 𝜉) between the robots. A higher value of 1 − 𝜉

means that a robot is more dependent on the other robot for decision-making. As
expected, the values of 1 − 𝜉 in the conﬂicting states, that is, the areas near the

entrance or doorway where robots are more inclined to collide with each other, are
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much higher than the values of those “safe” states where robot 𝑅1 can generally
choose its action without regard to robot 𝑅2 . It is also interesting to note that the
dependent degrees in domain TR are comparatively lower than those in the other
two domains. This can be easily explained by the fact that robots in domain TR
are not so tightly coupled because there is more than one route for the robots to
reach their own goals. This is the opposite of domain HG and TTG, where only one
route is available so that the robots are heavily dependent on each other for decisionmaking, especially in the conﬂicting states, consequently causing high values of 1 −𝜉
near these states.

Figure 3.9 shows that the independent degrees can be well learnt to reﬂect the
real levels of independence between the robots. As the independent degrees indicate the necessity of coordination between the robots, approach IDL enables robots
to conduct coordinated learning processes only when it is necessary during the dynamic adaptation of these independent degrees, which accordingly decreases the
high computation complexity when using the centralised learning approach JSAL.
3.4.2.2 Results and Analysis in Large-Scale Domains
Results in Large-Scale Domains
Table 3.3 gives the overall performance of the learning approaches in large-scale domains. The general patterns of results in small-scale domains can also be observed
in these large-scale domains. In all domains, approaches IDL and CL reduced the
computational complexities signiﬁcantly compared with the centralised learning approach JSAL and only maintained very low computational complexities, which are
quite close to those in approach IL. Generally speaking, approaches IDL and CL
can achieve higher average rewards than approach IL except in domain SUNY where
coordinated behaviors are not really needed between the robots. In several domains
(MIT, SUNY and CMU), the rewards achieved by the centralised learning approach
JSAL are lower than those achieved by the other approaches. This phenomenon will
be discussed below.
Analysis of Experimental Results in Large-Scale Domains
The fundamental diﬀerence between these large-scale domains in Figure 3.3 and the
domains in Figure 3.1 is that interactions in these large-scale domains occur much
less frequently than those in the domains in Figure 3.1. Robots are independent of
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Table 3.3: Performance of diﬀerent learning approaches in large-scale domains (with
95% conﬁdence intervals)
Domain

ISR

MIT

PTG

CIT

SUNY

CMU

Approach

States

IL
𝐶𝐿1
𝐶𝐿2
IDL
JSAL
IL
𝐶𝐿1
𝐶𝐿2
IDL
JSAL
IL
𝐶𝐿1
𝐶𝐿2
IDL
JSAL
IL
𝐶𝐿1
𝐶𝐿2
IDL
JSAL
IL
𝐶𝐿1
𝐶𝐿2
IDL
JSAL
IL
𝐶𝐿1
𝐶𝐿2
IDL
JSAL

43
47
60.5
45.75
1849
49
61
193
54.76
2401
52
53.5
64
55.66
2704
70
71.5
82
76.00
4900
74
75.5
81.5
79.86
5476
133
145
193
141.74
17689

Actions Q Values
4
5.12
5.95
4
16
4
5.50
8.41
4
16
4
4.69
5.38
4
16
4
4.51
5.03
4
16
4
4.49
4.81
4
16
4
4.54
5.08
4
16

172
240.64
359.98
183
29,584
196
345
1622.78
219.04
38,416
208
250.92
344.62
222.64
43,264
280
322.47
412.34
304
78,400
296
339.00
392.08
319.44
87,616
532
658.3
980.96
566.96
283,024

Reward

Collision(%)

Step

10.11±2.61
14.05±0.17
15.76±0.26
15.74±0.25
16.86±0.30
16.84±1.23
16.92±0.55
16.98±0.67
17.20±0.72
16.49±0.38
12.18±3.75
15.25±0.35
16.24±0.41
17.12±0.43
17.76±0.43
15.10±2.98
15.65±0.55
15.85±0.52
16.02±1.94
16.81±0.45
19.10±0.42
18.77±0.45
18.97±0.39
18.80±0.64
17.60±0.32
17.03±0.86
17.25±0.65
17.65±0.54
17.69±0.69
-9.96±1.41

0.32±0.09
0.15±0.01
0.10±0.02
0.10±0.00
0.06±0.01
0.08±0.02
0.07±0.01
0.07±0.01
0.05±0.02
0.02±0.01
0.24±0.13
0.13±0.03
0.09±0.02
0.06±0.01
0.04±0.01
0.12±0.10
0.10±0.08
0.08±0.03
0.08±0.06
0.03±0.01
0.01±0.01
0.02±0.01
0.02±0.02
0.02±0.02
0.02±0.01
0.03±0.02
0.02±0.02
0.01±0.01
0.02±0.02
0.05±0.01

6.28±0.26
12.54±0.42
12.96±0.63
10.67±0.45
14.56±5.10
23.15±0.98
29.56±1.53
31.25±1.65
25.11±1.17
44.02±4.57
10.04±1.06
12.51±1.36
12.84±1.71
11.27±1.40
14.32±4.30
20.87±0.80
22.26±1.36
22.35±1.42
22.04±1.42
22.42±1.92
12.17±0.14
14.46±1.36
16.26±1.98
12.94±1.00
26.47±3.98
42.65±1.81
47.56±2.36
53.02±3.04
44.04±2.15
236.50±9.62

each other in most states so that explicit coordination actions are not often required.
This explains why in some domains such as MIT, CIT, SUNY and CMU, the independent learning approach IL already achieves a very good performance. Even in
these domains, the proposed learning approaches can still improve the performance
further with the exception of domain SUNY where coordination is not necessary at
all. It is noted that the minor diﬀerence between the reward of 18.80 in approach
IDL and 19.10 in approach IL in domain SUNY is caused by the extra exploration
introduced by the coordinated learning process in approaches IDL. This is also the
case for approach CL. In all other domains where coordination is more necessary,
the beneﬁt that this coordinated learning process brings outweighs the uncertainties
it causes so that the performance of using coordinated learning is much better than
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Figure 3.10: Learning dynamics of diﬀerent approaches in large-scale domain CMU.
Another interesting ﬁnding in Table 3.3 is that as the state and action sizes
grow, the performance of the centralised learning approach JSAL decreases. This is
because approach JSAL searches the whole state-action space, thus robots cannot
learn the optimal policy in 10, 000 learning episodes. For example, in the CMU
domain, there are 17, 689 × 16 = 283, 024 𝑄 values to be estimated. Figure 3.10
plots the learning dynamics of the four learning approaches in the CMU domain3 .
It can be seen that approach JSAL converges too slowly to reach the optimal value.
The proposed learning approach CL, however, only needs to consider the joint-stateaction information when a robot is in the coordinated states which usually account
for a small proportion of the whole domain state space, and the approach IDL only
needs to consider the joint state information when the independent degrees signify
that it is necessary. In this way, the search space is reduced substantially compared
with approach JSAL. That is why approaches CL and IDL can converge faster than
approach JSAL.
3

The learning curve of approach 𝐶𝐿2 overlaps with the learning curves of approaches 𝐶𝐿1 and
IL. To reduce redundancy, the learning curve of approach 𝐶𝐿2 is not depicted in Figure 3.10.
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Discussions

To solve a coordinate MAL problem, a straightway is to let each agent treat the
remaining agents simply as part of the environment by ignoring their actions and
rewards and learn its policy independently. This results in a large reduction in the
state-action representation. At the same time, however, a poor learning outcome
might occur because of the lack of coordination. The standard convergence proof for
single-agent learning does not hold anymore, because the actions of the other agents
are ignored in the representation of the learning information while these agents
also change their behaviors while learning. This independent learning approach,
therefore, provides a valid perspective to study the so-called “moving target” eﬀect
complicating general MAL problems.
On the other hand, a coordinated MAL problem can be solved in a centralised
way based on the complete information of all the agents. This kind of approach,
however, faces some tricky issues in MAL, including: 1) curse of dimensionality, which means that the search space grows rapidly with the complexity of agent
behaviors, the number of agents and the size of domains; 2) limited observability and restricted communication, which means that agents might not have
access to the complete information (states, actions and rewards of other agents) for
learning due to the observability limits and communication constraints; and 3) slow
convergence, which means that it may take many steps to explore all joint actions
for every state, which results in a slow convergence to the optimal policy.
A middle ground solution to coordinated MAL problems is therefore to combine
the merits of both independent learning and centralised learning approaches by
using independent learning when agents are independent of each other, and using
centralised learning when coordination is required among the agents. This is because
the independent learning process can take advantage of the agents’ independence
from one another in order to achieve computational savings, while the centralised
learning process can take advantage of the information from other agents to mitigate
the uncertainties of the learning environment in order to improve learning.
The two proposed approaches in this chapter are driven by the fact that many
real-world MASs can exhibit a large amount of context-speciﬁc independence so that
a general decision-making problem in these MASs can be decomposed eﬃciently into
sub-problems which are easier to solve [RSV07]. In this kind of MASs, agents can
be loosely coupled and diﬀerent levels of independent relationships among agents

3.6. Summary

74

can conﬁne coordinated behaviors to some speciﬁc parts of the environment. Agents
thus only need to consider other agents’ information for coordination when they are
in these speciﬁc parts of environments. In this way, the computational complexity
during learning can be greatly reduced, while at the same time, a good learning
performance can be guaranteed.
The two proposed approaches do not require prior knowledge about the domain structure or assumptions about the learning agents. These features set the
approaches apart from most existing approaches in the literature and render them
potentially suitable for wider practical applications. Experimental results showed
that robots using the proposed approaches CL and IDL could learn where and how
to coordinate their behaviors eﬃciently in loosely coupled MASs. Both approaches
outperformed the uncoordinated approach IL by considering coordination when necessary (i.e. in the coordinated states or in the states with high dependent degrees).
On the other hand, the proposed approaches reduced the state-action space considerably when using the centralised approach JSAL and enabled robots to learn a
shorter path to the goal with higher certainty than approach JSAL. By removing
the assumption of central controller or agents’ global observability of the environment, approaches CL and IDL solve more realistic problems than approach JSAL,
and can achieve a good performance while only require limited information during
the learning process. Approach IDL could eﬃciently learn the independent degrees
in order to quantify agent independence so that an eﬃcient coordination policy can
be achieved with a low computational complexity. In all domains, the on-line learning approach IDL performed slightly better than the oﬀ-line learning approach CL
by considering the uncertainties of independence and without acquiring the other
robot’s action information during the coordinated learning process.

3.6

Summary

In this chapter, two approaches were proposed to solve coordinated MAL problems by exploiting agent independence in loosely coupled MASs. Some fundamental
concepts such as coordinated states, agent independence and independent degrees
were formally deﬁned. The two approaches were tested in diﬀerent scales of robot
navigation domains. Experimental results showed that robots using the proposed
approaches could learn eﬃcient coordinated behaviors in these domains.

Chapter 4
A Collective Multi-Agent Learning
Framework for the Emergence of Social
Norms
This chapter proposes a collective MAL framework to study the impact of agent local
collective learning on the emergence of social norms in networked MASs. Section 4.1
describes networked MASs and social norms. Section 4.2 presents the collective
MAL framework. Section 4.3 gives experimental studies. Section 4.4 lays out some
discussions. Finally, Section 4.5 summarises this chapter.

4.1

Networked Multi-Agent Systems and Social
Norms

This section introduces the formal description of networked MASs and social norms.

4.1.1

Networked Multi-Agent Systems

Deﬁnition 4.1 A networked MAS can be represented as an undirected graph
𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸), where 𝑉 = {𝑣1 , ..., 𝑣𝑛 } is a set of vertices (agents) and 𝐸 ⊆ 𝑉 × 𝑉

represents a set of edges, each of which connects two interacting vertices (agents).

Deﬁnition 4.2 Given a networked MAS (𝑉, 𝐸), the neighbors of agent 𝑖, which
are denoted as 𝑁(𝑖), are a set of agents such that 𝑁(𝑖) = {𝑣𝑗 ∣ (𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗 ) ∈ 𝐸} and
𝑁(𝑖) ⊂ 𝑉 .

This chapter focuses primarily on the following three types of topologies to represent a networked MAS.
(1) Grid networks. A grid network is a two-dimensional lattice with four
neighbors for each inner node, three neighbors for each boundary node and two
75
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neighbors for each corner node. In reality, parallel computing clusters and multicore processors are usually organized as a grid network. 𝐺𝑅𝑁 is used to denote a
grid network, where 𝑁 is the number of nodes.
(2) Small-world networks. This kind of network is to represent the smallworld phenomenon in many natural, social and computer networks, where each
node has only a small number of neighbors, and yet can reach any other node in
a small number of hops. Small-world networks feature a high clustering coeﬃcient
and a short average path length. This kind of networks appears in many social
networks such as the collaboration networks of ﬁlm actors and academic researchers
and the friendship networks of high school students [AB02]. 𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑘,𝜌 is used to denote
a small-world network, where 𝑘 is the average size of the neighborhood of a node,
𝜌 is the re-wiring probability to indicate the diﬀerent orders of randomness of the
network and 𝑁 is the number of nodes.
(3) Scale-free networks. This kind of network is characterised by the power
law of degree distribution of nodes, which means that a few “rich” nodes have high
connectivity degrees, while the remaining nodes have low connectivity degrees. The
probability that a node has 𝑘 neighbors is roughly proportional to 𝑘 −𝜆 . Examples
of scale-free networks include the network of citations of scientiﬁc papers [Red98]
and links between web pages on the World Wide Web [AB02]. These networks
exhibit the feature of “preferential attachment”, which means that the likelihood of
connecting to a node depends on the connectivity degree of this node. 𝑆𝐹𝑁𝑘,𝜆 is used
to denote a scale-free network, where 𝑁 is the number of nodes.

(a) Grid Network

(b) Small-world Network

(c) Scale-free Network

Figure 4.1: An example of the three kinds of networks.
Figure 4.1 gives an example of these three kinds of networks. A more detailed
explanation of these networks is given by [AB02, BLM+ 06].
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Coordination Games and Social Norms

Social norms, such as driving on a particular side of the road, tipping in restaurants
and not littering in parks are ubiquitous in our daily life and play a pivotal role
in regulating and guiding individual behaviors in human societies. Conformity to
norms can reduce social conﬂict, mitigate cognitive load and thus sustain social
order in the whole society [SA07]. This research is to study how agents can learn
to establish a social norm in networked MASs via agent local collective learning. A
social norm is deﬁned as a restriction on the set of actions available to the agents
by Deﬁnition 4.3.
Deﬁnition 4.3 A social norm is a convention or law that restricts the agents’
behaviors to one particular action [ST97].
A social norm is said to have been established when all (or at least the majority
of) agents in the society have complied with the same action. One performance
measure that can be used to evaluate how fast social norms arise in a society is the
convergence time 𝑇𝑐 for a given level of convergence 𝑐 so that 𝑅𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝑇𝑐 holds for

𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝑐 , where 𝑅𝑡 is the convergence ratio of a society at time 𝑡 (i.e., the fraction
of agents adopting the majority action). Following most of previous studies, this
research will focus on the study of the average time 𝑇90% .
This chapter uses the learning “rules of the road” [SA07, You96] as a metaphor
to study the emergence of norms. In this scenario, agents strive to establish a
convention of driving either on the left (L) or on the right (R) of the road. This
interaction can be viewed as a 2-person 2-choice symmetric coordination game [ST97,
You96], with the payoﬀ matrix displayed in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Payoﬀ matrix of the 2-person 2-choice symmetric Coordination Game
(𝑥 > 𝑣 and 𝑦 > 𝑢)
Left (L) Right (R)
Left (L)
𝑥, 𝑥
𝑢, 𝑢
Right (R)
𝑣, 𝑣
𝑦, 𝑦
Although its payoﬀ matrix appears simple, the coordination game poses a very

challenging puzzle for human beings to solve eﬃciently. The game has two pure
Nash-equilibria: both agents drive on the left and both agents drive on the right.
Classical game theory, however, does not give a coherent account of how people
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would play a game like this. The problem is that there is nothing in the game structure itself that allows the players (even purely rational players) to infer what they
ought to do. In reality, people can play such games because they can rely on some
contextual cues to agree on a particular equilibrium [You96]. One such contextual
cue is social norms (i.e., conventions and laws) that can be used to guide human behaviors when moral or rational reasoning does not provide a clear guidance because
of the myopic behavior and the limited processing ability of individuals [BIS11].

4.2

A Collective Multi-Agent Learning Framework

This section introduces the proposed collective MAL framework for norm emergence
in networked MASs. Subsection 4.2.1 gives the principle of the framework and
Subsection 4.2.2 introduces the ensemble learning methods used in the proposed
collective MAL framework.

4.2.1

The Principle of The Collective Learning Framework

Algorithm 7: The collective learning framework
1 Initialise network and learning parameters;
2 Initialise exploration mode indicator /∗ m=0: local exploration; m=1:global
exploration∗/;
3 for each step t (t=1,...,T) do
4
for each agent 𝑖 (i=1,...,n) do
5
if 𝑚 == 0 then
6
for each neighbor 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁(𝑖) of agent 𝑖 do
7
Agent 𝑖 chooses a best-response action 𝑎𝑖→𝑗 regarding agent 𝑗
using a learning policy with exploration;
8
Agent 𝑖 combines all the actions 𝑎𝑖→𝑗 to a ﬁnal action 𝑎𝑖 using
ensemble learning methods;
9
else
10
for each neighbor 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁(𝑖) of agent 𝑖 do
11
Agent 𝑖 chooses a best-response action 𝑎𝑖→𝑗 regarding agent 𝑗
using a learning policy without exploration;
12
Agent 𝑖 combines all the actions 𝑎𝑖→𝑗 to action 𝑎′𝑖 ;
13
Agent 𝑖 chooses ﬁnal action 𝑎𝑖 based on 𝑎′𝑖 with exploration;
14

15

Agent 𝑖 plays action 𝑎𝑖 with all the neighbors and receives reward 𝑟𝑖→𝑗
regarding each neighbor 𝑗;
Agent 𝑖 updates learning information regarding each neighbor 𝑗 using
⟨𝑎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖→𝑗 ⟩;
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The sketch of the collective learning framework is given by Algorithm 7. All
agents in a society interact repeatedly and simultaneously with their neighbors. At
each time step, each agent needs to determine an action to play with its neighbors.
For each of its neighbors, agent 𝑖 chooses a best-response action using a speciﬁc
learning strategy. In order to study the impact of diﬀerent levels of uncertainties
caused by exploration on the learning performance, two diﬀerent modes of conducting exploration during learning are proposed. The ﬁrst one is called local exploration,
denoted as collective learning-l, in which the agent conducts exploration before combining the actions regarding the neighbors into a ﬁnal action (Lines 5-8). The other
is called global exploration, denoted as collective learning-g, in which the agent conducts exploration after combining the actions regarding each neighbors into a ﬁnal
action (Lines 9-13).
The two diﬀerent kinds of exploration modes can be set according to the system designer’s purpose in diﬀerent situations. If an agents is set to use the local
exploration mode, the agent chooses a best-response action regarding each neighbor
using a speciﬁc learning strategy with exploration (Line 7). The actions for all the
neighbors are then aggregated into an overall action using ensemble learning techniques (Line 8). These ensemble learning techniques will be described in detail in
Subsection 4.2.2. If an agent is set to use the global exploration mode, the agent
determines the greedy action using a learning strategy regarding each of its neighbors (Line 11) and then aggregates these actions for all the neighbors into an overall
action (Line 12). Exploration is then conducted when the agent chooses the ﬁnal
action based on the aggregated overall action (Line 13). After determining the ﬁnal
action 𝑎𝑖 , the agent then plays this action with all its neighbors simultaneously and
receives the corresponding reward regarding each neighbor (Line 14). Finally, agent
𝑖 updates the learning information regarding each neighbor using the ﬁnal action
and corresponding reward (Line 15).
Diﬀerent learning strategies can be used for the interaction with each neighbor
to determine the corresponding best-response action. This chapter mainly uses Qlearning [WD92]. In the collective learning framework (e.g., local exploration), each
agent keeps a Q-value table for each of its neighbors. At each time step, regarding
each neighbor, agent 𝑖 chooses the best-response action with the highest Q-value
based on the corresponding Q-value table with a probability of 1 − 𝜀 and chooses

other actions randomly with a probability of 𝜀. Agent 𝑖 then collectively make a
decision by aggregating all the actions into a ﬁnal action 𝑎𝑖 and plays this action
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with its neighbors at the same time. The Q-value table regarding each neighbor
then can be updated based on the Q-learning update rule after the agent receives
the immediate reward.
The proposed collective learning framework is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
paired learning framework that has been adopted in most previous studies [VSMS11,
SS10, VSSM09]. In the paired learning framework, at each time step, each agent
is randomly paired with one of its neighbors for interaction and the agent directly
learns from the interaction either through a best response rule [SS10] or a memorybased rule [VSSM09]. The collective learning framework, however, imitates the
opinion aggregation process in human decision making because people usually seek
several opinions before making a ﬁnal decision [Pol06]. As the ﬁnal decision of an
agent is aﬀected by all its neighbors, this collective learning can have a signiﬁcant
impact on the emergence of social norms in the whole society in diﬀerent conditions
(e.g., diﬀerent network topologies, ensemble methods or heterogeneities of agents).

4.2.2

Ensemble Methods in Agent Learning

Ensemble learning methods have been extensively studied in supervised learning to
make more accurate predictions or classiﬁcations [Pol06]. The idea behind ensemble
learning methods is to weigh several individual classiﬁers and then combine them
in order to make a ﬁnal decision that will be better than the one made by each of
them separately. Although ensemble learning is used for the aim of increasing learning speed and improving ﬁnal performance, it has been employed in diﬀerent forms
in a reinforcement learning setting. The diﬀerent ways in which ensemble learning
is used lies in the diﬀerent ways of deﬁning the action choices. For example, the
action choices can be deﬁned as diﬀerent learning algorithms [WvH08], diversiﬁed
function approximations in terms of neural network topologies and weights [FS11],
or state-value functions [HU10]. In the proposed framework, however, the actions
that need to be aggregated are the focal agent’s best-response actions towards each
of its neighbors in every interaction. The agent needs to combine all these actions
to make a ﬁnal decision by considering each neighbor’s position (e.g., degree of connectivity) as well as the neighbor’s performance in past interactions. The ensemble
learning imitates the human collective decision making process in that people usually consult with many others before making a ﬁnal decision. People consider not
only others’ individual characteristics, such as intelligence and knowledge, but also
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their reputation, social position and power [JI07].
Formally, let 𝑎∗𝑡,𝑗 be the best-response action for neighbor 𝑗 at time 𝑡 and 𝑎𝑡
be the aggregated ﬁnal action. We enumerate the set of actions for each agent as
𝐴 = {𝑎[1], ..., 𝑎[𝑀]}, where 𝑀 is the number of actions available. The selection

of this ﬁnal action is then denoted as 𝜋𝑡 (𝑎[ℎ]), 𝑎[ℎ] ∈ 𝐴. The value of 𝑝𝑡 (𝑎[ℎ])

represents the focal agent’s preference for action 𝑎[ℎ]. The ﬁnal action 𝑎𝑡 can then
be determined by:
⎧
⎨ 1 if 𝑎[ℎ] = arg max 𝑝𝑡 (𝑎),
𝑎
𝜋𝑡 (𝑎[ℎ]) =
⎩ 0 otherwise.

(4.1)

We use the following methods to calculate 𝑝𝑡 (𝑎[ℎ]).

(1) Majority voting. The preference values are calculated by the majority
voting ensemble method as follows:

𝑝𝑡 (𝑎[ℎ]) =

∣𝑁 (𝑖)∣

∑

𝐼(𝑎[ℎ], 𝑎∗𝑡,𝑗 )

(4.2)

𝑗=1

where ∣𝑁(𝑖)∣ is the number of neighbors of focal agent 𝑖 and 𝐼(𝑎[ℎ], 𝑎∗𝑡,𝑗 ) is an indicator function deﬁned by:

𝐼(𝑎[ℎ], 𝑎∗𝑡,𝑗 ) =

{

1 if 𝑎[ℎ] = 𝑎∗𝑡,𝑗 ,
0

otherwise.

(4.3)

The most preferred action is simply the one that is suggested by most of the
neighbors. The principle of this method reﬂects the fact that people are social
beings and can be inﬂuenced by each other so that people are more prone to accept
the opinion that is adopted by the majority of their neighbors [JI07].
(2) Weighted voting. The majority voting method simply counts the number
of each action as the preference for corresponding action. However, each agent in
the network can occupy diﬀerent positions and thus can play a diﬀerent role in
shaping the norms of the whole society. For example, in scale-free networks, the
power law distribution of the degree of connectivity of the nodes means that a few
“rich” nodes can have high degrees of connectivity. The decisions of these powerful
nodes are pivotal in the society. Assume that the decision regarding neighbor 𝑗 is
weighed by weight 𝑤𝑡,𝑗 . The weighted voting method can be given by:

𝑝𝑡 (𝑎[ℎ]) =

∣𝑁 (𝑖)∣

∑
𝑗=1

𝑤𝑡,𝑗 𝐼(𝑎[ℎ], 𝑎∗𝑡,𝑗 )

(4.4)
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Several diﬀerent ways can be used to determine weights 𝑤𝑡,𝑗 . Here, two approaches are proposed as follows:
∙ Structure-based approach. This approach considers the diﬀerent structural

position of each agent in the network. A straightforward way of deﬁning the
structure-based weight of each agent is to use the agent’s degree of connectivity.
Therefore, the weight 𝑤𝑡,𝑗 of neighbor 𝑗 can be calculated as follows:

𝑤𝑡,𝑗 =

∣𝑁(𝑗)∣

∣𝑁 (𝑖)∣

∑
𝑙=1

(4.5)

∣𝑁(𝑙)∣

where ∣𝑁(𝑗)∣ is the number of neighbors of neighbor 𝑗, ∣𝑁(𝑖)∣ is the number of
neighbors of focal agent 𝑖 and ∣𝑁(𝑙)∣ is the number of neighbors of neighbor 𝑙.

∙ Performance-based approach. This approach determines each neighbor’s

weight according to past interaction experience between this neighbor and the
focal agent. If a neighbor’s action is always consistent with the agent’s own
action, the agent will then consider the neighbor to be more trustworthy and
accordingly assign a higher weight to this neighbor. This is driven by the fact
that in the real world a person who has a higher reputation will have a greater
inﬂuence on biasing the opinions in a society. So, we have:

𝑤𝑡,𝑗 = 𝑤𝑡−1,𝑗 + 𝛽(𝑠 − 𝑤𝑡−1,𝑗 )
where 𝑤0,𝑗 =

1
;
∣𝑁 (𝑗)∣

(4.6)

𝛽 is a learning rate; and 𝑠 = 1 if interaction at time 𝑡 − 1

is successful, otherwise 𝑠 = 0. The interaction is successful if the interaction
brings a positive reward to the agent, namely, the actions of the interacting
agents are consistent with each other.

4.3

Experiments and Analysis

This section ﬁrst gives the basic settings of the experiments and then presents the
results and analysis by evaluating the proposed framework in a number of diﬀerent
settings in terms of agent heterogeneities and network topologies.
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Experimental Settings

The pure coordination game [You96] is used to formulate the interaction between
two neighboring agents, with 𝑥 = 𝑦 = +1 and 𝑢 = 𝑣 = −1 in Table 4.1. The

Watts-Strogatz model [WS98] is used to generate a small-world network 𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑘,𝜌 and
the Barabasi-Albert model [AB02] is used to generate a scale-free network 𝑆𝐹𝑁𝑘,𝜆.
To use the Barabasi-Albert model, there are 𝑚0 = 5 agents initially and a new agent
with 𝑚 = 1 edge is added to the network at every time step. This network evolves
into a scale-free network 𝑆𝐹𝑁𝑘,3 following a power law with an exponent 𝜆 = 3.
In the experiments, unless speciﬁcally stated otherwise, the small-world network is
used as the default network topology due to the variety of this kind of network, Qlearning as the learning strategy due to its quick emergence speed, majority voting
as the ensemble method due to its simplicity and the local exploration mode as the
exploration mode due to its low uncertainties in learning.
The experiments investigate the following issues:
∙ Issue 1: The convergence of social norms and impact of exploration
modes

The ﬁrst and most fundamental issue is to test whether a social norm can
successfully emerge in the whole society in the proposed collective learning
framework. If a norm does emerge, what is the rate of such an emergence?
What is the impact of diﬀerent exploration modes on the norm emergence?
∙ Issue 2: The impact of agents’ cognitive deﬁciencies

To have a better understanding of the merits of the collective learning framework compared with the paired learning framework in previous studies, both
frameworks are tested in heterogeneous societies where agents have varying
cognitive capabilities by receiving noisy feedbacks from the environment. Each
agent has a probability of 𝑝𝑐 to receive a transformed payoﬀ 𝑟 ± 𝜎 2 (𝑟 = ±1 is
the original payoﬀ). Probability 𝑝𝑐 and noise 𝜎 2 indicate the diﬀerent cognitive

capabilities of the agents. 𝑝𝑐 is set to 0.2 and 𝜎 2 is chosen from {1, 3, 4, 5} to

indicate diﬀerent levels of cognitive deﬁciencies.

∙ Issue 3: The impact of agents’ learning strategies

It is also interesting to investigate whether the proposed framework is robust
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enough for diﬀerent learning strategies adopted by the agents. Three learning strategies are used for agent interactions : Q-Learning [WD92], WoLFPHC [BV02] and Fictitious Play (FP) [FL98]. Q-learning has been widely
used in MASs, but converges only to pure strategies. Learning rate 𝛼 is set
to 0.1 and the discount factor 𝛾 is set to 0 because the stateless version of
Q-learning is used. WoLF-PHC can learn mixed strategies and is guaranteed
to converge to a Nash equilibrium. However, it is not clear whether it is
guaranteed to converge in the collective learning framework. In WoLF-PHC,
learning rate 𝛼𝑤 is set to 0.04 when the agent is winning and learning rate 𝛼𝑙
is set to 0.01 when the agent is losing. Finally, an FP player uses the historical frequency count of its opponent’s past actions and tries to maximise the
expected payoﬀ by playing a best response to that mixed strategy represented
by this frequency distribution. The learning rate is set to 0.1.
∙ Issue 4: The impacts of population sizes, the number of neighbors/actions and the randomness of networks

The population size, the number of neighbors/actions and the randomness
of the network are important factors which inﬂuence the emergence of social
norms [SA07, SS10]. Agent number 𝑁 in network 𝑆𝑊𝑁12,0.8 is varied in the
𝑘,0.8
range of [50, 1000], number of neighbors 𝑘 in network 𝑆𝑊100
is varied in the
12,𝜌
set of {4, 6, 8, 12, 20}, randomness of network 𝜌 in network 𝑆𝑊100
is varied

12,0.8
in the set of {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}, number of actions in network 𝑆𝑊100
is

varied in the set 𝑁𝑎 = {2, 4, 6, 10, 20}. When agents have more than two ac-

tion choices, only when the agents choose the same action will they receive a
payoﬀ of 1. Otherwise, they receive a payoﬀ of −1.
∙ Issue 5: The impact of ensemble learning methods

Due to the diﬀerent features of the three kinds of networks, the collective
learning framework is also tested to discover the impact of diﬀerent ensemble
learning methods on norm emergence in these three kinds of networks .

∙ Issue 6: The impact of non-learning agents

A small proportion of agents with ﬁxed strategies in a population can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence norm emergence in the whole system [FGJ13]. To study
the eﬀect of non-learning agents in shaping the emergence of norms, diﬀerent
numbers of agents with ﬁxed actions or strategies are placed in the society
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to discover these agents’ impact on the emergence of social norms. It is also
interesting to investigate whether some non-learning agents playing contradictory strategies in diﬀerent areas of the network can cause sub-norms in the
whole society.
The parameter settings are summarised in Table 4.2 for clarity.
Table 4.2: Parameter settings for collective MAL for norm emergence
Categories
Network

Parameters
𝑁
𝑘
𝜌
𝑚0
𝑚
𝜆

Learning
algorithm

Others

4.3.2

𝛼
𝛼𝑙
𝛼𝑤
𝛾
𝜀
𝛽
𝑝𝑐
𝑁𝑎
𝜎2

Parameters in the experiments
Meanings
Values
number of agents
[50, 1000]
average size of neighborhoods in small{4, 6, 8, 12, 20}
world networks
re-wiring probability in small-world net[0, 1]
works
initial agents to generate small-world net5
works
edge added to the network at every time
1
step in small-world networks
the exponent value of power law in scale3
free networks
learning rate in Q-learning and FP
0.1
learning rate when losing in WoLF-PHC
0.1
learning rate when wining in WoLF-PHC
0.04
discount factor in Q-learning
0
𝜀-exploration rate
0.1
learning rate to adjust the weight
0.8
probability of having cognitive deﬁciency
0.2
{2, 4, 6, 10, 20} number of actions available to the agents
noise of payoﬀ
{1, 3, 4, 5}

Experimental Results and Analysis

This subsection presents experimental results and analysis in each of the six issues
laid out in the experimental settings.
Issue 1: The convergence of social norms and impact of exploration modes
12,0.8
The proposed framework is ﬁrst tested in network 𝑆𝑊100
and compared with the

paired learning framework that has been adopted in most previous studies [VSMS11,
SS10, VSSM09]. In the paired-learning framework, at each time step, each agent
is randomly paired with one of its neighbors for interaction and the agent learns
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directly from this interaction either through a best response rule [VSMS11, SS10],
or a memory-based rule [VSMS11, VSSM09]. The experiment runs 1000 independent
runs and the results are shown in Table 4.3, which presents the frequency and success
ratio of converging to a social norm, the ﬁnal average agent reward of the society
and the speed to evolve a norm.
12,0.8
Table 4.3: Norm emergence after 1000 runs in network 𝑆𝑊100

Paired learning
Collective learning-l
Collective learning-g

Norm(L)
506
493
522

Norm(R)
494
507
478

Success(%)
100
100
100

Reward
0.80
0.99
0.80

Speed(𝑇%90 )
33
7
10

From Table 4.3, it can be seen that a social norm can successfully emerge under
the three frameworks (with 100% probability) and that agents converge to norm
(Left) and norm (Right) with an almost equal probability. This makes sense because
the game structure itself does not give any preference for any particular action
to be the norm. The norm to which the whole population of agents converges
depends on which norm is detected by the agents at ﬁrst glance during the dynamics
of agent interaction. The average reward of all the agents in the society using
collective learning-l is almost 1, which means that nearly all the agents have reached
a consensus on which action should be the norm. The rewards using collective
learning-g and paired learning are much lower than that using collective learning-l
because agents are exploring the environment with a probability of 𝜀 = 0.1. However,
because agents using collective learning-l explore the environment locally and make
a ﬁnal decision collectively, the uncertainties caused by the exploration decrease.
The time steps needed for 90% of the agents to choose the same action as a social
norm under three frameworks diﬀer dramatically. The collective learning framework
is able to evolve a norm much faster than the paired learning framework.
Figure 4.2 shows the dynamics of the average reward of the whole population
and Figure 4.3 shows the frequency of each action adopted by the agents when norm
(Left) emerges in the population. Initially, each agent randomly chooses an action,
so there are about 50% of the agents choosing action L and the other 50% choosing
action R. This results in the average payoﬀ of 0 in the whole population. As the
learning process moves on, however, the number of agents who choose action L as the
norm increases. This means that more and more agents have reached a consensus
on that action L should be the norm and this consensus correspondingly increases
the average payoﬀ dramatically.
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Dynamics of average reward of the society
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Figure 4.2: Emergence of social norms in 𝑆𝑊100
(averaged over 1000 runs).
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Figure 4.3: Emergence of social norms in 𝑆𝑊100
(averaged over 1000 runs).

Results show that the norm emerges faster under the collective learning framework than under the paired learning framework. This is because agents using collective learning can learn directly from all of their neighbors at the same time to
decrease the diversity among the agents. These results conﬁrm that the collective
leaning framework is a more eﬃcient mechanism for the emergence of social norms.
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Convergence of social norms with different cognitive deficiencies
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Figure 4.4: Dynamics of the action frequency with diﬀerent cognitive deﬁciencies in
12,0.8
network 𝑆𝑊100
(averaged over 100 runs).
Issue 2: The impact of agents’ cognitive deﬁciencies
12,0.8
Figure 4.4 shows the dynamics of the action frequency in network 𝑆𝑊100
with

diﬀerent levels of cognitive deﬁciency 𝜎 2 . The results show that a society in the
collective learning framework is able to maintain a higher convergence ratio and a
quicker convergence speed, compared with a society in the paired learning framework. In both cases, as the cognitive deﬁciency 𝜎 2 increases, the convergence speed
slows down. This is because it is more diﬃcult for the agents in societies with larger
values of 𝜎 2 to distinguish the eﬀects of their actions on the environment and these
uncertainties can hinder the agents from reaching consensus with others in the society. However, the diﬀerence in the convergence speed using collective learning is
not as signiﬁcant as that using paired learning. This indicates that the collective
learning framework can mitigate the uncertainties caused by the agents’ cognitive
deﬁciencies and is more eﬃcient and robust for norm emergence compared with the
paired learning framework, which has been adopted by most existing work in MAL
for norm emergence.
Issue 3: The impact of agents’ learning strategies
The three diﬀerent learning strategies (i.e., Q-Learning , WoLF-PHC and Fictitious
Play) are tested in both a homogeneous and a heterogeneous society of 100 agents
to study their inﬂuences on norm emergence. In the homogeneous society, all agents
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Dynamics of the average payoff in a small−world network of 100 agents
using different learning algorithms over 100 runs
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Figure 4.5: Dynamics of the average payoﬀ when using diﬀerent learning strategies
12,0.8
in network 𝑆𝑊100
(averaged over 100 runs).
use the same learning strategy, while in the heterogeneous society, agents are equally
divided according to the strategies they adopt. The heterogeneity of society models
the real-life situation, when people have diﬀerent learning capabilities in the same
circumstances. Figure 4.5 shows the dynamics of the average payoﬀ using diﬀerent
12,0.8
learning strategies in network 𝑆𝑊100
. As can be seen, the collective learning

framework can successfully evolve a social norm using all three learning strategies.
The quickest one is using Q-learning, followed by WoLF-PHC and Fictitious play.
The norm evolves the most slowly using Fictitious play because agents need a great
deal of time to estimate the frequency distribution of neighbors’ past actions. In
the heterogeneous society, the time to evolve a norm falls between the time taken
by the corresponding homogeneous societies. These results are consistent with the
previous study [SA07], in which agents learn randomly in an unstructured population
and further demonstrate that the collective learning framework is robust for the
emergence of social norms in homogenous as well as heterogenous societies.
It can be seen that Q-learning agents are the fastest to evolve a social norm.
Hence, it is interesting to investigate the impact of diﬀerent proportions of these
fast learning agents on norm emergence in the whole population. Figure 4.6 shows
the convergence time when diﬀerent proportions of Q-learning agents are deployed in
a population of Fictitious Play learners and in a population of WoLF-PHC learners.
The results show that when there is only a small proportion (e.g., 10%) of Q-learning
agents in the population, the convergence time is steeply reduced from that in the
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Effects of the proportion of fast learners on the convergence speed of social norms
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Figure 4.6: The convergence time when having diﬀerent proportions of fast learning
agents in network 𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑘,0.8 (averaged over 100 runs).
original homogeneous population and further increasing the proportion of Q-learning
agents steadily decreases the convergence time. These results illustrate that even a
small proportion of fast learning learners can greatly facilitate the norm convergence
in a large scale agent society.
Issue 4: The impacts of population sizes, the number of neighbors/actions
and the randomness of networks
Convergence of social norms with different numbers of agents
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Figure 4.7: Dynamics of the average payoﬀ with diﬀerent numbers of agents 𝑁 in
network 𝑆𝑊𝑁12,0.8 (averaged over 100 runs).
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The dynamics of average agent reward with diﬀerent population sizes is shown
in Figure 4.7. It can be seen that the larger the agent population, the longer it takes
for the entire society to converge to a social norm. This is because the larger the
society, the more diﬃcult to diﬀuse the eﬀect of local learning to the whole society.
This phenomenon can be seen in human societies where small groups and clans can
more easily establish social norms than is the case in larger societies [SA07].
Convergence of social norms with different numbers of neighbors
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Figure 4.8: Dynamics of the average payoﬀ with diﬀerent numbers of neighbors 𝑘
𝑘,0.8
in network 𝑆𝑊100
(averaged over 100 runs).

Effects of the average neighborhood size on the convergence speed of social norms
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Figure 4.9: The convergence time with diﬀerent numbers of neighbors 𝑘 in network
𝑘,0.8
𝑆𝑊100
(averaged over 100 runs).
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Figure 4.8 shows the dynamics of average agent reward with diﬀerent neighborhood size 𝑘. I can be seen that when the average number of neighbors is increased,
the convergence time is steadily reduced. This eﬀect is due to the clustering coeﬃcient of the network. Clustering coeﬃcient is a measure of degree to which nodes in
a graph tend to cluster together [VSMS11]. When the average number of neighbors
increases, the clustering coeﬃcient also increases and therefore agents located in
diﬀerent parts of the network only need a smaller number of interactions to reach
a consensus. On the other hand, when agents have a small neighborhood size,
they only interact with their neighbors, which account for a small proportion of the
whole population. This results in diverse sub-norms formed at diﬀerent regions of
the network. Such sub-norms conﬂict with each other in the network and thus more
interactions are needed to solve these conﬂicts and achieve a uniform norm for the
whole society. Another interesting phenomenon is that when the average neighborhood size is small, a minor increase in the size (e.g., from 4 neighbors to 8 neighbors)
can bring about signiﬁcant improvement of the emergence speed, while further increasing the neighborhood size (e.g., from 8 neighbors to 20 neighbors) cannot cause
a further signiﬁcant improvement. In other words, the relation between the decrease
of convergence time and the increase of neighborhood size is non-linear, but follows
a logarithmical distribution, which can be further seen from Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.10: Dynamics of the average payoﬀ with diﬀerent numbers of actions in
12,0.8
network 𝑆𝑊100
(averaged over 100 runs).

Figure 4.10 shows the impact of diﬀerent numbers of potential actions on norm
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emergence. Note that the diﬀerent initial values are due to the payoﬀ matrix of
corresponding coordination games. As can be seen from Figure 4.10, a larger number
of available actions results in a delayed convergence of norms. This is because a
larger number of actions are more likely to produce local sub-norms, leading to
diversity across the society. It thus takes a longer time for the agents to eliminate
this diversity and achieve a ﬁnal consensus and thus the norm emergence process is
prolonged throughout the network.
Convergence of social norms with different randomness of networks (ρ)
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Figure 4.11: Impact of network randomness on norm emergence in network 𝑆𝑊100
(averaged over 100 runs).

Figure 4.11 shows the impact of network randomness on norm emergence. When
𝜌 = 0, network 𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑘,𝜌 is reduced to a regular ring lattice. Increasing rewiring
probability 𝜌 produces a small network with increasing randomness. When 𝜌 =
1, the network becomes a fully random network. The results indicate that it is
more eﬃcient for a norm to emerge in a network with higher randomness. This
is because the increase in randomness can reduce the network diameter (i.e., the
largest number of hops in order to traverse from one vertex to another [VSSM09])
and the smaller a network diameter is, the more eﬃcient for the network to evolve
a social norm [Del02].
Issue 5: The impact of ensemble learning methods
Figure 4.12 to Figure 4.14 show the impact of diﬀerent ensemble methods as well
as paired learning method on norm emergence in three diﬀerent kinds of networks.
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In the grid and small-world network, the majority voting method and structurebased method outperform the paired learning method throughout the whole learning period. Norms using the performance-based method converge very slowly at
the beginning and then quickly outperform those using the paired learning method
afterwards. In the scale-free network, however, the three methods under the collective learning framework have almost the same performance and all outperform the
paired learning method throughout the whole learning period.
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Figure 4.12: Grid network 𝐺𝑅100 .
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Figure 4.13: Small-world network 𝑆𝑊100
.

These results show that the proposed ensemble methods can bring about diﬀerent
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Figure 4.14: Scale-free network 𝑆𝐹100
.

patterns of norm emergence in the three diﬀerent kinds of networks and further
conﬁrm that the collective learning framework is more eﬃcient for norm emergence
than the paired learning framework.
Issue 6: The impact of non-learning agents
So far, the experiments focused on the emergence of social norms using the collective learning framework in diﬀerent settings in terms of network structure, social
heterogeneity or game size. In all these studies, the agents are all learners who
learn from local interactions from their neighbors. As reported in [FGJ13, SA07]
and [MSA08], however, a small proportion of inﬂexible agents can signiﬁcantly impact norm emergence in the whole society. For example, some agents may not have
learning capabilities but always choose a predeﬁned action, or choose an action according to some ﬁxed strategy. The existence of these non-learning agents (NL) can
bias, facilitate, or even impede norm emergence in the society. This part studies the
impact of these NL agents on norm emergence in three diﬀerent scenarios.
Scenario 1: NL agents with the same ﬁxed action.
In this experiment, some learning agents are replaced by NL agents, who use
the same ﬁxed action (i.e., driving on the left), in network 𝐺𝑅100 . Figure 4.15
presents the convergence process when there are 0%, 1%, 5%, 10%, 50% NL agents
in the whole population. The results show that when there are no NL agents, the
norm converges very slowly because all the agents are learners and must explore all

96

4.3. Experiments and Analysis

the possible actions equally before they can arrive at a mutual consistent action.
When there are only 1% NL agents, the norm does not emerge any faster because
the local eﬀect of a single NL agent is insuﬃcient to expedite convergence to a norm
in a 100 agent society. When there are more NL agents in the population, however,
the norm emergence process is greatly accelerated. This is because an agent that
has an NL agent in its neighborhood can observe a bias towards the ﬁxed action
that the NL agent always chooses. When the agent starts to exploit this knowledge,
it takes advantage of this bias and consequently plays the action played by the NL
agent. This eﬀect of bias can be cascaded into the whole population faster when
there are more NL agents.
Convergence of social norms with different proportions of agents with a fixed strategy
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Figure 4.15: Convergence of social norms with diﬀerent proportions 𝑝𝑓 of NL agents
in the whole population in network 𝐺𝑅100 (averaged over 50 runs).
It is also interesting to investigate the impact of the proportion of NL agents
on biasing the whole population towards a particular norm. In the previous studies
when all agents are learners, it is observed that the norms evolve roughly with an
equal frequency over multiple runs. This is reasonable because the payoﬀ matrix of
the coordination game (refer to Table 4.1) has no preference for one norm over the
other. When NL agents are present, however, the norm can be biased. The impact
of diﬀerent proportions of NL agents (driving on the left) on biasing the population
to norm Left in network 𝐺𝑅100 is given by Figure 4.16, in which the x-axis indicates
the proportion of NL agents and the y-axis indicates the probability of converging
to norm Left over 100 independent runs. Results are averaged over 10 Monte Carlo
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Figure 4.16: Impact of diﬀerent proportions of NL agents (driving on the left) in
the whole population on biasing the norm in network 𝐺𝑅100 .
experiments. As can be seen, when there are no NL agents in the population,
the norm Right and the norm Left emerge with an almost equal frequency. When
there are more agents driving on the left, the population converges more often to
the norm Left. Two interesting phenomena can also be observed from the results.
First, although a very small number of NL agents cannot boost the norm converging
process, they can signiﬁcantly bias the whole population to a particular norm (2%
and 4% NL agents can increase the possibility of the norm Left from 50% to around
70% and 80%, respectively). Second, a small proportion (i.e., 14%) of NL agents is
suﬃcient to bias the population to a particular norm with 100% possibility. These
results show that a small proportion of agents with ﬁxed strategies can signiﬁcantly
manipulate the norm emergence in relatively large populations, without relying on
imposing additional architectural requirements at either agent or society level. These
results are signiﬁcant as they can help designing eﬃcient strategies for controlling
large scale distributed systems. For example, when an administrative authority
wants to control the evolution and formation of group consensuses, conventions
or trends in real human or agent-supported computational societies at a minimal
administrative cost, the authority only needs to place a small proportion of people
(agents) playing ﬁxed actions according to the authority’s will in order to bias the
whole society accordingly.
Scenario 2: NL agents with the same observation strategy.
In this experiment, NL agents do not play the same ﬁxed action but use the
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same observation strategy. The observation strategy means that an NL agent simply
observes its neighbors and chooses the action which is played by most of its neighbors
for next round play. This kind of agents is considered to be NL agents as they do
not learn from local interactions with their neighbors. In other words, no learning
information is kept by the agents during interaction.
Influence of non−learning agents using the observation strategy on norm emergence
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Figure 4.17: Norm emergence with diﬀerent proportions of NL agents using the ﬁxed
observation strategy in network 𝐺𝑅100 (averaged over 50 runs).
Figure 4.17 shows the learning dynamics with diﬀerent proportions of NL agents
using the same observation strategy in network 𝐺𝑅100 . The results show that the
norm emerges more quickly when the proportion of NL agents gets larger at the beginning (i.e., from 0% to 80%). However, increasing the proportion further from 90%
to 100% signiﬁcantly hinders the convergence process. Upon deeper examination,
it is found that the turning point of such a varying performance was around 83%.
When the population consists of 100% NL agents, the system is fully in chaos because all the agents simply observe their neighbors, whose initial actions are random,
in order to copy the most chosen action. Since no learning capability is assumed, the
agents cannot remember the past learning experience to make a reasonable decision.
That is why the learning curve for the system of 100% NL agents ﬂuctuates at the
beginning and then stabilises at a reward of 0 afterwards. However, incorporating
a small number of learning agents, e.g., 10% (i.e., curve 90% in Figure 4.17), can
drastically boost the norm convergence. This is because the learning agents can take
advantage of the interaction experience to exploit other agents for a better outcome.
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In real applications, equipping agents with a learning capability often means a
cost to either the agents themselves or the whole system. For example, the agents
might need physical space to store the learning information, thus imposing a managerial cost on the agents, or for some safety-critical environments, a fatal decision
caused by the trial-and-error process during learning could bring about disastrous
consequences to the whole system. It is therefore more eﬃcient to deploy as few
learning agents as possible in the whole system in order to decrease the side-eﬀects
caused by learning. The results of this experiment indicate that it is possible to
achieve a maximal performance by incorporating only a small number of learning agents into a large group of non-learners who use a ﬁxed observation strategy.
This principle can be helpful for the eﬃcient mechanism design of large scale normgoverned systems, in which the coexistence of millions of agents makes it ineﬃcient
or even unfeasible to achieve a global optimal performance through each agent’s
individual learning.
Scenario 3: NL agents with diﬀerent strategies.
In the previous experiments, all NL agents played the same ﬁxed action or strategy and they were able to impact the emergence of a norm signiﬁcantly. In practice,
however, NL agents may be unrelated and even adopt conﬂicting actions. In this
case, it is possible for NL agents to inﬂuence other agents in their neighborhood and
thus diﬀerent norms can emerge in diﬀerent neighborhoods. As such, the NL agents
are likely to decrease the speed of norm emergence, or even prevent the emergence
of a norm in the entire population [MSA08]. The following experiment uses diﬀerent
numbers of NL agents playing contradictory strategies and studies their impact on
norm emergence. The agent’s coordinate (x,y) is used to indicate its location in
network 𝐺𝑅100 , with (0,0) indicating the upper left corner and (9,9) indicating the
lower right corner of the grid. Five diﬀerent settings are chosen for the locations of
NL agents. The settings are given in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Settings for locations of NL agents in network 𝐺𝑅100
Case (𝑁𝑓 )

Agents (driving on the left)

Agents (driving on the right)

2 agents

(2,2)

(7,7)

6 agents

(1,1), (2,2), (3,3)

(6,6), (7,7), (8,8)

10 agents

(1,1), (2,2), (3,3), (1,3), (3,1)

(6,6), (7,7), (8,8), (6,8), (8,6)

14 agents

(1,1), (2,2), (3,3), (1,3), (3,1), (1,2), (2,1)

(6,6), (7,7), (8,8), (6,8), (8,6), (6,7), (7,6)

18 agents

(1,1), (2,2), (3,3), (1,3), (3,1), (1,2), (2,1), (2,3), (3,2)

(6,6), (7,7), (8,8), (6,8), (8,6), (6,7), (7,6), (7,8), (8,7)

Figure 4.18 shows the impact of NL agents with contradictory strategies on norm
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Figure 4.18: Impact of number of NL agents (𝑁𝑓 ) with contradictory strategies on
norm emergence in network 𝐺𝑅100 (averaged over 50 runs).
emergence. From the results, it can be seen that the norm emerges more slowly when
more NL agents are located in two diﬀerent areas in the network. This is because
the more NL agents in the population, the more likely for the NL agents to bias their
neighboring agents towards the corresponding ﬁxed strategy and thus agents in the
upper left area of the grid are more inclined to converge to the norm Left and agents
in the lower right are more likely to converge to the norm Right. This results in two
sub-norms in the population during learning. It was expected that these two subnorms could co-exist in the network. As can be seen from Figure 4.18, however, the
learning curves are still in the process of converging after 500 episodes. This means
that the two sub-norms are competing with each other after they emerged in each
area and ultimately there will be only one norm for the whole population. However,
the existence of two sub-norms indicates that more interactions are necessary to
resolve the conﬂicts for a uniform norm to emerge, which accordingly delays the
emergence of a social norm.

4.4

Discussions

The systematic study and development of robust mechanisms that can facilitate
the eﬃcient emergence of stable norms provide a promising research paradigm for
coordinated control of distributed MASs. Such mechanisms can not only provide
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a better understanding of the formation and evolution process of opinions, conventions and rules in human societies, but also enable to build and control robust
virtual MASs such as electronic institutions. MAL has been shown to be an eﬃcient mechanism that enables robust social norms emerge in a system based on each
agent’s private interactions. Most existing studies on MAL for norm emergence,
however, are based on simple sequential interaction protocols and do not consider
social factors during agent learning. In the proposed MAL framework, each agent
needs to make a decision collectively by considering each neighbor’s position in the
network as well as the neighbor’s performance in past interactions. This collective
learning imitates the collective decision making process in humans in that people
usually consult with many others before making a ﬁnal decision. People consider
not only others’ individual characteristics, such as intelligence and knowledge, but
also their reputation, social position and power in the society.
The only work in the current literature, to the author’s best knowledge, which
has considered the collective decision making for norm emergence is the one by
Epstein [Eps01], which tried to model the phenomenon that individual thought or
computing was often inversely related to the strength of a social norm. In the proposed model, agents learn how to behave (what norm to adopt) and also learn how
much to think about how to behave (how many neighbors to learn from). Although
Epstein’s work is quite related to the work in this chapter, its focus and techniques
used are quite diﬀerent. Epstein’s work focused on the dynamical adaptation of
learning range to model the phenomenon that once a norm was entrenched, the
agent should reduce the learning range to save cost. Also, the agent just adopted
the majority action of its neighbors, which is more like adaptation or strategy diﬀusion rather than learning from past experiences as in the proposed collective MAL
framework in this chapter.
The novelty of the collective MAL framework proposed in this chapter lies in the
incorporation of ensemble learning methods into agent learning by aggregating the
focal agent’s best-response actions towards each of its neighbors in every interaction.
Ensemble learning methods have been extensively studied in supervised learning to
make more accurate predictions or classiﬁcations [Pol06]. In agent learning, ensemble learning methods have also been widely used to boost learning eﬃciency and
improve learning performance. For example, Sun and Peterson [SP99] developed
several techniques using genetic algorithms to partition the spaces of a task. Agents
applied the Q-learning algorithm [WD92] to learn the action-values in subspaces
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and all the values were combined through a weighting scheme to a single agent;
Jiang [Jia07] developed a system in which each reinforcement learning algorithm
learns individually in a learning module and provides its output to an intelligent
aggregation module. The aggregation module aggregates these outputs dynamically
using some aggregation methods and provides an action decision to deal with dynamic learning problems; Wiering and Hasselt [WvH08] used a number of ensemble
methods to combine multiple independent reinforcement learning algorithms in order to choose the best action; and in a more recent work, Hans and Udluft [HU10]
used ensemble techniques to make reinforcement learning with neural networks as
function approximation more robust, reliable and less dependent on ﬁne-tuning of
various parameters.
All the current studies employed ensemble learning in agent learning with the aim
of enhancing learning speed and improving ﬁnal performance. In the collective MAL
framework presented in this chapter, ensemble learning is used to combine a focal
agent’s best-response actions towards each of its neighbors to make a ﬁnal decision.
The focus of this research is not on learning eﬃciency, but on the diﬀerent patterns
of norm emergence achieved through varied local collective learning behaviors in
diﬀerent structural or topological settings.

4.5

Summary

This chapter studied MAL for the emergence of social norms in networked MASs. A
collective MAL framework was proposed to model the collective decision making in
humans. A number of key issues such as neighborhood and population sizes, agent
cognitive deﬁciencies and learning strategies were investigated in the collective MAL
framework. Experimental studies conﬁrmed that the collective MAL framework was
indeed a robust mechanism for evolving stable norms in networked MASs.

Chapter 5
A Two-layered Emotional Multi-Agent
Learning Framework in Social Dilemmas
This chapter proposed a two-layered emotional MAL framework to modify agent
rational learning in order to achieve cooperation in social dilemmas. Section 5.1
describes social dilemmas. Section 5.2 presents the two-layered emotional MAL
framework. Section 5.3 gives the experimental studies. Section 5.4 lays out some
discussions. Finally, Section 5.5 summarises this chapter.

5.1

Social Dilemmas

This chapter uses the well-known Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game as a metaphor
to study social dilemmas among self-interested agents. In PD, each player has two
actions: ‘cooperate’ (𝐶), which is a socially reciprocal behavior and ‘defect’ (𝐷),
which is a self-interested behavior. Consider the typical pay-oﬀ matrix of the PD
game in Table 5.1, where 𝑇 means the temptation to defect, 𝑅 is the reward for
mutual cooperation, 𝑃 is the punishment for mutual defection and 𝑆 is the sucker’s
pay-oﬀ. To be deﬁned as a social dilemma, the game must comply with the following
constraints: 𝑇 > 𝑅 > 𝑃 > 𝑆 and 2𝑅 > 𝑇 + 𝑆. Given these constraints, in the oneshot PD, the rational action for both agents is to select 𝐷 because choosing 𝐷 ensures
a higher pay-oﬀ for either agent no matter what the opponent does. In other words,
mutual defection (𝐷𝐷) is the unique Nash equilibrium and both agents have no
incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. As can be seen from Table 5.1, however,
𝐷𝐷 is not the Pareto optimal because each agent would be better oﬀ (i.e., 𝑅 > 𝑃 )
and both agents together would receive a higher social reward (i.e., 2𝑅 > 𝑇 + 𝑆)
if both agents select 𝐶. Therefore, when played repeatedly, which is called the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), it may be beneﬁcial for an agent to cooperate
in some rounds, even if this agent is selﬁsh, in the hope of a reciprocal cooperative
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behavior to bring beneﬁts in the long run. IPD has been widely used for studying
the emergence of cooperation among selﬁsh individuals in a variety of disciplines
including artiﬁcial intelligence, economics and social sciences, etc. [BPB11].
Table 5.1: Pay-oﬀ matrix in the PD game (pay-oﬀ of the row player is shown ﬁrst)
Cooperate (C)
Defect (D)
Cooperate (C) R(= 3),R(= 3) S(= 0),T(= 5)
Defect (D)
T(= 5),S(= 0) P(= 1),P(= 1)
This chapter uses the spatial version of IPD by considering the topological structure among the agents to study the impact of agents’ local interactions on the emergence of cooperation. More formally, a spatial IPD can be deﬁned by Deﬁnition 5.1.
Deﬁnition 5.1 A spatial IPD can be represented as a graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸), where
𝑉 = {𝑣1 , ..., 𝑣𝑛 } is a set of vertices (agents) and 𝐸 ⊆ 𝑉 ×𝑉 represents a set of edges,
each of which connects two interacting vertices (agents) playing an IPD game.

Deﬁnition 5.2 Given a spatial IPD (𝑉, 𝐸), the neighbors of agent 𝑖, which are
denoted as 𝑁(𝑖), are a set of agents such that 𝑁(𝑖) = {𝑣𝑗 ∣ (𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗 ) ∈ 𝐸} and
𝑁(𝑖) ⊂ 𝑉 .

This chapter focuses on the grid networks, small-world networks and scale-free
networks to represent a spatial IPD. Subsection 4.1.1 in Chapter 4 gives detailed
explanations of these networks.
A straightforward way to solve MAL problems is to let each agent learn individually using its own local state/action and individual reward information, which can
be given by Equation 5.1.

𝑄𝑡+1 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) = 𝑄𝑡 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝛼𝑡 [𝑅(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) + 𝛾 max
𝑄𝑡 (𝑠′𝑖 , 𝑎′𝑖 ) − 𝑄𝑡 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 )]
′
𝑎

(5.1)

Applying distributed MAL technique to solve social dilemmas is a very challenging issue because agents not only need to learn the structure of the interaction
game, but also need to learn how to play the game optimally in a non-stationary
environment. Various mechanisms have been proposed to boost the likelihood of
cooperation by altering the deﬁnition of local state 𝑠𝑖 and individual reward 𝑅𝑖 .
For example, previous studies [SC96, MO09] deﬁned local state 𝑠𝑖 as the sensations of past actions of the interacting agents and have shown that a longer history window could result in a higher level of cooperation among the agents; other
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studies [BdCL08, VC10, MKN11] evolved or reshaped individual reward 𝑅𝑖 during
interactions so that agents could rapidly reach the cooperation outcome. This research follows the second paradigm by proposing an emotional MAL framework, in
which each agent’s individual reward 𝑅𝑖 is emotionally derived through the agent’s
repeated interactions with its neighbors, so as to boost the likelihood of cooperation
among the agents.

5.2

A Two-layered Emotional Multi-Agent Learning Framework

A two-layer emotional MAL framework is proposed in this section. Subsection 5.2.1
gives a description of the framework. Subsection 5.2.2 shows how to appraise the two
fundamental variables, social fairness and individual wellbeing, in social dilemmas
based on the proposed framework. Subsection 5.2.3 illustrates how to derive the
intrinsic emotional rewards based on previous emotion derivation models. Finally,
Subsection 5.2.4 presents the interaction protocols in the learning framework.

5.2.1

Framework Description

In recent years, researchers in artiﬁcial intelligence, cognition and psychology have
shown increasing interest in deﬁning the source and nature of rewards in RL [SLB09].
It has been pointed out that the standard view of deﬁning rewards in RL simply
as an output of a “critic” from the external environment (i.e., Figure 5.1) is seriously misleading and thus not suitable as a reﬂection of real-life human and animal
reward systems [SLBS10]. Barto et al. [BSC04] argued that the environment of an
RL agent should not simply be identiﬁed with the external environment where the
agent is physically located, but should also include the agent’s internal environment
constituted by multiple intrinsic emotion circuits and drives. A novel framework
called Intrinsically Motivated Reinforcement Learning (IMRL) [SLBS10] has been
proposed to implement intrinsic motivation systems in learning agents by clarifying
the rewards into “extrinsic rewards” that deﬁne a speciﬁc task related to an agent’s
external goal or cost, and “intrinsic rewards” related to an agent’s internal emotion circuits and drives. The IMRL framework provides a computationally sound
approach to better reﬂect the reward systems in real human and animals, and thus
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enables a learning agent to achieve more adaptive behaviors by overcoming its perceptual limitations. Most work on the IMRL framework, however, focused mainly
on single-agent scenarios, in which the motivational system is used to drive a single agent to learn adaptive behaviors in complex environments. In addition, most
previous work lacks an explicit description of how to derive the intrinsic rewards for
learning, especially by using an emotional system.

States

Environment
Critic

Rewards

Actions

Learning
Algorithm

Agent

Figure 5.1: The standard view of RL [SB98]
To this end, in Figure 5.2, a two-layered emotional MARL framework is proposed, which extends the IMRL framework by implementing an intrinsic emotional
reward system based on the computational component appraisal models of emotions [MGP10]. The framework consists of an agent and its external environment.
The agent takes an action on the external environment, observes its neighbors’
actions and receives extrinsic rewards from the environment. The internal environment, including an emotion appraisal derivation model and an emotion derivation
model, generates the intrinsic emotional rewards, which are then used as reinforcement signals to adjust the emotion derivation model and to adapt learning behaviors
in an emotion consequent model.
The emotion appraisal derivation model transforms an agent’s belief about its
relationship with the environment into a set of quantiﬁed appraisal variables. The
appraisal variables correspond to a set of judgments that can be used to produce
diﬀerent emotional responses. Diﬀerent appraisal models adopt diﬀerent sets of appraisal variables, depending on the assumptions required and speciﬁc problems to
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Figure 5.2: The proposed emotional MARL framework (adapted from [SLBS10];
[MGP10]).
be solved. Ellsworth et al. [ES03] have indicated that emotions could be generally considered to be composed of interacting elementary variables from two main
dimensions: the basic/motivational dimension dealing with individual goals, needs
and pleasantness, and the social dimension dealing with social norms, justice and
fairness. The proposed framework, therefore, uses two fundamental variables to
appraise emotions by considering not only an agent’s individual wellbeing, which
is derived from extrinsic rewards from the environment, but also its sense of social fairness, which is derived from the agent’s observation of the decisions of its
neighbors.
The emotion derivation model maps the appraisal variables to an emotion state
and speciﬁes how an agent reacts emotionally once a pattern of appraisals has been
determined. By combining the variables using diﬀerent emotion derivation functions,
diﬀerent internal cues can be deﬁned for the agents to emotionally react to the
environment. For example, if the function is deﬁned in such a way that social
fairness is the core factor to determine an agent’s ﬁnal emotion state, the agent
then can be considered as a socially aware agent. On the contrary, the agent is
more like an egoist who cares about its own wellbeing more than social fairness. In
the framework, each agent has several emotion derivation functions. Each function
maps the appraisal variables to an emotion state (i.e., intrinsic emotional reward)
and through this intrinsic reward, the strategy of choosing the emotion derivation
functions can be updated. This learning process, which is referred to as “inner-layer
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learning”, models the emotional reaction process in human decision making because
people usually react to the environment based on several internal emotional cues.
These emotional cues compete with each other during interaction so that a certain
emotional cue will emerge as a dominant factor to inﬂuence the agent’s emotion
derivation process.
The emotion consequent model maps emotions into some behavioral or cognitive
changes. In the framework, the consequent intrinsic emotional rewards generated
from the internal environment are used directly as reinforcement signals to bias the
agent’s learning behavior. This process is referred to as “outer-layer learning”, as
opposed to the inner-layer learning process used to adapt an agent’s internal cues
of deriving emotions. The outer-layer learning can be carried out using general RL
approaches [SB98], such as TD control method Sarsa, Q-learning and Actor-Critic
methods. In this chapter, the widely used Q-learning algorithm [WD92] is adopted
as the basic RL approach.
Many studies [AP06, SM12, SMP11] have claimed that RL mechanisms in nature should rely on emotional cues rather than on direct exogenous stimuli from
the environment to indicate the advantages or disadvantage of an event. In fact,
MARL is not merely a matter of “straight” learning, but a matter involving complex
patterns of social interactions and cognitive processes leading to complex collective
functions [Sun01]. The proposed framework takes this position by diﬀerentiating the
external and internal environment, and deﬁning a two-layered learning system that
endows agents with internal emotional capabilities to drive them towards more complex and adaptive behaviors. The next section will show in detail how to implement
the framework so that agents can learn altruistic behaviors in social dilemmas.

5.2.2

Appraisal of Emotions

This subsection shows how to appraise social fairness and individual wellbeing in
social dilemmas based on the proposed emotional MARL framework.
Appraisal of Social Fairness
Research in the ﬁeld of behavioral economics has shown that humans are not purely
self-interested, but care strongly about fairness [FS99]. Humans generally show a
remarkable ability to solve social dilemmas due to their tendency to consider fairness to other people [dJT11, dJUT08]. In order to evaluate the social fairness, an
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agent needs to assess its own situation in the environment represented by its neighborhood context. An agent interacts with the external environment (its neighbors)
and observes the actions of its neighbors. Dynamics of the neighbors’ actions thus
constitute the agent’s neighborhood context 𝐶, which can be deﬁned as:
𝑖=𝑁
1 ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑐 − 𝑛𝑖𝑑
(
),
𝐶=
𝑁 𝑖=1
𝑀

(5.2)

where 𝑛𝑖𝑐 and 𝑛𝑖𝑑 are the counts of 𝐶 actions and 𝐷 actions adopted by neighbor 𝑖
in 𝑀 steps1 , respectively, and 𝑁 is the number of neighbors of the focal agent.
In Equation 5.2,

𝑛𝑖𝑐 −𝑛𝑖𝑑
𝑀

indicates the cooperativeness of neighbor 𝑖. If neighbor

𝑖 cooperates more often (𝑛𝑖𝑐 − 𝑛𝑖𝑑 ≥ 0), it is considered to be more cooperative.

Otherwise, it is considered to be more defective. A focal agent’s neighborhood
context 𝐶 ∈ [−1, 1], thus, indicates the extent of cooperativeness of the environment,

with 𝐶 = 1 indicating a fully cooperative environment, 𝐶 = −1 indicating a fully
uncooperative environment and 𝐶 = 0 indicating a neutral environment. An agent’s

sense of fairness is then used to evaluate its own situation in such a neighborhood
context, which can be given by Equation 5.3.
𝑛𝑐 − 𝑛𝑑
,
(5.3)
𝑀
where 𝐹 ∈ [−1, 1] represents the agent’s sense of social fairness, 𝑛𝑐 is the count of
𝐹 =𝐶×

C actions and 𝑛𝑑 is the count of D actions adopted by the agent in 𝑀 steps.

From Equation 5.3, it can be seen that when the environment is cooperative
(𝐶 > 0), an agent senses fairness if itself cooperates more often (𝑛𝑐 > 𝑛𝑑 ) and unfair
if it defects more often (𝑛𝑐 < 𝑛𝑑 ). Similar analysis applies when the environment is
uncooperative (𝐶 < 0).
Appraisal of Individual Wellbeing
Agents also need to care about their own individual wellbeing in terms of maximising
utilities and achieving goals. Three diﬀerent approaches are proposed in this chapter
to appraise an agent’s individual wellbeing as follows.
∙ Absolute value-based approach: It has been shown that an agent experience happiness because something good has happened to the agent (positive

1
In this research, a learning episode consists of several interaction steps, which means that the
learning information will be updated only at the end of 𝑀 interaction steps.
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reaction) while an agent experience sadness when something bad has happened
to it (negative reaction) [SM12]. It is therefore crucial to understand what constitutes the positive and negative reactions of the agents. A straightforward
way to appraise an agent’s individual wellbeing is to use its absolute wealth
as an evaluation criterion, which is given by Equation 5.4.
𝑊 =

2𝑅𝑡 − 𝑀 × (𝑇 − 𝑆)
,
𝑀 × (𝑇 − 𝑆)

(5.4)

where 𝑅𝑡 is the accumulated reward in 𝑀 interaction steps at episode 𝑡 and
𝑀 × (𝑇 − 𝑆) is the normalization factor to conﬁne 𝑊 to [−1, 1], with 𝑊 = 1

indicating the highest wellbeing of the agent and 𝑊 = −1 indicating the lowest
wellbeing of the agent.

∙ Variance-based approach: It is argued, however, that low wealth does not
necessarily imply a negative reaction and high wealth does not necessarily im-

ply a positive reaction of the agents [SM12]. In fact, this phenomenon can be
observed in real-world societies where rich people are not necessarily happier
than poor people, but an increase in wealth can often cause a positive reaction. Therefore, individual wellbeing can be deﬁned as positive and negative
variations of an agent’s absolute wealth, which is given by Equation 5.5.
𝑊 =

𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡
,
𝑀 × (𝑇 − 𝑆)

(5.5)

where 𝑅𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡+1 are the accumulated reward collected during 𝑀 interaction
steps at learning episode 𝑡 and the following episode 𝑡 + 1, respectively, and
𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡 is the variation of an agent’s absolute wealth.
∙ Aspiration-based approach: In reality, people will be happy if their intrinsic aspirations can be satisﬁed [IIG08]. The aspiration-based approach thus
appraises the agent’s individual wellbeing by comparing the reward achieved
with an adaptive aspiration level, which is given by Equation 5.6.

𝑊 = tanh[ℎ(
where tanh(𝑥) =

𝑒𝑥 −𝑒−𝑥
𝑒𝑥 +𝑒−𝑥

𝑅𝑡
− 𝐴𝑡 )],
𝑀

(5.6)

is the monotonically increasing hyperbolic tangent

function that maps variable 𝑥 ∈ ℜ into [−1, 1], ℎ > 0 is a scalable parameter
and 𝐴𝑡 is the aspiration level, which can be updated by:
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𝐴𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛽)𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽
where 𝛽 ∈ [0, 1] is a learning rate and 𝐴0 =

𝑅𝑡
,
𝑀

𝑅+𝑇 +𝑆+𝑃
4
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(5.7)
is the initial aspiration

level.

The basic idea of the aspiration-based approach is that an agent feels positive
about its own wellbeing state (𝑊 ≥ 0) if the received reward is higher than its
𝑡
≥ 𝐴𝑡 ) and feels negative about its own wellbeing
internal aspiration level ( 𝑅
𝑀

state (𝑊 < 0) if the received reward is lower than its internal aspiration

𝑡
level ( 𝑅
< 𝐴𝑡 ). The aspiration level is then updated as a weighted average
𝑀

between the received reward and the current aspiration level, which is given
by Equation 5.7.

5.2.3

Derivation of Emotions

After appraising the two fundamental variables in the appraisal of emotions, the
emotion derivation model then maps these appraisal variables to an emotion state
through an emotion derivation function. The emotion derivation function indicates
the structural relationship between appraisal variables and speciﬁc emotion states,
and therefore stipulates how an agent reacts emotionally once a pattern of appraisals
has been determined.
Formulation of emotion derivation functions
This chapter aims to study the eﬀects of various structural relationships between
social fairness and individual wellbeing on the derivation of emotions and how such
emotional reactions aﬀect agent learning behaviors in social dilemmas. To this end,
it is necessary to diﬀerentiate the roles of the two appraisal variables in determining
the ﬁnal emotion states. Smith et al. [SL93] proposed a structural model of emotion
appraisal to explain the relation between appraisals and the emotions they elicit.
The appraisal process is broken up into two diﬀerent categories, primary appraisal
and secondary appraisal, with primary appraisal concerning whether and how the
encounter is relevant to the person’s motivational goals and secondary appraisal
concerning the person’s resources and options for coping with the encounter [SL93].
The structural model of appraisal allows researchers to formulate which emotions
will be elicited from a certain set of circumstances by examining an individual’s
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appraisal of a situation, and therefore allows researchers to deﬁne diﬀerent appraisal
processes that lead to diﬀerent emotions.
Based on the diﬀerentiation of the emotion appraisal process, an appraisal variable can be deﬁned to be a core appraisal variable (denoted as 𝑐) or a secondary
appraisal variable (denoted as 𝑠). The core appraisal variable determines the desirability of an emotion through the agent’s evaluation of its situation, while the
secondary appraisal variable indicates the intensity of such an emotion based on the
agent’s evaluation of its coping ability. An emotion derivation function of emotion
𝑥, Ϝ𝑥 (𝑐, 𝑠), therefore, can be formally deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.3 Let 𝑐, 𝑠 be the core and secondary appraisal variable, respectively,
0 ≤ 𝐷𝑥 ≤ 1 be the desirability of emotion 𝑥 and −1 ≤ 𝐼𝑥 ≤ 1 be the intensity
of emotion 𝑥, an emotion derivation function can be deﬁned as Ϝ𝑥 (𝑐, 𝑠) :=

𝐸𝑥 (𝑐, 𝑠) = 𝑓 (𝐷𝑥 ) ⋅ 𝑔(𝐼𝑥 ), where 0 ≤ 𝐸𝑥 (𝑐, 𝑠) ≤ 1 is the overall state of emotion 𝑥,
0 ≤ 𝑓 (𝐷𝑥 ) ≤ 1 is the core derivation function that increases monotonically with the

desirability of emotion 𝑥(𝐷𝑥 ) and 0 ≤ 𝑔(𝐼𝑥 ) ≤ 1 is the secondary derivation function
that increases monotonically with the intensity of emotion 𝑥 (𝐼𝑥 ).

In reality, people react to things diﬀerently. Even when presented with the same
or a similar situation, people will react in slightly diﬀerent ways based on their
appraisals of the situation. These appraisals elicit various emotions that are speciﬁc
to each person. Based on Deﬁnition 5.3, two diﬀerent kinds of emotion derivation
functions can be deﬁned as follows:
∙ Fairness-Wellbeing (FW) Emotion Derivation Function: An agent that
derives its emotions using the FW function puts social fairness as the core

appraisal variable (𝑐 ← 𝐹 ) and then derives its emotions based on its sense of
the increase or decrease in its own wellbeing (𝑠 ← 𝑊 ). More formally:
((𝐹 ≥ 0 ⇒ 𝐷𝑗𝑜𝑦 = 𝐹 ) ∧ 𝐼𝑗𝑜𝑦 = 𝑊 ) ⇒ 𝐸𝑗𝑜𝑦 (𝐹, 𝑊 ) = 𝑓 (𝐹 ) ⋅ 𝑔(𝑊 );

(5.8)

((𝐹 < 0 ⇒ 𝐷𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟 = −𝐹 ) ∧ 𝐼𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 𝑊 ) ⇒ 𝐸𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟 (𝐹, 𝑊 ) = 𝑓 (−𝐹 ) ⋅ 𝑔(𝑊 ); (5.9)
((𝐹 < 0 ⇒ 𝐷𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 = −𝐹 ) ∧ 𝐼𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 = −𝑊 ) ⇒ 𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 (𝐹, 𝑊 ) = 𝑓 (−𝐹 ) ⋅ 𝑔(−𝑊 );
(5.10)

An agent using the FW function to derive its emotions is a socially aware agent
that pays more attention to social fairness than to its individual wellbeing
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in appraising its emotions. Equation 5.8 shows how an FW agent elicits the
emotion of 𝑗𝑜𝑦. As the ﬁrst priority of an FW agent is to pursue social fairness,
when the agent senses that the environment is fair (i.e., 𝐹 > 0), the agent will
be in a positive state of 𝑗𝑜𝑦 because the situation is consistent with the agent’s
motivational goal. The fairer the environment, the higher the desirability of
emotion 𝑗𝑜𝑦. Desirability 𝐷𝑗𝑜𝑦 is then equivalent to the value of core derivation
variable of 𝐹 . The intensity of emotion 𝑗𝑜𝑦 is then based on the increase or
decrease in the agent’s sense of its own wellbeing. An increase in the individual
wellbeing in a fair environment indicates that the socially aware agent is in a
positive emotion state because the agent can achieve selﬁsh interest while at
the same time pursue its core motivational goal of social fairness. The ﬁnal
state of the emotion of 𝑗𝑜𝑦, therefore, can be calculated as 𝑓 (𝐹 ) ⋅ 𝑔(𝑊 ).
On the contrary, when an FW agent senses that the environment is unfair
(i.e., 𝐹 < 0), the agent will feel negative because the situation is inconsistent
with the agent’s goal of pursuing social fairness. The unfair environment
can be caused by two reasons: the agent defects more often in a cooperative
environment (Equation 5.9) and the agent cooperates more often in a defective
environment (Equation 5.10). The socially aware agent will feel 𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟 in the
former case because it is exploiting its neighbors by choosing defection, while
in the latter case, the agent will feel 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 because it is being exploited by its
neighbors. In both cases, desirability of the negative emotion is equivalent to
the value of core derivation variable of −𝐹 . The secondary appraisal of emotion

𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟 considers one’s expectations of change in the motivational congruence of
a situation [SL93]. If the agent feels 𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟, the intensity of emotion 𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟 then
increases monotonously with the wellbeing state of the agent (𝐼𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 𝑊 ),
because the socially aware agent realizes that it is exploiting its neighbors
for an increase in its own wellbeing. The higher the wellbeing, the higher
intensity of fear of the agent. The ﬁnal state of the emotion of 𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟 can be
then calculated as 𝑓 (−𝐹 ) ⋅ 𝑔(𝑊 ). In contrast, if the agent feels 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟, the
intensity of emotion 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 then increases inversely with the wellbeing state
of the agent (𝐼𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 = −𝑊 ), because a lower wellbeing will result in a higher

intensity of emotion 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟. The ﬁnal state of the emotion of 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 can be
then calculated as 𝑓 (−𝐹 ) ⋅ 𝑔(−𝑊 ).
∙ Wellbeing-Fairness (WF) Emotion Derivation Function: In contrast
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to the FW function, an agent that derives its emotions using the WF function
puts its own wellbeing as the core derivation variable (𝑐 ← 𝑊 ) and then derives
its emotions based on its sense of social fairness (𝑠 ← 𝐹 ). More formally:
((𝑊 ≥ 0 ⇒ 𝐷𝑗𝑜𝑦 = 𝑊 ) ∧ 𝐼𝑗𝑜𝑦 = 𝐹 ) ⇒ 𝐸𝑗𝑜𝑦 (𝑊, 𝐹 ) = 𝑓 (𝑊 ) ⋅ 𝑔(𝐹 );

(5.11)

((𝑊 < 0 ⇒ 𝐷𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = −𝑊 )∧𝐼𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝐹 ) ⇒ 𝐸𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 (𝑊, 𝐹 ) = 𝑓 (−𝑊 )⋅𝑔(𝐹 );
(5.12)

An agent using the WF function to derive its emotions is more like an egoist
that pays more attention to its own wellbeing than to social fairness to determine its emotions. Equation 5.11 formulates how to generate the emotion of
𝑗𝑜𝑦. As the ﬁrst priority of a selﬁsh WF agent is to pursue its own beneﬁts,
when the agent senses that its wellbeing is high (i.e., 𝑊 > 0), the agent will
be in a positive state of 𝑗𝑜𝑦 because the situation is consistent with the agent’s
motivational goal. The desirability of emotion 𝑗𝑜𝑦, 𝐷𝑗𝑜𝑦 , is then equivalent to
the value of core derivation variable 𝑊 . The intensity of emotion 𝑗𝑜𝑦 is then
based on the agent’s sense of social fairness. A high social fairness (associated
with a high individual wellbeing) indicates that the selﬁsh agent is in a positive
emotion state because the agent can achieve fairness while at the same time
pursue its core motivational goal of staying in high wellbeing. The ﬁnal state
of the emotion of 𝑗𝑜𝑦, therefore, can be calculated as 𝑓 (𝑊 ) ⋅ 𝑔(𝐹 ).
On the contrary, when a WF agent senses that its wellbeing is low (i.e., 𝑊 < 0)
(Equation 5.12), the agent will feel sadness because the situation is inconsistent
with the agent’s goal of pursuing individual beneﬁts. The desirability of the
emotion of 𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝐷𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 , is then equivalent to the value of −𝑊 . The

intensity of emotion 𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 is then based on the increase or decrease in the
agent’s sense of social fairness. A WF agent feels sadness because its wellbeing
is low in a fair environment. The ﬁnal state of the emotion of 𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 can be
calculated as 𝑓 (−𝑊 ) ⋅ 𝑔(𝐹 ).
The core derivation function 𝑓 (𝐷𝑥 ) monotonically maps the desirability of emotion 𝑥 to a value in-between [0, 1], with value 0 indicating no desirability of emotion
𝑥 and value 1 indicating the highest desirability of emotion 𝑥. 𝑓 (𝐷𝑥 ) can be formally
deﬁned as:
𝑓 (𝐷𝑥 ) = 𝐷𝑥𝜇 ,

0 ≤ 𝐷𝑥 ≤ 1, 𝜇 > 0

(5.13)
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where 𝜇 is the core derivation coeﬃcient. According to diﬀerent values of 𝜇, three
diﬀerent strategies to adapt the core derivation function can be deﬁned as follows:
∙ Conceder (0 < 𝜇 < 1): The value of 𝑓 (𝐷𝑥 ) increases quickly when the value
of 𝐷𝑥 is small and slowly when the value of 𝐷𝑥 is high.

∙ Linear (𝜇 = 1): The value of 𝑓 (𝐷𝑥 ) increases at a constant rate with the
value of 𝐷𝑥 .

∙ Boulware (𝜇 > 1): This strategy is the contrary of Conceder, which means

that the value of 𝑓 (𝐷𝑥 ) increases slowly when the value of 𝐷𝑥 is small and
quickly when the value of 𝐷𝑥 is high.

The above three diﬀerent strategies indicate diﬀerent kinds of agent personalities.
An agent who uses the Conceder strategy is more aggressive or sensitive because a
slight desirability of an emotion will cause a dramatic increase in the corresponding
value of emotion functions. In contrast, an agent who uses the Boulware strategy
is more conservative or stubborn because only a high desirability of an emotion
can cause a dramatic increase in the value of emotion functions. An agent who
uses Linear strategy is moderate in nature because the increase rate of the emotion
function is independent of the value of desirability.
Accordingly, the secondary derivation function 𝑔(𝐼𝑥 ) maps intensity −1 ≤ 𝐼𝑥 ≤ 1

to a value in-between [0, 1], which can be deﬁned by Equation 5.14.
(

)𝜈
𝐼𝑥 + 1
𝑔(𝐼𝑥 ) =
− 1 ≤ 𝐼𝑥 ≤ 1, 𝜈 > 0
2
where 𝜈 is the secondary derivation coeﬃcient.

(5.14)

Emotion derivation function Ϝ𝑥 (𝑐, 𝑠) maps the emotion derivation variables to a
ﬁnal emotion state. The ﬁnal state of emotion 𝑥 is then used as the intrinsic reward
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡 for agent learning, which can be given as follows:
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡 =

{

𝐸𝑥
−𝐸𝑥

if emotion 𝑥 is positve,
if emotion 𝑥 is negative.

(5.15)

where emotion 𝑥 is positive if it is 𝑗𝑜𝑦 and negative if it is 𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 or 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟.
Competition between emotion derivation functions
In the framework, each agent is embodied with both FW and WF functions to model
real-life situations when people react to the environment based on several internal
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emotional cues. These two functions compete with each other in order to dominate
an agent’s internal derivation process of emotions through the inner-layer learning
process. The sketch of the inner-layer learning process is given by Algorithm 8, in
which 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 ) is the probability to choose the FW function, 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 ) is the probability
to choose the WF function and 𝑄(𝐹 𝑊 )/𝑄(𝑊 𝐹 ) are the corresponding 𝑄 values to
select function 𝐹 𝑊/𝑊 𝐹 .
Algorithm 8: The inner-layer learning process
1 𝑄(𝐹 𝑊 ) ← 0, 𝑄(𝑊 𝐹 ) ← 0, 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 ) ← 0.5, 𝜋(𝑊 𝐹 ) ← 0.5;
2 for each learning episode t (t=1,...,T) do
3
Generates a random number 𝜏, 𝜏 ∈ [0, 1];
4
if 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 ) ≤ 𝜏 then
5
Chooses function 𝑊 𝐹 ;
6
else Chooses function 𝐹 𝑊 ;
7
Calculates intrinsic emotional reward 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡 according to selected function;
8
if selected function is FW then
9
Updates Q(FW), 𝑄(𝐹 𝑊 ) ← 𝑄(𝐹 𝑊 ) + 𝛼(𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡 − 𝑄(𝐹 𝑊 ));
10
else Updates Q(WF), 𝑄(𝑊 𝐹 ) ← 𝑄(𝑊 𝐹 ) + 𝛼(𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡 − 𝑄(𝑊 𝐹 ));
11
Calculates average reward, 𝑟 = 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 )𝑄(𝐹 𝑊 ) + 𝜋(𝑊 𝐹 )𝑄(𝑊 𝐹 );
△(𝐹 𝑊 ) = 𝑄(𝐹 𝑊 ) − 𝑟, △(𝑊 𝐹 ) = 𝑄(𝑊 𝐹 ) − 𝑟;
12
13
if △(𝐹 𝑊 ) > 0 then △(𝐹 𝑊 ) = △(𝐹 𝑊 ) ∗ (1 − 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 ));
14
else △(𝐹 𝑊 ) = △(𝐹 𝑊 ) ∗ 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 );
15
if △(𝑊 𝐹 ) > 0 then △(𝑊 𝐹 ) = △(𝑊 𝐹 ) ∗ (1 − 𝜋(𝑊 𝐹 ));
16
else △(𝑊 𝐹 ) = △(𝑊 𝐹 ) ∗ 𝜋(𝑊 𝐹 );
17
𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 ) = 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 ) + 𝛼 ∗ △(𝐹 𝑊 ), 𝜋(𝑊 𝐹 ) = 𝜋(𝑊 𝐹 ) + 𝛼 ∗ △(𝑊 𝐹 );
𝑊)
𝐹)
𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 ) = 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊𝜋(𝐹
, 𝜋(𝑊 𝐹 ) = 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊𝜋(𝑊
;
18
)+𝜋(𝑊 𝐹 )
)+𝜋(𝑊 𝐹 )
An agent chooses an emotion derivation function according to the probability
distribution of 𝜋(𝐹 𝑊 ) and 𝜋(𝑊 𝐹 ) (Line 3-6). The agent then calculates the intrinsic emotional reward 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡 based on the selected function (Line 7) and updates the Q
values using 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡 (Line 8-10). The Q value associated with a function indicates the
expected future reward using the corresponding function, and the average reward
𝑟 indicates the expected future reward using current strategy of selecting emotion
derivation functions (Line 11). The agent then compares the expected future reward 𝑄 value of using the corresponding function to the expected future reward 𝑟
of using the current strategy of selecting emotion derivation functions (Line 12). If
the expected future reward using a function is larger than that using the current
strategy of selecting functions (i.e., 𝑄 > 𝑟), the increase in the probability of selecting the corresponding function is weighted by 1 − 𝜋 (Line 13, 15), otherwise it is
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weighted by 𝜋 (Line 14, 16). The strategy of selecting each function is then updated
with learning rate 𝛼 (Line 17) and ﬁnally normalised between [0, 1] (Line 18). The
principle of Algorithm 8 is based on the Weighted Policy Learner (WPL) algorithm
[AL06] to indicate diﬀerent learning rates of adapting strategies inside an agent.

5.2.4

The Interaction Protocol

Algorithm 9 gives the sketch of the interaction protocol in the emotional MARL
framework. All the agents interact with each other simultaneously. Each agent keeps
a strategy 𝜋(𝑒) to select an emotion derivation function and Q values associated with
the FW function and the WF function. In a learning episode, each agent chooses
emotion derivation function 𝑒 based on 𝜋(𝑒) (Line 7). If the selected function is
the FW function, the agent then chooses best-response action 𝑎𝑖 to cooperate or to
𝐹
defect based on 𝑄𝐹𝑖 𝑊 (𝑎), otherwise, action 𝑎𝑖 is chosen based on 𝑄𝑊
(𝑎) (Line 8-10).
𝑖

The agent interacts with each of its neighbors using action 𝑎𝑖 , observes the actions
of its neighbors and receives the reward (i.e., sum of the pay-oﬀs of interaction with
each of its neighbors) from the environment after each interaction step (Line 11-14).
The agent then calculates its sense of social fairness (Line 15) and its individual
wellbeing (Line 16) after each learning episode, and derives the intrinsic emotional
rewards using the selected emotion derivation function 𝑒 (Line 17). Finally, the agent
calls the inner-layer learning to update strategy 𝜋(𝑒) of selecting emotion derivation
functions (Line 18) and updates the learning information 𝑄𝑒𝑖 (𝑎) associated with
function 𝑒 using the intrinsic emotional reward (Line 19).

5.3

Experiments and Analysis

This section presents the experimental studies. Subsection 5.3.1 introduces the
experimental settings. Subsection 5.3.2 gives the experimental results. Finally,
Subsection 5.3.3 summarises the general ﬁndings from the experiments.

5.3.1

Experimental Settings

The experiments use the typical values 𝑇 = 5, 𝑅 = 3, 𝑃 = 1, 𝑆 = 0 of the PD game
pay-oﬀs as given in Table 5.1. Q-learning is used as the basic learning approach with
learning rate 𝛼 = 0.5 and discount factor 𝛾 = 0. The discount factor 𝛾 is set to 0
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Algorithm 9: The interaction protocol in the emotional MARL framework
1 // 𝜋(𝑒):
probability to select emotion derivation function 𝑒;
𝐹𝑊
2 // 𝑄𝑖
(𝑎): Q values associated with the FW function;
𝑊𝐹
3 // 𝑄𝑖
(𝑎): Q values associated with the WF function;
4 Initialise network and learning parameters;
5 for each learning episode t (t=1,...,T) do
6
for each agent 𝑖 (i=1,...,N) do
7
Chooses emotion derivation function 𝑒 based on 𝜋(𝑒);
8
if e=FW then
9
Chooses best-response action 𝑎𝑖 based on 𝑄𝐹𝑖 𝑊 (𝑎);
𝐹
10
else Chooses best-response action 𝑎𝑖 based on 𝑄𝑊
(𝑎);
𝑖
11
for each neighbor 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁(𝑖) do
12
Plays action 𝑎𝑖 with agent 𝑗;
13
Observes the action chosen by agent 𝑗;
14
Receives pay-oﬀ 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 after interacting with agent 𝑗;
Calculates its sense of social fairness;
Calculates its individual wellbeing;
Calculates the intrinsic emotional reward using selected function 𝑒;
Calls Algorithm 8 to update 𝜋(𝑒);
Updates 𝑄𝑒𝑖 (𝑎) using the intrinsic emotional reward.

15
16
17
18
19

because of the stateless of state transitions. The 𝜀-greedy exploration strategy is used
as the exploration strategy with exploration rate 𝜀 = 0.1. Scalable parameter ℎ in
the aspiration-based approach is set to 10. Learning rate 𝛽 to update the aspiration
level is set to 0.5. Interaction steps in each learning episode 𝑀 is set to 1 to model
memoryless agents. Unless stated otherwise, the linear function (i.e., 𝜇 = 𝜈 = 1) is
used to model moderate agents. All results are averaged over 100 independent runs.
The experiments investigate the following issues:
∙ Issue 1: The emergence of cooperation in the emotional MARL
framework

The ﬁrst and most fundamental issue is to test whether cooperation can be
achieved when agents play spatial IPD in the proposed emotional MARL
framework in three diﬀerent kinds of networks. If cooperation does emerge, is
there any emotion derivation function that can emerge as a dominant factor
to determine the agents’ internal emotion derivation process?
∙ Issue 2: The emergence of cooperation without the inner-layer learning
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It is also interesting to investigate the impact of inner-layer learning on the
emergence of cooperation. Therefore, the emotional MARL framework is
tested in a system where each agent uses only outer-layer learning to adapt its
learning behaviors based on one particular emotion derivation function.
∙ Issue 3: The impacts of the neighborhood/population sizes and the
network randomness

The neighborhood/population sizes and the randomness of networks are important factors that can inﬂuence the emergence of cooperation in a system.
Agent number 𝑁 is varied in the range of [25, 1000] in network 𝐺𝑅𝑁 and network 𝑆𝑊𝑁4,0.4 , number of neighbors 𝑘 is varied in the set of {2, 4, 6, 8, 12} in net-

𝑘,0.4
work 𝑆𝑊100
and randomness of network 𝜌 is varied in the set of {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6,

4,𝜌
0.8, 1} in network 𝑆𝑊100
, to investigate the impacts of these factors on the

emergence of cooperation in the whole system.
∙ Issue 4: The impact of the core/secondary derivation coeﬃcient 𝜇/𝜈

It is interesting to investigate the impact of diﬀerent agents’ personalities on
their learning behaviors. Therefore, 𝜇, 𝜈 are varied in the set of {0.2, 0.6, 1, 2, 3,

5, 10} in grid network 𝐺𝑅100 to investigate the impact of diﬀerent derivation
coeﬃcients on the emergence of cooperation among the agents.
The parameter settings are summarised in Table 5.2 for clarity.

5.3.2

Experimental Results and Analysis

This subsection presents the experimental results and analysis in each of the four
issues laid out in the experimental settings.
Issue 1: The emergence of cooperation in the emotional MARL framework
Extensive experiments are carried out by applying the proposed emotional MARL
framework in the spatial IPD. The patterns of results do not diﬀer greatly in terms
of population size (which can be seen later). Therefore, here, the results when
population size is 100 are given. The experimental analysis is conducted from two
diﬀerent angles: 1) dynamics of population rewards in diﬀerent kinds of networks
and 2) dynamics of appraisal variables and emotion states.
1) Dynamics of population rewards in diﬀerent kinds of networks
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Table 5.2: Parameter settings in the emotional MARL experiments
Categories Parameters
𝑁
Network

𝑘
𝜌
𝑚0
𝑚
𝜆

Learning
algorithm

Game
structure

Others

𝛼
𝛽
𝛾
𝜀
𝑇
𝑅
𝑃
𝑆
ℎ
𝑀
𝜇
𝜈

Parameters in the experiments
Meanings
Values
number of agents
[25, 1000]
average neighborhood size in small-world net{2, 4, 6, 8, 12}
works
{0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1} re-wiring probability in small-world networks
initial agents to generate small-world networks
5
number of edges added to the network at every
1
step in small-world networks
exponent value of power law in scale-free net3
works
learning rate in Q-learning and inner learning
0.5
learning rate to update aspiration level
0.5
discount factor in Q-learning
0
𝜀-exploration rate
0.10
temptation to defect
5
reward for mutual cooperation
3
punishment for mutual defection
1
sucker’s pay-oﬀ
0
scalable parameter in aspiration-based ap10
proach
interaction steps in a learning episode
1
{0.2, 0.6, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10} core derivation coeﬃcient
{0.2, 0.6, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10} secondary derivation coeﬃcient

Figure 5.3(a) shows the learning dynamics of the average population reward
in grid network 𝐺𝑅100 . In the ﬁgure, Absolute value-based, Variance-based and
Aspiration-based learning approaches indicate the diﬀerent approaches to appraise
agents’ individual wellbeing in the proposed emotional MARL framework, and Nonemotional learning denotes the fully distributed MARL approach (refer to Equation
5.1) that agents make decisions by maximising their Q-values directly based on
extrinsic individual rewards from the environment. In all approaches, each agent
chooses an action randomly at the beginning of learning, which results in an initial
average reward around

1
(𝑇
4

+ 𝑅 + 𝑃 + 𝑆) = 2.25. As learning proceeds, how-

ever, diﬀerent learning approaches produce diﬀerent patterns of learning behaviors.
As expected, the non-emotional learning approach ends up with mutual defection
among the agents, causing a converged average population reward close to 𝑃 = 12 .
This result indicates that behaving rationally does not necessarily bring about the
best outcome for the learning agents. In the IPD game, rational learning can only
2

Note that the stabilised ﬁnal reward for defection is a bit higher than 𝑃 = 1 and the reward for
cooperation is a bit lower than 𝑅 = 3 in Figure 5.3. This is caused by the 𝜀-exploration strategy
during learning, which means that each agent has a probability of 𝜀 = 0.1 to choose an action
randomly.
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Figure 5.3: Learning dynamics in network 𝐺𝑅100 with various wellbeing appraisal
approaches.
lead to a behavior that ensures each agent from being exploited by its opponents.
No agent can achieve a dominant position by choosing defection to exploit its opponent because the opponent will eliminate such dominance by also choosing defection,
resulting in the Nash equilibrium of mutual defection among the agents. The mutual defection result achieved through rational learning contradicts with real-life
phenomena when many simple as well as complex organisms, including mammals
and humans, exhibit a large tendency towards altruistic cooperative behaviors. In
contrast, the proposed emotional MARL framework using the variance-based or
aspiration-based approach to appraise individual wellbeing can greatly boost the
emergence of cooperation among the agents, causing a converged average population reward close to mutual cooperation of 𝑅 = 3. These results indicate that
the emotional learning framework can endow selﬁsh agents with an internal cognitive and emotional capability that drives these agents to reciprocal behaviors in
social dilemmas. Learning with emotions can prevent agents from being Rational
Fools [BBC99], who act to maximise their gains in the short term. The absolute
value-based approach, however, cannot bring about cooperation among the agents,
causing a similar learning curve to the non-emotional learning approach. This result
conﬁrms that the absolute wealth of an agent cannot reﬂect the agent’s real emotion
state regarding its own wellbeing.
Figure 5.3(b) plots the dynamics of the strategy of selecting emotion derivation
functions in grid network 𝐺𝑅100 , in which 𝜋(𝑒) indicates the probability of selecting emotion derivation function 𝑒 (i.e, FW and WF) to derive the emotions of the
agents. As can be seen, at the beginning, the two emotion derivation functions are
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chosen by the agents with an equal probability. When the learning process moves on,
however, the probability of selecting the functions diﬀers signiﬁcantly. When agents
adopt the satisfaction-based or the variance-based approach to appraise individual
wellbeing, the FW function gradually emerges as a dominant factor with a probability close to 100% (not considering the exploration during learning) for the agents
to derive their emotions. When agents adopt the absolute value-based approach to
appraise individual wellbeing, however, neither of the functions can dominate the
other. The probability of selecting the WF function is only a bit higher than that
of selecting the FW function. The results in Figure 5.3(b) indicate that, through
the competition of agents’ emotion derivation functions in the inner-layer learning,
the socially reciprocal behavior using the FW function can override the selﬁsh egoistic behavior using the WF function, which correspondingly facilitates cooperation
among the agents. The results provide an explanation of real-life phenomena where
people are social beings and often care about social fairness more than their own
interests in order to achieve mutually beneﬁcial outcomes [dJT11]. For example, in
the Ultimatum game, people usually refuse an unfair oﬀer, even if this will cause
them to receive nothing, and in the public goods game, people are usually willing
to punish free riders, even though this punishment imposes a cost on themselves.
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Figure 5.4: Learning dynamics in network 𝑆𝑊100
with various wellbeing appraisal

approaches.
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Figure 5.5: Learning dynamics in network 𝑆𝐹100
with various wellbeing appraisal

approaches.
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 show learning dynamics in a small-world and a scalefree network, respectively. From the results, it can be seen that the patterns of
learning behaviors in these two kinds of networks are almost the same as those
in grid networks. The minor diﬀerence occurs in the scale-free network, in which
the variance-based approach outperforms the aspiration-based approach in terms
of a higher level of cooperation and a quicker emergence rate, and the absolute
value-based approach can maintain a certain level of cooperation in contrast to the
full defection of agents using the non-emotional learning approach. In general, the
proposed emotional-MARL framework is robust for the diﬀerent kinds of networks
to enable the emergence of cooperation among the agents when variance-based and
aspiration-based approaches are adopted in the appraisal of individual wellbeing.
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Figure 5.6: Learning dynamics in diﬀerent networks using emotional and rational
learning.
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To further illustrate the diﬀerent learning behaviors in the three kinds of networks, Figure 5.6 shows the learning dynamics of the non-emotional learning approach and variance-based emotional learning approach in three diﬀerent kinds of
networks. As can be seen, agents exhibit exactly the same learning behaviors in
three kinds of networks using the non-emotional learning approach, which leads
to mutual defection among the agents. Agents using the variance-based emotional
learning approach can achieve very similar behaviors in three kinds of networks,
which lead to the emergence of cooperation among the agents. The cooperation
level and emergence rate, however, diﬀer slightly in the three networks, with scalefree networks resulting in the highest cooperation level and quickest emergence rate,
followed by grid networks and then small-world networks.
2) Dynamics of appraisal variables and emotion states
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Figure 5.7: Learning dynamics of emotion appraisal variables in grid network 𝐺𝑅100 .
Figure 5.7 shows the dynamics of appraisal values and the resultant overall emotion state in grid network 𝐺𝑅100 . Figure 5.7(a) gives the learning dynamics of
agents using the variance-based appraisal approach. It can be seen that the value
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of social fairness 𝐹 increases as learning proceeds. This is because more and more
agents have chosen to cooperate as a result of their local interactions and internal emotion derivation processes. At the beginning of learning, agents choose their
actions randomly, causing an average of population reward of 2.25. As learning
proceeds, the average population reward increases gradually to a ﬁnal cooperation
reward of 3 as more and more agents choose cooperate. The individual wellbeing
𝑊 , which is appraised through the variance of agents’ absolute wealth, is therefore
quite small. Note that the curves in the ﬁgure are averaged in the whole agent population over 100 runs, which means each curve only indicates the overall variation
of social fairness, wellbeing and overall emotion state of all the agents. To have
a better understanding of the dynamics during learning, Figure 5.7(d) shows the
learning dynamics of the appraisal values and overall emotion state in a single FW
agent in one particular run. It can be seen that the agent is dynamically updating
the values of emotion appraisal variables and consequent emotion states, and during
this dynamical updating process, the agent can bias its learning behavior to achieve
cooperation with other co-learning FW agents. Previous results have shown that
the FW function can emerge as a dominant factor when agents use the variancebased approach to appraise individual wellbeing. In Figure 5.7(a), the agent feels
𝑗𝑜𝑦 because it senses fairness (𝐹 > 0). The overall state of the emotion of 𝑗𝑜𝑦, 𝐸𝑗𝑜𝑦 ,
therefore, increases during the learning process and ﬁnally stabilises around 0.32,
which means the agents cannot reach a fully joyful state (i.e., 𝐸𝑗𝑜𝑦 = 1). This is
because reciprocal altruistic behaviors require agents to forsake their own short-term
beneﬁts for long-term group beneﬁts. The agents cannot sense fairness (𝐹 > 0) and
remain in the highest wellbeing state (𝑊 = 1) at the same time, because being
very wealthy will result in others’ defection. The agent will feel unfairness (𝐹 < 0)
again in this case and will be fearful of being revenged by their neighbors (refer
to Equation 5.9). The stabilised ﬁnal level of emotion state of 𝑗𝑜𝑦 at around 0.32,
therefore, becomes the emotional equilibrium (i.e., being moderately joyful in order
to achieve mutually satisfactory outcomes) among the agents where no one has the
incentive to deviate. Figure 5.7(b) gives the learning dynamics of agents using the
aspiration-based appraisal approach. The results are quite similar to those using
the variance-based emotional learning approach in Figure 5.7(a), which can also be
veriﬁed by the similar performance as given before. The situation is quite diﬀerent when agents use absolute value-based appraisal approach to appraise individual
wellbeing in Figure 5.7(c). The value of 𝐹 increases because more and more agents
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have chosen to defect. Agents sense fairness in this uncooperative environment when
they defect more often. The value of 𝑊 decrease gradually and the overall emotion
state of 𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝐸𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 , increases accordingly and ﬁnally stabilises around 0.34,
which means the agents are sad about the mutual defection outcome because they
should have achieved better results by cooperating with each other.
Issue 2: The emergence of cooperation without the inner-layer learning
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Figure 5.8: Learning dynamics using only outer-layer learning.
Previous results have shown that, through the competition between the FW
function and the WF function in the inner-layer learning process, socially reciprocal behavior using the FW function always emerges as a dominant factor to derive
emotions in order to achieve cooperation among the agents. A question then arises
whether agents can learn to achieve cooperation directly based on the FW function
without the inner-learning process. Figure 5.8(a) shows the learning dynamics in
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grid network 𝐺𝑅100 . As expected, agents using the FW function can learn to cooperate successfully, while agents using the WF function can only learn to achieve a
certain level of cooperation. This result is reasonable because agents using the FW
function to derive their emotions are socially aware agents that behave in a reciprocal altruistic way, while agents using the WF function to derive their emotions
are selﬁsh egoists that care about individual wellbeing more than social fairness.
Figures 5.8(b)-(d) show the learning dynamics in the three diﬀerent kinds of networks when agents use the FW function to derive emotions and use the proposed
three diﬀerent approaches to appraise individual wellbeing. As can be seen, three
diﬀerent kinds of networks produce almost the same pattern of learning behaviors.
The aspiration-based approach outperforms the other two approaches in all three
networks. In contrast to mutual defection result which occurs when agents use both
outer-layer and inner-layer learning, the absolute value-based approach can maintain
a certain level of cooperation, which is a bit lower than that using aspiration-based
or variance-based approach. These results further conﬁrm that absolute wealth of
an agent cannot reﬂect the agent’s real emotion state regarding its own wellbeing in
order to achieve high levels of cooperation among the agents.
Issue 3: The impacts of the neighborhood/population sizes and the network randomness
Figure 5.9 shows the inﬂuences of diﬀerent neighborhood sizes, orders of network
randomness and population sizes on the emergence of cooperation when agents adopt
the variance-based emotional learning approach. Figure 5.9(a) shows the learning
𝑘,0.4
dynamics with diﬀerent neighborhood sizes 𝑘 in small-world network 𝑆𝑊100
. As

can be seen, only a small number of average neighbors (𝑘 = 2, 4) can ensure the
emergence of cooperative behavior of the agents. When the number of average
neighbors becomes large (𝑘 = 6, 8, 12), cooperation cannot be achieved. Extensive
experiments are carried out by varying the number of neighbors in diﬀerent population sizes, and found that there was always a turning point of performance from
cooperation to defection. This phenomenon is quite interesting and indicates that
more local interactions of agents are not necessary to facilitate the emergence of an
altruistic norm in social dilemma games, against the general cases of norm emergence in coordination games given by previous studies [Del02, YZRL13]. Figure
5.9(b) plots the learning dynamics with diﬀerent orders of network randomness 𝜌
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Figure 5.9: Learning dynamics with diﬀerent neighborhood sizes, orders of network
randomness and population sizes.
4,𝜌
in small-world network 𝑆𝑊100
, with 𝜌 = 0 indicating a regular regular ring lattice,

an increased 𝜌 producing a small network with increasing randomness and 𝜌 = 1
indicating a fully random network. The result shows that agents are able to achieve
a high level of cooperation in a network with high randomness. This is because the
increase in randomness can reduce the network diameter (i.e., the largest number
of hops in order to traverse from one vertex to another), and the smaller a network diameter is, the more eﬃcient for the network to evolve a social norm (i.e.,
reciprocal altruistic behavior). Figure 5.9(c) and Figure 5.9(d) show the learning
dynamics with diﬀerent population sizes in grid network 𝐺𝑅𝑁 and small-world network 𝑆𝑊𝑁4,0.4 , respectively. As can be seen, in the grid network, the increase in
population size has a negligible impact on the emergence of cooperation among the
agents, while in the small-world network, the increase in population size can raise
the cooperation level among the agents slightly.
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Issue 4: The impact of the core/secondary derivation coeﬃcient 𝜇/𝜈
3

3

µ=0.2

ν=2

ν=3

2.8

Average reward

µ=1

2.6

µ=2

µ=0.6

2.5

ν=5

ν=1

2.4

ν=10

µ=3
2.2

ν=0.6

2

µ=5

2

1.8

µ=10
1.5
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

ν=0.2

1.6

160

180

200

1.4
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Learning episode

(a) Core derivation coeﬃcient 𝜇

(b) Secondary derivation coeﬃcient 𝜈

Figure 5.10: Impact of derivation coeﬃcient 𝜇/𝜈 on the emergence of cooperation
in 𝐺𝑅100 .
Figure 5.10 shows the impact of core/secondary derivation coeﬃcient 𝜇/𝜈 on
the emergence of cooperation in grid network 𝐺𝑅100 . As can be seen from Figure 5.10(a), the Conceder strategies (𝜇 = 0.2, 0.6) and the Linear strategy (𝜇 = 1)
to adapt the core derivation function can greatly boost the emergence of cooperation among the agents and these two strategies result in almost the same learning
behaviors, while the Boulware strategies (𝜇 = 2, 3, 5, 10) hinder the establishment
of cooperation. The larger the value of 𝜇, the lower the level of cooperation among
the agents. The result indicates that cooperation is more likely to emerge if agents
are more aggressive in their core appraisal of emotions. Figure 5.10(b) shows the
impact of secondary derivation coeﬃcient 𝜈 on the emergence of cooperation. The
Conceder strategies (𝜈 = 0.2, 0.6) lead to low levels of cooperation, while the Linear
strategy (𝜇 = 1) and the moderate Boulware strategies (𝜈 = 2, 3) can obtain high
levels of cooperation. Drastic Boulware strategies (𝜈 = 5, 10), however, slightly decrease the levels of cooperation again. This result indicates that cooperation can be
achieved if agents are conservative in their secondary appraisal of emotions. Results
in Figure 5.10 show that diﬀerent agents’ personalities (in terms of adapting their
core and secondary derivation functions) have signiﬁcant impacts on the emergence
of cooperation among the agents.
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General Research Findings

A comprehensive set of empirical results and analysis were provided in Subsection 5.3.2 to show the performance of the emotional MARL framework in social
dilemmas. The two-layered emotional MARL framework can endow selﬁsh agents
with an internal cognitive and emotional capability that drive these agents to learn
reciprocal behaviors in social dilemmas.
The general research ﬁndings from the experiments are summarised as follows.
1. The proposed framework enables agents to achieve high levels of cooperation if agents evaluate their individual wellbeing via the variance of absolute wealth or the degree of satisfaction between the
absolute wealth and the intrinsic aspirations.
The absolute wealth of an agent cannot reﬂect the agent’s real emotion states
regarding its own wellbeing in order to achieve cooperative behaviors. Agents
which use the absolute value-based approach to appraise the wellbeing, therefore, cannot achieve full cooperation among them. Through the competition
of agents’ emotion derivation functions in the inner-layer learning, the socially
reciprocal behavior using the FW function can override the selﬁsh egoistic behavior using the WF function, which correspondingly facilitates cooperation
among the agents.
2. When only using the outer-layer learning, agents adopting the FW
function can learn to cooperate with each other successfully, while
agents adopting the WF function can only learn to achieve a certain
level of cooperation.
This result conﬁrms that the socially reciprocal behaviors based on the FW
function, which is selected as the dominant emotional cue through the competition with the WF function in agents’ inner-layer learning, is the core factor
for the agents to learn cooperative behaviors.
3. The proposed framework enables agents to achieve very similar
learning behaviors in the three diﬀerent kinds of networks with various population sizes.
The average neighborhood size and the randomness of networks, however, are
important factors that can inﬂuence the emergence of cooperation among the
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agents. To achieve a high level of cooperation, a network must feature a small
neighborhood size and a high order of randomness.
4. The diﬀerent strategies to adapt the core/secondary derivation functions have signiﬁcant impacts on agents’ learning behaviors.
To achieve a high level of cooperation, agents must be aggressive in adapting the core derivation function and conservative in adapting the secondary
derivation function.

5.4

Discussions

On one hand, cooperation is ubiquitous in the real world and can be observed at
diﬀerent organisations ranging from microorganisms and animal groups to human
societies [HCS11], and achieving a satisfactory understanding of the evolution of
cooperation among self-interested entities in social dilemmas is a fundamental issue
for elucidating and comprehending many key issues that our societies are faced with
today. Directly applying naive MAL approaches in social dilemmas will end up with
convergence to the Nash equilibrium of mutual defection among the agents if no
additional mechanisms are implemented. The convergence to the Nash equilibrium
occurs because both agents adopt the best-response actions during learning. As
a result, neither agent can achieve a dominant position by choosing defection to
exploit its opponent because the opponent will eliminate such dominance by also
choosing defection, resulting in mutual defection between the agents.
On the other hand, it is an important research issue in MASs to incorporate
emotion-related concepts and mechanisms into a computational model so as to
make the model more aligned with human expectations and therefore more feasible
to reach the intended goals. Emotions have been shown to be an eﬃcient heuristic to assist humans’ bounded rationality for an eﬀective decision-making process,
and thus can play a fundamental role in learning by eliciting physiological signals
that bias human’s behaviors toward maximising reward and minimising punishment [RBDW12, AP06]. It has been argued that “MAL is not merely a matter of
straight learning, but a matter involving complex social interactions and cognitive
processes, leading to complex collective functions [Sun01]”. Therefore, MAL, in
essence, should rely on some emotional cues to indicate the advantage or disadvantage of an event.
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Research in this chapter focuses on the incorporation of emotions in MAL to
achieve cooperation in social dilemmas. The proposed emotional MAL framework
captures two fundamental variables, individual wellbeing and social fairness, in the
appraisal of emotions, and presents an explicit instantiation of the structural model
of emotion appraisal to derive emotions based on these two appraisal variables.
Agents can learn whether to cooperate in the outer-layered learning, while in the
meta-level inner-layer learning, two contradictory emotion derivation functions compete with each other in order to dominate the agent’s emotional reaction process.
In the current literature, emotions, agent learning and social dilemmas have been
extensively studied in two diﬀerent directions:
1. Using emotions to enhance cooperation in social dilemmas
Several studies have examined the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas
by implementing an emotion mechanism. For example, Bazzan [BB01] speciﬁed the rules of generating emotions based on the OCC model [OCC90] by
comparing an agent’s received rewards to a pre-deﬁned constant value and by
counting the number of neighbors who are in a speciﬁc emotion state. The
results showed that the level of cooperation in a two-dimensional IPD when
agents made decisions using emotions increased to 47%, a slightly higher than
that of 32% when without using emotions. Scolnoki et al. [SXWP11] proposed
a new imitation mechanism that agents could copy the neighbors’ emotional
proﬁles (deﬁned as the probability to cooperate with the neighbors of various success rates) and found that this imitation could be capable of guiding
the population towards cooperation in three diﬀerent social dilemmas. Bazzan [BBC99] used sentiments like generosity toward others and guilt for not
having played fairly with someone to prevent IPD players from trying to maximise the gain in the short term only. The results showed that in a society
where agents had emotions, to behave rationally might not be the best attitude
neither for an individual nor for the social group.
All these studies, however, are based on rule-based emotional frameworks, in
which the way of eliciting explicit emotions must be predeﬁned so that agents
can adapt their behaviors (i.e., cooperation or defection) directly based on
their emotion states. This is in contrast to the work in this chapter, in which
emotions, derived via agents’ appraisal of their sense of individual wellbeing
and social fairness, are used as intrinsic rewards to inﬂuence agents’ learning
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behaviors during repeated interactions with their neighbors.
2. Using emotions to increase learning eﬃciency in agent learning
In another line of research, numerous previous studies have incorporated emotions into agent learning with the aim either to facilitate learning eﬃciency
or to adapt a single agent to dynamic and complex environments. Ahn et
al. [AP06] presented a computational framework where both “the extrinsic reward from the external goal” and “the intrinsic reward from multiple emotion
circuits and drives” played an integral role in agent learning. Their experimental results showed that using emotions could improve the speed of learning and
regulate the trade-oﬀ between exploration and exploitation. Sequeira [SMP11]
proposed four emotion appraisal dimensions (novelty, motivation, control and
valence) to evaluate an agent relationship with its environment. Each of these
dimensions was translated into a numerical feature that was used as intrinsic
rewards to an RL agent. The experimental results showed that contributions
from diﬀerent reward features could lead to distinct behaviors that allowed
agents to adapt to particular environments and thus obtain better performance. Salichs [SM12] proposed a new approach to modeling emotions in
agents based on drives, motivations and emotions. Three kinds of emotions
(i.e., happiness, sadness and fear) were implemented to enable an agent to
learn reasonable behaviors in order to maximise its wellbeing by satisfying
the agent’s drives and avoiding dangerous situations. Their research results
showed that emotions were essential for the agent to learn the right sequences
of actions that were expected in nature.
Most of these studies, however, focus on single-agent learning scenarios, in
which the emotion system drives a single agent to learn more eﬃcient strategies
and adaptive behaviors in complex environments. In the proposed emotional
MAL framework in this chapter, emotions are used to aﬀect the behavior of
multiple agents that conduct learning at the same time in order to achieve
cooperation among these agents in the context of spatial social dilemmas.
This diﬀerentiates the work in this chapter from all these previous studies.
Research in this chapter, therefore, bridges the gap between the two research
directions of using emotions to solve social dilemmas and using emotions in agent
learning, by incorporating emotions into MAL to study the emergence of cooperation
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in social dilemmas. This eﬀort is claimed to be the major contribution of the research
in this chapter.

5.5

Summary

This chapter proposed a two-layered emotional MAL framework to study the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. The goal of this research is to investigate
whether such emotional learning can inﬂuence agents’ rational learning so that cooperation can be obtained among the agents. Experimental results revealed that
diﬀerent ways of appraising emotions and various network topologies had signiﬁcant
impacts on agent learning behaviors in the proposed framework, and under certain
circumstances, high levels of cooperation could be achieved among the agents.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
With the increasing complexity and scalability of MASs in practical applications,
learning has been considered to be a highly desirable ability for intelligent agents
in order to be ﬂexible, robust and capable of adapting to environmental changes.
MAL research studies how agents can learn satisfactory solutions in complex environments. The main problem arising in MAL is that the concurrent learning
processes of multiple agents can make the learning environment non-stationary for
each individual learner. Learning in this circumstance is diﬃcult, especially when
agents also need to deal with incomplete information caused by their communication
constraints or observability limits. This thesis provided eﬀective solutions to several
challenging issues in MAL research. This chapter summarises the contributions of
this thesis and outlines the directions for future work.

6.1

Contributions of This Thesis

In this thesis, the research focuses on solving MAL problems in various complex
environments. The contributions of this thesis include:
1. Two coordinated MAL approaches in loosely coupled MASs
Two coordinated MAL approaches were proposed to enable agents to learn
where and how to coordinate their behaviors in loosely coupled MASs by exploiting sparse interactions and diﬀerent levels of independent relationships of
agents. In the oﬀ-line learning approach, agents ﬁrst collect statistical information to detect those states where coordination is most necessary and then
learn to coordinate their behaviors with each other through the agents’ local observability of the environment. To handle the uncertainties caused by
agents’ local observability, an optimistic estimation mechanism was introduced
135

6.1. Contributions of This Thesis

136

to guide the learning process of the agents. In the on-line learning approach,
agents learn to make a trade-oﬀ between a single-agent learning process and
a coordinated learning process through dynamic adaptation of the estimation of independent degrees between agents. The single-agent learning process
can take advantage of the agents’ independence from one another in order to
achieve computational savings, while the coordinated learning process can take
advantage of each agent’s limited observability to mitigate the uncertainties of
the learning environment in order to improve learning. Through the dynamic
trade-oﬀ between these two processes, agents can learn an eﬃcient coordinated
policy with minimum computational consumption. Both approaches do not
require prior knowledge about the structure of the domain and assumptions
about the learning agents. These features set the approaches apart from most
existing approaches in related work and render them potentially suitable for
wider practical applications. Experimental results showed that agents using
the proposed approaches could achieve eﬃcient coordinated behaviors in different scales of domains with a low computational complexity.
2. A collective MAL framework for emergence of social norms in networked MASs
A collective learning framework, which imitates the opinion aggregation process in human decision making, was proposed to study the impact of agent
local collective behaviors on the emergence of social norms in a number of
diﬀerent situations. In the framework, each agent interacts repeatedly with
all of its neighbors. At each step, an agent ﬁrst takes a best-response action
towards each of its neighbors and then combines all of these actions into a
ﬁnal action using ensemble learning methods. This learning framework, which
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the paired learning framework that has been
adopted in most previous studies, models the collective decision making in
humans and the formation and evolution process of opinions, conventions and
rules in human societies. Extensive experiments were conducted to evaluate
the framework in diﬀerent settings in terms of agent heterogeneities and topological varieties. Experimental results revealed some signiﬁcant insights into
the manipulation and control of norm emergence in networked MASs achieved
through local collective learning behaviors.
3. A two-layered emotional MAL framework for cooperation in spatial
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social dilemmas
A two-layered emotional MAL framework was proposed to study the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. In particular, the spatial version of
social dilemmas was used by the consideration of the topological structure
among the agents to study the impact of local interactions on the emergence
of cooperation in the whole system. The framework captures two fundamental
variables, individual wellbeing and social fairness, in the appraisal of emotions, and presents an explicit instantiation of the structural model of emotion
appraisal to derive emotions based on these two appraisal variables. In the
framework, agents can learn whether to cooperate in the outer-layered learning, while in the meta-level inner-layer learning, contradictory emotional cues
compete with each other in order to dominate the agent’s emotional reaction
process. The goal of this work is to investigate whether such an emotional MAL
framework can inﬂuence agents’ rational learning so that cooperation can be
obtained. Experimental results revealed that diﬀerent ways of appraising emotions and various network topologies had signiﬁcant impacts on agent learning
behaviors in the proposed framework, and under certain circumstances, high
levels of cooperation among the agents could be achieved.

6.2

Future Work

Although the proposed approaches and frameworks in this thesis have shown their
eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency in learning satisfactory behaviors of agents in diﬀerent
environments, there is still some room for the improvement of the proposed solutions.
1. Coordinated MAL in loosely coupled MASs
Firstly, although two-agent scenarios greatly simplify general robot navigation problems, most current research into coordinated MAL in robot navigation problems still focuses on this setting because two-agent scenarios already
encompass the main challenges encountered in general robot navigation problems, that is, concurrent learning dynamics, each agent’s local observability
and limited or no prior knowledge concerning the domain or the agents. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to test the scalability of the proposed approaches
in situations involving more than two agents.
Secondly, due to the overestimation of other agents’ behaviors caused by the
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optimistic estimation mechanism, the oﬀ-line learning approach cannot obtain
a near-optimal performance. It is thus necessary to introduce an extra mechanism to improve the learning update rules further so that a near-optimal
performance can be guaranteed.
Thirdly, in the on-line learning approach, the independent degrees are adjusted
immediately when an event (conﬂict) occurs. This mechanism can be improved
by using a delayed updating rule to adjust the independent degrees based on
a speciﬁed period of learning experiences.
Finally, although the two proposed approaches are designed primarily to solve
robot navigation problems, the principles of the approaches can potentially
be used for solving other general coordinated learning problems where agents’
diﬀerent levels of independence can constrain coordinated behaviors to certain
situations. For this reason, it is possible to extend or modify the proposed approaches to apply them to other similar domains, e.g., prey-predator domains.
2. Collective MAL in networked MASs
Firstly, relationships between agents can be added to the network structure
to model real-life societies where people have diﬀerent kinds of relationships
among them. The collective learning process of an agent should thus not
only consider the neighbors’ position or reputation, but also consider such
relationships between the agent and its neighbors.
Secondly, more varied local learning behaviors can be further investigated,
for example, by considering the multiple transitive states of agents and by
assigning diﬀerent learning strategies to diﬀerent neighbors.
Finally, further work can be done to investigate the relationship between social
norms and the associated learning cost. Agents can learn to make a balance
between using the collective learning to boost norm emergence and using the
social learning (e.g., the observation strategy) to save learning cost. This
problem is inspired by the real-world phenomenon that individual thought
(learning) is often inversely related to the strength of a social norm, that is,
“once a norm is entrenched, we conform thoughtlessly” [Eps01].
3. Emotional MAL in social dilemmas
Although the framework was only implemented in the setting of IPD, it is potentially suitable to solve other forms of social dilemmas. For example, in the
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public good games, the inequity aversion function [FS99] can be used to appraise the social fairness, and the proposed three kinds of appraisal approaches
can be used to appraise the individual wellbeing. The proposed framework,
therefore, can be easily adapted to analyze the emergence of cooperation in
the public good games.
It is also interesting to study the inﬂuence of agent heterogeneities on the emergence of cooperation by endowing learning agents with diﬀerent mechanisms
to adapt the competition process in the inner-layer learning or with diﬀerent
individual wellbeing appraisal approaches, to model real-life situations when
people usually have diﬀerent emotional reactions to the same environmental
changes.
Lastly, application domains can be found for an explicit implementation of the
framework in order to solve the social dilemma arising in these domains. One
possible such domain is task allocation or routing in wireless sensor network,
in which sensors should work together in a cooperative manner to allocate
tasks or rout packages eﬃciently, rather than exploit others as a free rider to
pursue the short-term beneﬁts.
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G. Szabo and G. Fáth. Evolutionary games on graphs. Physics
Reports, 446(4-6):97–216, 2007.

[SGW01]

J.L. Stimpson, M.A. Goodrich, and L.C. Walters. Satisﬁcing and
learning cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. In International Joint
Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, volume 17, pages 535–544, 2001.

[SL93]

C.A. Smith and R.S. Lazarus. Appraisal components, core relational
themes, and the emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 7(3-4):233–269,
1993.

[SLB09]

S. Singh, R.L. Lewis, and A.G. Barto. Where do rewards come from.
In Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science
Society, pages 2601–2606, 2009.

[SLBS10]

S. Singh, R.L. Lewis, A.G. Barto, and J. Sorg. Intrinsically motivated reinforcement learning: An evolutionary perspective. IEEE
Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development, 2(2):70–82, 2010.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[SM08]

154

M.T.J. Spaan and F.S. Melo. Interaction-driven Markov games for
decentralized multiagent planning under uncertainty. In Proceedings
of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems-Volume 1, pages 525–532, 2008.

[SM12]

M.A. Salichs and M. Malfaz. A new approach to modeling emotions
and their use on a decision-making system for artiﬁcial agents. IEEE
Transactions on Aﬀective Computing, 3(1):56–68, 2012.

[SMP11]

P. Sequeira, F. Melo, and A. Paiva. Emotion-based intrinsic motivation for reinforcement learning agents. Aﬀective Computing and
Intelligent Interaction, pages 326–336, 2011.

[SP99]

R. Sun and T. Peterson. Multi-agent reinforcement learning: weighting and partitioning. Neural Netw., 12(4-5):727–753, Jun. 1999.

[SP05]

F.C. Santos and J.M. Pacheco. Scale-free networks provide a unifying
framework for the emergence of cooperation. Physical Review Letters,
95(9):98104, 2005.

[SPG07]

Y. Shoham, Powers.B, and T. Grenager. If multi-agent learning is
the answer,what is the question? Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 171:365–377,
May 2007.

[SPL06]

F.C. Santos, J.M. Pacheco, and T. Lenaerts. Evolutionary dynamics
of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 103(9):3490, 2006.

[SRAA+ 11]

N. Salazar, J.A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, J.L. Arcos, A. Peleteiro, and J.C.
Burguillo-Rial. Emerging cooperation on complex networks. In The
10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, pages 669–676, 2011.

[SS10]

O. Sen and S. Sen. Eﬀects of social network topology and options on
norm emergence. Lecture Notes on Computer Science, 6069:211–222,
2010.

[SSK05]

P. Stone, R.S. Sutton, and G. Kuhlmann. Reinforcement learning for
robocup soccer keepaway. Adaptive Behavior, 13(3):165, 2005.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[SSP08]

155

F.C. Santos, M.D. Santos, and J.M. Pacheco. Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games. Nature,
454(7201):213–216, 2008.

[SST95]

A. Schaerf, Y. Shoham, and M. Tennenholtz. Adaptive load balancing: A study in multi-agent learning. arXiv preprint cs/9505102,
1995.

[ST97]

Y. Shoham and M. Tennenholtz. On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, analysis, and simulations. Artiﬃcial Intelligence,
94(1):139–166, 1997.

[Sto07]

P. Stone. Multiagent learning is not the answer. It is the question.
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 171(7):402–405, 2007.

[Sun01]

R. Sun. Individual action and collective function: From sociology to
multi-agent learning. Journal of Cognitive Systems Research, 2:1–3,
2001.

[SV00]

P. Stone and M. Veloso. Multiagent systems: A survey from a machine learning perspective. Autonomous Robots, 8(3):345–383, 2000.

[SWMR99]

J. Schneider, W.K. Wong, A. Moore, and M. Riedmiller. Distributed
value functions. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 371–378, 1999.

[SXWP11]

A. Szolnoki, N.G. Xie, C. Wang, and M. Perc. Imitating emotions
instead of strategies in spatial games elevates social welfare. Europhysics Letters, 96(3):38002, 2011.

[SZ08]

S. Seuken and S. Zilberstein. Formal models and algorithms for decentralized decision making under uncertainty. Autonomous Agents
and Multi-Agent Systems, 17(2):190–250, 2008.

[Tan93]

M. Tan. Multi-agent reinforcement learning: Independent vs. cooperative agents. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
on Machine Learning, volume 337, 1993.

[Tes03]

G. Tesauro. Extending q-learning to general adaptive multi-agent
systems. In Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), 2003.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[TJDB07]

156

G. Tesauro, N.K. Jong, R. Das, and M.N. Bennani. On the use
of hybrid reinforcement learning for autonomic resource allocation.
Cluster Computing, 10(3):287–299, 2007.

[TM11]

S. Tanabe and N. Masuda. Evolution of cooperation facilitated by
reinforcement learning with adaptive aspiration levels. Journal of
Theoretical Biology, 293:151–160, 2011.

[Tou00]

C.F. Touzet. Robot awareness in cooperative mobile robot learning.
Autonomous Robots, 8(1):87–97, 2000.

[TP07]

K. Tuyls and S. Parsons. What evolutionary game theory tells us
about multiagent learning. Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 171(7):406–416,
2007.

[TT13]

L. Torrey and M. Taylor. Teaching on a budget: agents advising
agents in reinforcement learning. In Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems,
pages 1053–1060, 2013.

[VC10]

V. Vassiliades and C. Christodoulou. Multiagent reinforcement learning in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma: Fast cooperation through
evolved payoﬀs. In 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural
Networks, pages 1–8, 2010.

[VCC09]

V. Vassiliades, A. Cleanthous, and C. Christodoulou. Multiagent
reinforcement learning with spiking and non-spiking agents in the
iterated prisoners dilemma. Artiﬁcial Neural Networks–ICANN 2009,
pages 737–746, 2009.

[VCC11]

V. Vassiliades, A. Cleanthous, and C. Christodoulou. Multiagent
reinforcement learning: Spiking and nonspiking agents in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma. Neural Networks, IEEE Transactions on, (99):1–
15, 2011.

[VDHHK+ 07] H. Van Den Herik, D. Hennes, M. Kaisers, K. Tuyls, and K. Verbeeck.
Multi-agent learning dynamics: A survey. Cooperative Information
Agents XI, pages 36–56, 2007.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[Ven07]

157

D. Vengerov. A reinforcement learning approach to dynamic resource allocation. Engineering Applications of Artiﬁcial Intelligence,
20(3):383–390, 2007.

[VMS09]

D. Villatoro, N. Malone, and S. Sen. Eﬀects of interaction history and
network topology on rate of convention emergence. In Proceedings of
3rd International Workshop on Emergent Intelligence on Networked
Agents, 2009.

[VSMS11]

D. Villatoro, J. Sabater-Mir, and S. Sen. Social instruments for robust
convention emergence. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint
Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, pages 420–425, 2011.

[VSSM09]

D. Villatoro, S. Sen, and J. Sabater-Mir. Topology and memory eﬀect
on convention emergence. In Proc. 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Agent Technology.,
pages 233–240, 2009.

[WD92]

C.J.C.H. Watkins and P. Dayan. Q-learning. Machine Learning,
8(3):279–292, May 1992.

[Wei99]

G. Weiss. Multiagent systems: a modern approach to distributed artiﬁcial intelligence. The MIT press, 1999.

[WFS12]

Z. Wu, H. Fang, and Y. She. Weighted average prediction for improving consensus performance of second-order delayed multi-agent
systems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part
B: Cybernetics, 42(5):1501–1508, Oct. 2012.

[Woo08]

M. Wooldridge. An introduction to multiagent systems. Wiley, 2008.

[WS98]

D.J. Watts and S.H. Strogatz. Collective dynamics of small-world
networks. Nature, 393(6684):440–442, 1998.

[WS02]

X. Wang and T. Sandholm. Reinforcement learning to play an optimal nash equilibrium in team markov games. Advances in neural
information processing systems, 15:1571–1578, 2002.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[WvH08]

158

M.A. Wiering and H. van Hasselt. Ensemble algorithms in reinforcement learning. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics, 38(4):930–936, 2008.

[WW06]

P. Wang and T. Wang. Adaptive routing for sensor networks using
reinforcement learning. In The 6th IEEE International Conference
on Computer and Information Technology (CIT’06), pages 219–219.
IEEE, 2006.

[WXZL11]

J. Wu, X. Xu, P. Zhang, and C. Liu. A novel multi-agent reinforcement learning approach for job scheduling in grid computing. Future
Generation Computer Systems, 27(5):430–439, 2011.

[YG04]

E. Yang and D. Gu. Multiagent reinforcement learning for multirobot systems: A survey. Department Computer Science, University
Essex, Colchester, UK, Technical Report CSM-404, 2004.

[You96]

H.P. Young. The economics of convention. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 10(2):105–122, Mar. 1996.

[YRZ13]

C. Yu, F. Ren, and M. Zhang. An adaptive bilateral negotiation
model based on bayesian learning. In Complex Automated Negotiations: Theories, Models, and Software Competitions, pages 75–93.
Springer, 2013.

[YZBI10]

D. Ye, M. Zhang, Q. Bai, and T. Ito. Self-organisation in an agent
network via multiagent q-learning. In Knowledge Management and
Acquisition for Smart Systems and Services, pages 14–26. Springer,
2010.

[YZR11]

C. Yu, M. Zhang, and F. Ren. Coordinated learning for loosely coupled agents with sparse interactions. AI 2011: Advances in Artiﬁcial
Intelligence, pages 392–401, 2011.

[YZR12]

C. Yu, M. Zhang, and F. Ren. Coordinated learning by exploiting
sparse interaction in multiagent systems. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 2012.

159

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[YZRL13]

C. Yu, M. Zhang, F. Ren, and X. Luo. Emergence of social norms
through collective learning in networked agent societies. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-agent Systems, pages 475–482, 2013.

[ZAL09]

C. Zhang, S. Abdallah, and V. Lesser. Integrating organizational control into multi-agent learning. In Proceedings of The 8th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume
2, pages 757–764, 2009.

[ZL09]

Y. Zhang and J. Leezer. Emergence of social norms in complex networks. In International Conference on Computational Science and
Engineering (CSE’09), volume 4, pages 549–555. IEEE, 2009.

[ZLA10]

C. Zhang, V. Lesser, and S. Abdallah. Self-organization for coordinating decentralized reinforcement learning. In Proceedings of the
9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems: volume 1, pages 739–746, 2010.

[ZLS09]

C. Zhang, V. Lesser, and P. Shenoy. A multi-agent learning approach
to online distributed resource allocation. In Proceedings of the 21st
international jont conference on Artiﬁcal intelligence, pages 361–366.
Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 2009.

[ZW12]

Y. Zhang and Y. Wu.

How behaviors spread in dynamic social

networks. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory,
18(4):419–444, 2012.

